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ABSTRACT 
Executive pay research has traditionally focused on salary, severance payments and long-
term incentives.  A systematic rigorous empirical examination of short-term annual 
bonuses is lacking.  To address this omission, this research empirically examines the 
relationship between short-term bonuses and firm performance (TSR and EPS), in the 
UK.  It also considers the association between form of bonus payment (i.e. cash/shares), 
and type of performance target (i.e. hard/soft and simple/complex) with bonus and 
performance.  Furthermore, firm size and particular corporate governance factors are 
included (i.e. NED ratio on remuneration committee, CEO presence on nominations 
committee, CEO/Chair duality, tenure, and power) to examine their relationship with 
bonus value. 
 
From a sample of 299 firms listed in the FTSE-350 (1,542 executives including 300 
CEOs), this study uses two competing theories (i.e. agency and power theory) to provide 
a fuller explanation of the subtleties of the pay-performance relation.  The main findings 
support the agency view, since bonus is positively and significantly associated with 
financial performance.  As with previous studies on executive bonus pay this association 
remains weak.  By implication, power theory is not supported.    
 
However, other findings indicate: (1) although firm size may change, the proportion of 
bonus pay relative to salary does not vary.  This suggests that large and small firms pay 
out proportionally similar bonuses; (2) cash bonuses are not positively related with the 
total value of bonus pay, suggesting that they are not any more open to abuse than other 
methods of compensation, as agency theory would predict; (3) cash bonuses encourage 
short-term achievement, as predicted by power theory; (4) consistent with agency theory, 
share-based bonuses are positively related to bonus pay and performance (weak 
association), suggesting that share-based bonuses (rather than cash bonuses) may be 
more effective at aligning pay with performance; (5) in line with agency theory, 
transparency (i.e. hard (external/published) and simple bonus conditions) is positively 
associated with performance, providing support for the alignment between principals’ 
and agents’ interests; (6) detailed bonus scheme characteristics are generally insensitive 
to performance and are becoming increasingly softer (i.e. more internal/unspecified 
targets) and complex (i.e. multiple targets).  On the power view, these may create 
opportunities for executives to mask weak performance and extract greater rents; (7) 
governance factors are insignificant, suggesting that efforts to improve this area may be 
wasted, since they mainly leave pay-performance sensitivities unaffected.  However, 
based on power theory, weak governance may foster the rise of powerful executives and 
widen the pay-performance gap.  Therefore, it is suggested that close monitoring of 
executive pay must continue and shareholders should remain vigilant.   
 
Keywords: executive pay, bonuses, deferred pay, firm performance, performance targets, 
firm size, corporate governance, strategic human resource management, agency theory, 
self-serving/power model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The magnitude and determination of all the elements of executive pay is a controversial 
subject everywhere, with emotive language about ‘fat cats’ countered by the argument 
that executive pay is simply a market-clearing price (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).  
Therefore, this thesis examines one neglected element of executive pay, the relationship 
between executive annual bonus pay, its detailed characteristics, and firm performance in 
the UK.  It is acknowledged that the pay and performance relationship is always 
complex.  However, when examining this association it is necessary to consider its 
detailed characteristics.  These include the form in which the bonus is paid (i.e. 
cash/shares), the type of performance targets used and the governance practices in 
operation.  In general, this study argues that short-term bonus pay, albeit weakly, is 
closely associated with financial performance and that transparency in the form of 
external or published targets that are easy to communicate, understand and monitor are 
associated with the best results. 
 
This chapter, therefore, introduces and defines the main concepts and theories relating to 
pay and performance, which are developed further in the literature review (see chapter 
2), and has six sections.  Section 1.1 provides an overview of executive compensation 
and how human resources support a corporation’s strategic focus.  It outlines specific 
features of corporate governance (CG) and briefly indicates how some of the governance 
policies, practices and structures influence executive pay.  Section 1.2 highlights two 
prominent theoretical models, which will be used to analyse the pay-performance 
relationship.  Section 1.3, based on existing research, provides a context for the executive 
pay and firm performance relationship and outlines the theory behind performance 
targets and measures.  Section 1.4 introduces the concept of incentives and their various 
forms, with particular attention on the value of the annual bonus.  Section 1.5 highlights 
the main aim of the research and provides some justification for it.  Finally, section 1.6 
provides an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
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1.1. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, CORPORATE STRATEGY, HUMAN 
RESOURCES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Executive compensation is a large and diverse topic that is both complex and emotive 
(Murphy, 1986b) and, despite a topic of intense interest and controversy, has generated 
an abundant but disjointed and inconclusive literature (J. Kerr & Bettis, 1987; Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1988).  As a result, decades of work have been unable to show an 
unambiguous direct link between executive pay and firm performance (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990), or have demonstrated a weak or statistically insignificant relationship 
(Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  Nevertheless, executive pay is potentially a powerful 
incentive alignment mechanism that can impact upon firm performance (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). 
 
In his seminal work on executive compensation, Gomez-Mejia (1994) states that 
“multiple factors contribute to this empirical morass” (p. 174).  He suggests that this 
weakness may be due to the various paradigms and traditions that influence the 
interpretation of data, the fact that accounting formulas are not homogenous across firms, 
the difficulty associated with calculating subjective assessments of executive behaviour, 
the impact of lag effects as a result of deferred payments, the use of crude proxies to 
measure executive behaviour and, finally, variables which are expected to influence 
executive pay tend to be highly correlated which poses a collinearity problem that makes 
it difficult to isolate the unique effect of a single factor.    
 
Previous empirical research has been problematical in a number of ways. First, concerns 
have centred primarily on the sheer size of the executive’s pay package and the gains 
from share option schemes that are difficult to value (Blair, 1995; Greenbury, 1995).  
However, besides ‘excessive’ pay in absolute terms, research has begun to explore 
whether executives have ‘earned’ their rewards through firm performance improvements.  
Secondly, there has been a preoccupation with American data (Barkema & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998).  Thirdly, most of the work has focused entirely on the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) or highest paid director (Ezzamel & Watson, 2002) and, finally, it has 
tended to neglect short-term pay.   
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Essentially, existing research carried out by academics has focused on the relationship 
between aggregate executive pay and firm performance (see Main, Bruce, & Buck, 1996; 
Veliyath, 1999; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002), whereas remuneration consultants, like 
Incomes Data Services (IDS), have concentrated on the individual elements of executive 
pay.  Furthermore, much of this research has been preoccupied with long-term, share-
based incentive schemes as opposed to short-term rewards such as the annual bonus.  As 
a result, few, if any, UK studies have examined the association between annual bonus 
pay, as a single feature of executive compensation, and firm performance.  This short-
term focus reflects part of this study’s unique contribution. 
 
At the same time, executive compensation has emerged as a significant theme within the 
strategic management literature and, according to Andrews (1980), a firm’s corporate 
strategy determines the kind of economic and human organisation a firm is or intends to 
be, and the nature of the economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to 
its shareholders, employees, customers, and communities.  Corporate strategy is an 
organisational process that operates on different levels, affects the whole enterprise, and 
is defined as, “the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its 
objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving 
those goals, and defines the range of business the company is to pursue” (Andrews, 1987, 
p. 13).  Of all the components of strategic choice, “the combination of human resources 
and competence is most crucial to success” (Andrews, 1987, p. 20).  
 
The theory, research and practice of human resource management (HRM) has evolved 
considerably over the past century and experienced a major transformation in both form 
and function over the past two decades (Ferris, Hochwarter, Buckley, Harrell-Cook, & 
Frink, 1999).  Furthermore, Guest (1998) and Storey (2001) comment that the 1980s 
were a turning point in HRM development, which has progressed from a maintenance 
function to one of strategic importance.  Consequently, far from being marginalized, the 
HRM function has become recognised as a central business concern (Dulebohn, Ferris, & 
Stodd, 1995; Storey, 2001). 
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Significantly, the notion that firm performance will be enhanced by the alignment of 
HRM practices with corporate strategy has gained considerable currency in recent years 
(Wright & McMahan, 1992).  Consequently, this process of linking human resources to 
the broader longer-term and strategic needs of the firm is the essence of what is known as 
strategic human resource management (SHRM) (Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 1991; Schuler 
& Huber, 1993), and defined as, “the pattern of planned human resource deployments 
and activities intended to enable a firm achieve its goals” (Wright & McMahan, 1992, p. 
298).  Essentially, SHRM specialises in the management of people and emphasises that 
people are a pre-eminent organisational resource that determines the ultimate strengths 
and weaknesses of an organisation and is key to achieving outstanding performance and 
also critical in achieving sustainable competitive advantage (Huselid, 1995; Delaney & 
Huselid, 1996; I. Smith, 1996; Gratton, 1998; Legge, 2001; Skinner, Saunders, & 
Thornhill, 2002; Colbert, 2004).   
 
The SHRM model recognises that people are central to improving firm performance.  It 
is also acknowledged that reward management is a central theme in HRM (Poole & 
Jenkins, 1998) and a necessary management tool for sustaining and nurturing work 
motivation.  Consequently, rewarding employee effort and performance effectively can 
have a positive impact on firm performance (Huselid, 1995; Huselid & Becker, 1997; 
Guest, Michie, Conway, & Sheehan, 2003).   In addition to the SHRM issues mentioned, 
CG factors also contribute to, and influence, the pay-performance relationship and are 
now considered. 
  
Donaldson (1990) describes CG as the structures whereby managers at the organisation’s 
apex are controlled through the board of directors, its associated structures, executive 
incentives, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding.  Consequently, CG has 
become an important determinant in shaping executive pay which, as one part of a 
company’s CG strategy, is supposed to align executive and owner interests through 
salary, bonuses, and long-term incentives such as stock options (Hitt, Ireland, & 
Hoskisson, 1996; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002).  According to Bushman and Smith 
(2003), CG motivates managers to maximise shareholder value.  At the same time, of 
course, some critics assert that the notion that boards of directors hire executives is 
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mainly a sham, when executives themselves hold most power within the firm (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2004).   
 
Many of the major CG variables must be interrelated and each is discussed in greater 
depth in the literature review (see chapter 2, sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.6).  However, in brief, 
the variables to be considered include: (a) the impact that institutional investors, as one 
type of shareholder, have in terms of maintaining strong CG; (b) the supervisory and 
monitoring arrangements introduced by shareholders to reduce executive excess.  This 
involves examining the impact of the board of directors as a CG mechanism and in turn 
the composition of the remuneration and nomination committees and the subsequent ratio 
of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs); (c) the impact of the market for corporate control 
and the executive labour market as pure market forces that discipline executives to act in 
the interests of the firms’ owners; and (d) executive power, e.g. through CEO/Chair 
duality or prolonged tenure on the board. 
 
In summary, executive pay makes a potentially powerful contribution to improving firm 
performance, and existing research overlooks the possible bonus pay-performance 
relationship.  Similarly, existing research neglects UK data and focuses, predominantly, 
on the CEO.  However, rewarding people effectively has become a crucial HRM tool in 
achieving corporate success.  In addition, it is recognised that for a firm to sustain a 
competitive edge and be successful, monitoring the pay-performance relationship, 
through appropriate governance structures, may be of value to shareholders.  Again, in 
relation to annual bonuses, this is an area of research that has generally been overlooked.   
 
The next section will outline the theoretical models used to underpin this research. 
 
1.2. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: AN INTRODUCTION  
Unlike other studies, this thesis will use two prominent theories gleaned from the 
executive pay literature, agency theory and the self-serving management/power 
perspective, in order to fully capture and explain the relationship between bonus pay and 
firm performance.  This dual approach is supported by numerous academics who suggest 
that compensating employees is far more intricate than is represented in the standard 
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agency model (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), and that one theoretical perspective is 
insufficient to fully explain how compensation relates to organisational performance 
(Brown, Sturman, & Simmering, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, according to J. R. Platt (1964), testing opposing hypotheses is important for 
strong inference, and can generate a set of observations that permits researchers to 
“decide between two alternative theories, both of which according to present knowledge 
are quite likely” (Stinchcombe, 1983, p. 25).  In addition, a simultaneous consideration of 
contradictory theories can potentially deepen understanding of CEO-board and pay-
performance issues (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  A brief outline of the theoretical 
perspectives to be included in this study will follow. 
 
Agency theory is often regarded as the dominant theoretical framework for examining 
the effects of contingent pay in general (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and has its 
roots embedded in Berle and Means’ (1932) influential statement about the divorce of 
ownership from control and self-interested managers (Zajac & Westphal, 1995).  
Nevertheless, agency theory would argue that the association between bonus pay and 
performance might be strong and positive because of its potential to contribute to the 
integration and alignment of interests between the company’s shareholder principals and 
executive agents. 
 
Alternatively, the self-serving management hypothesis argues that executives are self-
serving and opportunistic and, when given the necessary latitude, will participate in 
dysfunctional behaviour.  This behaviour is termed managerial opportunism or moral 
hazard and results in a divergence of interests and lack of goal congruence between the 
company’s owners and executives (Holmstrom, 1979; Veliyath, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 
2001; J. S. Miller, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).   
 
Closely associated with the self-serving management perspective, the managerial power 
model is heavily concerned with the separation of ownership and control (Garen, 1994).  
This refers to a situation where power and control of the corporation has shifted away 
from the common stockholders and, subsequently, ownership is becoming more 
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dispersed and control more concentrated (Berle & Means, 1991).  This separation, 
therefore, has weakened many of the checks and balances that owners once exercised 
over management and with this rather unconstrained power, management may pursue its 
own interests, with some disregard for the welfare of the owners (Berle & Means, 1991; 
Werner & Tosi, 1995; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).  The relation between the value of bonus 
pay and firm performance, on this view, may be weakly positive or even negative. 
 
Both of these competing perspectives will be used to capture the intricacies associated 
with pay and performance.  Each has implications for executive pay and will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  The next section will introduce the pay-
performance relationship and performance targets in general. 
 
1.3. EXECUTIVE PAY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: AN OUTLINE                  
It has been argued that firm size is the most compelling explanation for absolute 
differences in executive pay (Berle & Means, 1991).  Many of the earlier studies (see 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988; Hill & Phan, 1991; Gregg, Machin, & Szymanski, 1992; 
Main & Johnston, 1993; McKnight, 1996; Cosh & Hughes, 1997; Conyon, 1998; Benito 
& Conyon, 1999; Laing & Weir, 1999; Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001) examining this 
executive pay and firm size relation would support this claim.  However, there is a small 
body of research which opposes this view (see Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Lambert, 
Larcker, & Weigelt, 1991; Murphy, 1998) and argues that executive pay is not associated 
with firm size.  They suggest that factors other than firm size explain the majority of 
variance in executive compensation e.g. CG variables.  In this thesis, however, size will 
be rather de-emphasised by the use of a transformed, relative measure of bonus as a 
proportion of total cash pay. 
 
Significantly, much of the existing research on pay and performance is mixed.  However, 
in general, the research is indicative of a weak association between executive pay and 
firm performance (Main, 1991; Conyon & Leech, 1993; Ezzamel & Watson, 1998; 
Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999a; Laing & Weir, 1999; McKnight & Tomkins, 1999; 
Conyon & Sadler, 2001). 
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Essentially, a company and its management are held accountable for their actions by 
various groups of stakeholders who impose standards defined by their interests (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992).  Therefore, firm performance (variously measured) typically becomes 
the principal determinant of compensation (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992).  Consequently, 
regulators like the Association of British Insurers (ABI) recommend that executive pay in 
general, and annual bonuses in particular, should be linked to performance, emphasising 
that performance targets should be related to what individuals can influence (Greenbury, 
1995).  They should also be tailored to the requirements of the business, reviewed 
regularly to ensure that they remain appropriate (ABI, 2002) and, ultimately, should be 
relevant, challenging and designed to enhance the business (The Combined Code, 2000; 
ABI, 2002).   
 
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) suggest that all performance related pay (PRP) can be 
a powerful motivator of human action, and may create a commonality of interest between 
principal and agent (Forbes & Watson, 1993).  According to Schuler and Huber (1993), it 
is argued that PRP is necessary for company survival in a volatile business environment 
and represents a move away from the traditional view of rewards as incentives and 
towards rewards as total pay systems, which are sensitive and responsive to company and 
employee needs.  However, one of the main criticisms of executive pay is that rewards 
fail to reflect performance (Charkham, 2001), and the title of an influential recent text on 
executive reward is ‘Pay Without Performance’ (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
 
Standards for corporate performance refer to the explicit and implicit yardsticks used by 
stakeholders to evaluate the performance of a company (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  
These may be stock market-based performance measures which are a more holistic 
evaluation of firm performance and less amenable to manipulation (Healy, 1985), 
internally generated earnings-based bonus schemes, which are to some extent under an 
executives’ control and vulnerable to manipulation, and internal, non-financial 
performance measures which are even more prone to executive manipulation and are 
rarely subject to public verification (Ittner, Larcker, & Rajan, 1997).  This raises the 
obvious research question, which will be returned to later: will internal, soft targets that 
are easier to manipulate be associated with larger bonuses? 
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Focusing on one performance measure can often lead to agents ignoring alternative un-
rewarded objectives (S. Kerr, 1975).  As a result, Feltham and Xie (1994) suggest that 
increasing the number of performance measures may, first, lead to a rise in the set of 
viable actions, which may increase the likelihood that a more preferred action will be 
implemented and, secondly, may reduce the risk imposed on the agent to induce a 
particular action.  Essentially, a multi-dimensional performance measure system may 
represent a more accurate definition of the organisation’s goals (Kaplan & Atkinson, 
1998). 
 
However, it is recommended that few measures, which are both clear and simple as well 
as easy to understand, manage and communicate, should be incorporated into 
performance target design (Lingle & Schiemann, 1996; Ho & McKay, 2002; Franco & 
Bourne, 2003).  Consequently, it may be suggested that using simple targets can heighten 
CEO focus, facilitate the monitoring of CEO action, and the identification of CEO 
achievement.  Simplicity, therefore, has the potential to limit CEO discretion and reduce 
the pay-performance gap.   
 
In contrast, multi-tasking agents may misallocate effort across tasks (Holmstrom & 
Milgrom, 1991) or over-complicate the decision-making process (Yearta, Maitlis, & 
Briner, 1995).  Consequently, combining external and internal performance targets may 
be associated with a heightened degree of complexity, which has the potential to hamper 
monitoring strategies, and limit the ability to identify achievement.  Complexity, 
therefore, may dilute CEO incentives, encourage CEO discretion, and widen the pay-
performance gap.  As a result, will multiple, complex measures that are difficult to 
monitor be associated with larger bonuses? 
 
Having outlined the pay-performance relationship and discussed performance targets and 
its associated variations, the next section will examine the value of incentive plans and 
the annual bonuses in particular. 
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1.4. INCENTIVE PLANS AND ANNUAL BONUSES 
Incentive plans are an integral part of management control since it has been widely 
recognised that incentives, as contributors to income and as measures of recognition of 
performance, are significant motivating factors for executives (Sarin & Winkler, 1980).  
They are not a gift (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989) nor the ‘gravy’ on top of an executive’s 
base salary (Mitchell, Lewin, & Lawler, 1990), but serve as recognition of managerial 
competence (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) and are an important precursor to effective 
monitoring (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
 
Extrinsic rewards can have a significant impact on performance (Vroom, 1964).  As a 
result, money has become one of the most powerful motivators (Schuler & Huber, 1993), 
with some scholars claiming that an executives’ motivation and behaviour is a function 
of their pay package (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  Consequently, money matters 
more than most people would like to admit.  However, it is also true that intrinsic 
psychological rewards may be just as, if not more, significant.  Nevertheless, this study 
focuses on extrinsic rewards, which examines the relationship between monetary 
compensation and firm performance.  Therefore, although recognising the value of 
intrinsic rewards, it would be outside of this study’s remit to examine this area of reward 
and, hence, has been excluded. 
   
Returning to financial incentives, executive compensation arrangements in practice are 
diverse and encompass disparate elements including deferred pay such as stock options 
as well as short-term pay such as bonuses (Lewellen, Loderer, & Martin, 1987).  A 
deferred compensation strategy is used as a means of ‘bonding’ executives to the firm 
(Eaton & Rosen, 1983), and consists of pensions, stock options and other long-term 
incentive plans (LTIPs).  Stock-based incentives may offer a more efficient trade-off 
between risk and incentives and, subsequently, may be more effective at aligning the 
interests of the manager with that of the owner. 
 
Finally, one alternative and important component of executive remuneration is the annual 
bonus, with most firms using short-term annual bonus plans to compensate their 
executives (Conyon, Gregg, & Machin, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Ittner 
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et al., 1997).  Annual bonuses emphasise short-term performance and tend to use cash 
(rather than stock) as the mode of payment (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998).  They also 
represent the most direct and immediate link between managerial actions and 
consequences since cash incentives generate no further risk or commitment on the part of 
the executive since the value of a cash bonus is not affected by how well the firm does in 
the future (Rajagopalan, 1996; Murphy, 2001).   
 
Short-term bonuses may, however, be notoriously susceptible to manipulation or 
tampering (Larker, 1983; Healy, 1985) and, according to Grant (2003), have played a 
large part in the rise of executive compensation.  IDS (1993), for example, reported that 
in 1979 only 8% of large UK companies had an annual bonus scheme for their top 
executives and by 1993 almost all companies had some form of annual bonus scheme for 
their executives. 
 
Bonus pay is argued to be an old and effective way to improve organisational 
performance and represents rewards for past actions or made to induce future 
contributions (Prasad, 1974; Lawler, 1990).  However, regulators recommend that 
executives should not be automatically entitled to bonuses nor should it become a 
guaranteed element of remuneration (Greenbury, 1995; ABI, 2002).  Essentially, bonuses 
should be lower when individual performance is poor (ABI, 2002).  
  
Bonuses, regardless of ability, position and promotion prospects, may motivate 
individuals to be more productive (Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002).  Additionally, bonus-
based incentives may be more significant at higher levels in the organisation since the 
probability of future promotion is lower (Baker et al., 1988; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 
1997).  They are a means to reward superior performance as well as compensating for 
heightened responsibility and pressure, and for recruiting and retaining exceptional talent 
(Vogt, 1995; Joyce, 1999; Sturman & Short, 2000; Osborne, 2001).   
 
In theory, therefore, executive bonuses are an important and potentially effective form of 
short-term executive incentive.  However, due to academic researchers largely ignoring 
bonus pay, this claim lacks rigorous empirical support.  Consequently, this thesis 
 12
attempts to rectify this omission and the following section will introduce the primary aim 
of the research. 
 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Using an independently constructed database of companies listed on the FTSE-350, the 
main aim of this study is to investigate the question, what is the relationship between 
executive bonus pay, its detailed characteristics (i.e. form of payment, performance 
target type, firm size, and governance mechanisms), and firm performance in the UK?  
The importance of this question is discussed in sections 1.1 to 1.4.  However, to 
summarise this discussion, four points are made.  First, most empirical studies on 
executive pay have used American data or focused on American contexts (Barkema & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and there is little research on executive bonuses in the UK.  
Secondly, due to the preoccupation of existing research with aggregate or long-term pay 
(see Veliyath, 1999; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002), there is a real need to focus on short-
term annual bonuses, which have been relatively neglected.  Thirdly, in contrast to much 
of the research that focuses on the highest paid executive or CEO only (Ezzamel & 
Watson, 2002), the present study has a much wider scope and includes the top tier of 
management (i.e. the CEO and executive directors).  Finally, this thesis for the first time 
addresses the detailed characteristics of executive bonus schemes in relation to the form 
in which the bonus is received and the type of performance targets used.   
 
With this research question and the general approach in mind, the next section will 
provide an overview of the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.6. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Following this introduction of the main concepts and theories employed, the structure of 
the thesis is as follows. 
 
Chapter 2, the literature review, reports an established link between bonus pay and firm 
performance, in both the UK and America and discusses this relationship from two 
prominent theoretical propositions that have emerged from the executive pay literature, 
including agency theory and the self-serving management/power perspective.  In 
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addition, the chapter examines how a firm’s corporate strategy, human resources, CG 
policy and practices, the form in which the bonus is received, and the type of 
performance targets and measures used in annual bonus design, interrelate with bonus 
pay in the UK.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the research hypotheses that will direct the investigation.  This chapter 
develops a set of testable hypotheses, which examine the impact of firm performance, 
firm size, performance targets and measures, payment types, as well as aspects of CG on 
bonus payments.  These governance elements consist of various features of the board of 
directors and include the composition of the remuneration committee in terms of NED 
ratio, CEO presence on the nominations committee, CEO/Chair duality, executive tenure 
and power.   
 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological considerations of the research.  It outlines the 
ontological and epistemological approach and the methods used to collect the data.  The 
chapter also specifies variables, models and tests to analyse the data.  
 
Chapter 5 reports the main statistical findings for the executive director and CEO 
samples.  The results are divided into three sections with each segment becoming more 
sophisticated, progressing from descriptive analyses to single period multiple regressions 
and, finally, to panel regressions.   
 
Chapter 6 discusses the main findings of the thesis using the concepts and theories 
outlined in the literature review.  The two chosen theoretical models (agency theory and 
the self-serving management/power perspective) will again be used as the main 
framework for the presentation of results.   
 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings of chapters 5 and 6 and identifies the main limitations 
of the study as well as making recommendations for future research.  Finally, the chapter 
also offers some implications for policy regulation and for practitioners.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature relating to executive pay and company performance 
and has ten sections.  Sections 2.1 to 2.3 introduce the topic of employee compensation 
and how HRM supports a corporation’s strategic goals.  Section 2.4 examines the impact 
of CG practices and structures on executive pay.  Section 2.5 addresses two prominent 
theoretical models, which provide some explanation for the pay-performance 
relationship.  Section 2.6 reviews previous research, from both the UK and America, in 
relation to the impact of firm performance on executive compensation.  Section 2.7 
highlights additional factors that influence executive pay such as firm size.  Sections 2.8 
and 2.9 discuss the effect performance targets, measures, and incentives (in its various 
forms) have on firm performance, with particular attention on the value of the annual 
bonus.  Finally, section 2.10 summarises this chapter. 
 
2.1. EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION 
Compensation has a major role in modern perspectives on organisational control and its 
structure can be a powerful incentive alignment mechanism (Conlon & Parks, 1990; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  Schuler and Huber (1993) state that compensation has the 
potential to drive business by enhancing organisational competitiveness, survival and 
profitability.  Supplementing this assertion, Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) claim that 
compensation is one of the most important incentives that exist in organisations, and is 
likely to impact upon managerial decision making and strategy, both of which have clear 
implications for firm performance.  Fundamentally, compensation is a large and diverse 
topic which is enormously complex and emotive (Murphy, 1986b; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1989; Baron & Kreps, 1999; McKnight & Tomkins, 1999).    
 
According to Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan and Yiu (1999) a firm’s unique resource is its 
strategic leader and, in most cases, this is the CEO.  Consequently, the lead executive i.e. 
CEO, stands at the top of the corporate hierarchy and upholds an exalted position of 
supremacy who drives the corporation, maintains top executive authority, and serves as a 
custodian of corporate objectives (Charkham, 2001; Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003).  
Essentially, the CEO is often the most influential and visible leader in a firm and 
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recognised as the main strategist, whose pre-eminence is frequently reflected in their pay 
package (Charkham, 2001; Ezzamel & Watson, 2002; Combs & Skill, 2003). 
 
However, the analysis of compensation for executives below the very top of the 
corporate hierarchy is valuable because many strategic decisions are made by top 
managers of business units, as opposed to the corporate CEO (Lambert et al., 1991).  To 
further emphasise this point, Ezzamel and Watson (2002) claim that the limitation of 
previous research on executive pay is its predominant focus on the remuneration of the 
CEO or highest paid director to the exclusion of other board members.     
 
Therefore, the value of a CEO, or executive director, to a firm and their level of 
compensation depends on what they can reasonably be expected to contribute to firm 
performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988).  As a result, much of the research on 
executive compensation has been motivated by the concerns that have centred primarily 
on the sheer size of the lead executive’s pay package and the gains from share option 
schemes, which have often coincided with staff reductions and pay restraints for other 
staff (Blair, 1995; Greenbury, 1995).  Besides ‘excessive’ pay in absolute terms, research 
has been concerned with executives ‘earning’ their rewards through firm performance 
improvements.  However, existing research indicates that many academics have focused 
on the relationship between aggregate executive pay and company performance (see 
Main et al., 1996; Veliyath, 1999; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002), whereas remuneration 
consultants, like IDS, have concentrated on the individual elements of executive pay.  In 
addition, much of this research has been preoccupied with share-based incentives as 
opposed to short-term rewards like the annual bonus.   
 
Executive compensation has emerged as a significant theme within the strategic 
management literature and corporate strategy in general (Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2001).  
Nevertheless, executive pay remains one of the most heavily researched but least 
understood areas of management studies (Buck, Bruce, Main, & Udueni, 2003).  As a 
result, the next section highlights how important a firm’s human resource is in order to 
maintain a competitive advantage and to what extent this impacts upon corporate 
strategy. 
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2.2. CORPORATE STRATEGY 
As outlined in chapter 1, Andrews (1980) argues that a firm’s corporate strategy 
determines the kind of economic and human organisation a firm is or intends to be, and 
the nature of the economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its 
shareholders, employees, customers, and communities.  Strategy formulation is an 
organisational process that operates on multiple levels and is applicable to the whole 
enterprise.  Furthermore, of all the components of strategic choice including market 
opportunity, corporate competence and resources, personal values and aspirations, and 
acknowledged obligations to segments of society other than stockholders, the 
combination of human resources and competence is most crucial to the success of an 
enterprise (Andrews, 1987).  According to Purcell (1992), the single purpose of an 
organisation’s strategies is to enhance shareholder wealth.  However, opportunism 
remains the principal counter force to this alleged purpose.  The following section, 
therefore, develops the notion that a firm’s human resource is a significant strategic tool, 
which determines the strengths and weaknesses of an organisation and, when managed 
effectively, is central to the success of a firm. 
 
2.3. STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
The theory, research and practice of HRM has evolved considerably over the past century 
and experienced a major transformation in both form and function over the past two 
decades (Ferris et al., 1999).  Furthermore, Guest (1998) and Storey (2001) comment that 
the 1980s were a turning point in HRM development, which has progressed from a 
maintenance function to one of strategic importance.  Redman and Wilkinson (2001) add 
that the study of HRM has adopted a cross-functional approach and expanded its breadth 
of analysis beyond the staple concerns of selection, training, and reward.  They claim that 
SHRM has emerged as highly influential in this respect.   
  
According to Marchington and Grugulis (2000), HRM has a greater impact on 
productivity and profits than a range of other factors such as research and development.  
However, the empirical evidence supporting this argument has been limited.  First, 
Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) argue that there is little empirical evidence to 
suggest that SHRM directly influences organisational performance or competitive 
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advantage.  In contrast, Guest et al. (2003) found some evidence of an association 
between HRM and performance.  Significantly, they failed to provide any convincing 
indication that greater application of HRM will lead to an improvement in firm 
performance. 
 
The idea that firm performance will be enhanced by the alignment of HRM practices 
with corporate strategy has gained considerable currency in recent years (Wright & 
McMahan, 1992).  Consequently, this process of linking human resources to the broader 
longer-term and strategic needs of the firm is the essence of what is known as SHRM 
(Butler et al., 1991; Schuler & Huber, 1993).  SHRM is also referred to as macro-level 
HRM (Wright & McMahan, 1992; Huselid, 1995), and described as a management 
process consisting of internal human resource practices that are integrated and aligned 
with the organisation’s external corporate strategy (Torrington, Hall, & Taylor, 2002).  
Essentially, SHRM specialises in the management of people and, in conjunction with the 
resource-based view of the firm, emphasises that people are a pre-eminent organisational 
resource which determines the strengths and weaknesses of an organisation and who are 
key to achieving outstanding performance and critical in achieving sustainable 
competitive advantage (Huselid, 1995; Delaney & Huselid, 1996; I. Smith, 1996; 
Gratton, 1998; Larsen & Brewster, 2000; Legge, 2001; Redman & Wilkinson, 2001; 
Skinner et al., 2002; Colbert, 2004).  Figure 1 overleaf illustrates how a firm’s human 
resource may be a source of competitive advantage.    
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Figure 1. A model of the human resource as a source of sustained competitive advantage 
(Wright, McMahon, & McWilliams, 1994, p. 318).  
 
Scarce resources create entry barriers for firms that do not have them (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
Therefore, in order to maintain a competitive edge over market rivals, it is imperative 
that organisation’s ensure that their human resources are rare, valuable, inimitable, and 
non-substitutable (Barney, 1991).  Consequently, an organisation’s continued success 
and long-term survival in a global and hypercompetitive (D'Aveni, 1994) business 
environment is a function of its internal and unique competitive resources (Hoskisson et 
al., 1999; Storey, 2001).   
 
Far from being marginalized, HRM is an important area for debate and practice in 
employment and personnel management (Bacon, Ackers, Storey, & Coates, 1996).  It has 
also become recognised as a central business concern, evolving into a strategic partner 
and sharing comparable boardroom status with disciplines such as accounting and 
marketing (Dulebohn et al., 1995; Storey, 2001).  However, it is acknowledged that this 
is not a reality for all companies but improvements have been made in the last ten years.  
For example, human resource issues are now often represented by maths formulas, which 
are then documented in the company’s annual report.  Essentially, this strategy of placing 
workers at the hub of human resource policy concerns and viewing them as means rather 
than objects of production is an approach likened to the ‘soft’ HRM model (Guest, 1999).  
This model is juxtaposed with the ‘hard’ HRM model which adopts a rational approach 
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to managing employees viewing workers as another economic factor to exploit and a cost 
to be controlled and minimised (Guest, 1999).   
 
While SHRM theory strongly advocates a strategic role for human resources in business, 
empirical evidence supporting, unequivocally, a link between HRM practice and firm 
performance has thus far been inconclusive.  Part of the problem in drawing such links 
relate to the range of other factors that may also influence firm performance.  Therefore, 
the next section examines additional governance factors that are also known to influence 
pay and performance. 
 
2.4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A loose description of CG is provided on page 4 but, more rigorously, Blair (1995) 
defines CG  as, “the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that 
determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control 
is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are 
allocated” (p. 3). 
  
According to Masson (1971), executives that feel safe from market and shareholder 
pressures do not need to be as effective at maximising profit in contrast to those 
executives who are acutely aware of these pressures.  As a result, CG has become an 
important determinant in shaping executive pay which, as one part of a company’s CG 
strategy, attempts to align executive and owner interests through salary, bonuses and 
long-term incentives such as stock options (Hitt, Ireland et al., 1996; Carpenter & 
Sanders, 2002).  According to Bushman and Smith (2003), CG structures serve two 
purposes.  First, they ensure that minority shareholders receive reliable information about 
the value of the firm and the value of their investment and, secondly, they motivate 
managers to maximise shareholder value. 
 
Charkham (2001) states that two principles underlie CG in the UK.  First, executives 
must be free to drive their companies forward and, secondly, executives must exercise 
that freedom within a framework of effective accountability, which ensures that 
standards of competence are maintained.  According to Monks (2002), CG creates the 
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framework within which management takes place.  Figure 2 overleaf illustrates the many 
sources of CG, which have varying influences on the pay-performance relationship.  
Many of the major CG variables are interrelated and, subsequently, the following 
sequence has been segmented into four parts.  Section 2.4.1 examines the effect 
institutional investors as one type of shareholder has in terms of maintaining strong CG.  
Section 2.4.2 discusses the supervisory power and monitoring strategies implemented by 
shareholders in order to nullify executive excess.  This involves examining the impact of 
the board of directors as a CG mechanism and in turn the composition of the 
remuneration and nomination committees and subsequent ratio of NEDs.  Finally, 
sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 review the impact of the market for corporate control in the first 
instance and the executive labour market in the second, as pure market forces that 
discipline executives to act in the interests of the firms’ owners. 
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Figure 2. Revised ‘Berle-Means’ model of the corporation with institutional investors 
adapted from Blair (1995). 
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2.4.1. Institutional investors 
Institutional investors, who develop and act on shared values in order to directly 
influence corporate behaviour (Demb & Neubauer, 1992), have become the dominant 
shareholder in Anglo-American countries (Prodhan, 1993).  They are regarded as a 
potentially important force for improving CG in the UK (Prodhan, 1993) and should use 
their power and influence to ensure the implementation of best practice (Greenbury, 
1995).  They also represent a force strong enough to serve as an adequate check on the 
power of management thus limiting executive discretion and reducing agency problems 
(Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) and, therefore, should be more proactive in the use of 
their voting rights (Hampel, 1998). 
 
However, Mayer (2000) argues that institutional investors, in general, prefer ‘exit’ (i.e. 
selling shares) to ‘voice’ (i.e. challenging management) and are reluctant to intervene 
unless there is very clear evidence of managerial failure.  Despite this, pressure from 
external investors through frequent consultations encourages executives to pursue value-
maximising investment policies (Bushman & Smith, 2003) and, according to Grant 
(2003), have been successful in leveraging their position and pressuring companies to 
take steps to improve firm performance and change practices that are not in the interest 
of their owners. 
   
According to Demb and Neubauer (1992), concentrated ownership can exert control and 
accept a longer-term perspective on firm performance.  However, some argue that the 
composition of a corporation’s equity holders has evolved from one of concentrated 
ownership to increasingly diffuse ownership, which creates a free-rider problem in 
corporate control.  In this case, no individual owner is willing to invest in the costs of 
monitoring necessary to keep management acting in the owners’ interest and, therefore, 
makes it difficult to rely on ownership for guidance about priority interests (Boeker, 
1992; Demb & Neubauer, 1992).   
 
Consequently, the level and effect of monitoring will vary as a function of ownership 
dispersion (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989).  For example, atomistic stockholders will 
exercise less monitoring on account of a limited equity stake in the firm and due to the 
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difficulties associated with coordinating their actions so as to curtail self-serving 
executive behaviour (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  In contrast, Mayer (2000) would 
argue that coalitions of shareholders can control a significant fraction of shares in a 
company so that together they are able to exercise control, although he does acknowledge 
that such coalitions are infrequent.  In summary, concentrated ownership leads to 
stronger external influence on management while fragmentation tends to pacify 
shareholder voice (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
   
According to Holmstrom (1979), any monitoring is likely to result in benefits to the 
shareholders and is defined as the observation of an agent’s effort or outcomes.  
However, the quality of information obtained through monitoring (or supervising) 
depends on the resources committed to this activity as well as on the available 
monitoring technology (Harris & Raviv, 1979).  Nevertheless, this monitoring process is 
expected to prevent executives from making decisions that may have a negative impact 
on the welfare of a corporations owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Tosi, Katz, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1997).   
 
Consequently, some of the strategies implemented by firms in an attempt to curb 
executive opportunism include objective and subjective monitoring systems (Baker et al., 
1988).  A criticism of the objective monitoring system, highlighted by Baker (1992), is 
that it can induce unintentional and dysfunctional consequences whereby resourceful 
employees ‘game the system’, optimising actual instead of intended measures, thus 
focusing only on those aspects of performance that are rewarded.  Discretionary 
subjective monitoring systems also have their critics.  Some argue that they are difficult 
to implement due to the employees lack of trust and confidence in their superiors in 
making unbiased and accurate performance evaluations (Prendergast, 1999).  Superiors 
can be guilty of:  centrality bias, a practice where supervisors give ratings to all workers 
that vary little from the norm; or leniency bias, which implies that, supervisors overstate 
the performance of the poor performers (Prendergast, 1999).   
 
Research suggests that corporate ownership is becoming increasingly dispersed (Berle & 
Means, 1991) and, as a result, it becomes the board’s responsibility to ensure that 
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management behave in accordance with owner interests.  Consequently, the next section 
examines to what extent the board, as a governance mechanism, can control and manage 
executive behaviour and align pay with performance.  
 
2.4.2. Board of directors 
The board of directors is “the shareholders first line of defence against incompetent 
management” (Weisbach, 1988, p. 431).  They are the mechanism which holds 
professional management accountable to the owners, and are the most visible component 
of the CG system (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  Furthermore, Rodek (2004) adds that the 
board of directors are the shareholders’ advocate and watchdog on issues such as 
compliance and governance, and should act as constructive critics with a clear view of 
the external factors that may affect a company and its industry environment (Peterson, 
2004). 
   
Corporate boards arise endogenously as a control instrument and may be the 
representatives of all the important stakeholders in the firm, or they may support 
executives or just outside shareholders, but can only act as an effective governing and 
monitoring mechanism if it is independent (Fama, 1980; Williamson, 1988; Hart, 1995; 
Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996).  Essentially, boards are supposed to be the link 
between the shareholders who own the enterprise and the executives who manage it 
(Berle & Means, 1991; Short & Keasey, 1999).  However, Porac, Wade, and Pollock 
(1999) warn that the board operates under a dual role whereby they balance their 
fiduciary responsibilities to provide informative peer comparisons against the obvious 
self-protective motivations to make themselves and management look as good as 
possible.  Nevertheless, the board is of central importance in terms of CG, which consists 
of a group of elected individuals who actively support, advise and assist management 
(Shen, 2003).  It is their duty to ratify and monitor crucial strategic decisions, and control 
the corporations top executives in order to mitigate executives’ myopic decision focus 
and protect shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Bushman & Smith, 2001; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
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Demb and Neubauer (1992) suggest that through board deliberations executive 
perspectives are consolidated with outside perspectives in a ‘critical’ and ‘independent’ 
judgement of company performance.  They define ‘critical’ in terms of discriminating, 
which is dependent on having a sufficient knowledge of a situation in order to 
discriminate the important from temporary irregularities.  ‘Independent’, on the other 
hand, refers to being free from the bias of self-interest.  However, a large board may 
restrict opportunities for ‘real’ discussion at board meetings.  Yet, there is no perfect size.  
A board should be large enough to avoid becoming too intimate and small enough so that 
no one can escape the pressures of responsibility (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  
Nevertheless, authority for final decisions does rest with the board (Main et al., 1996).  
But of course, boards may monitor managers ineffectively.  Of particular interest is, first, 
how influential the NEDs that sit on the remuneration committee, which is a sub-
committee of the main board and responsible for reviewing and approving pay and 
benefits policies and objectives (Brountas, 2004), are at aligning executive pay with firm 
performance and curbing managerial opportunism?  Secondly, how independent is the 
nominations committee when the CEO has an active presence on the committee? 
 
In the first instance, the absence of a remuneration committee would appear to suggest 
that executives may be to some extent writing their own contracts with one hand and 
signing them with the other (Williamson, 1985).  This is reaffirmed by Main, O'Reilly, 
and Wade (1995) who found that the CEOs of companies without a remuneration 
committee were paid 24% more than CEOs whose board does have such a committee.  
Consequently, the board’s remuneration committee has an important and positive role in 
the exercise of boardroom control (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Conyon & Peck, 
1998).  It is the role of the remuneration committee to act as independent arbiters of 
executive compensation on behalf of shareholders, respond competitively towards market 
pressures, and design a compensation contract that ensures executives have an incentive 
to behave consonantly with shareholder interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Bruce & 
Buck, 1997; Conyon, 1997b; Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Conyon & Peck, 1998).   
 
In contrast, Main and Johnston (1993) found little evidence to support the contention that 
the remuneration committee is an extension of CG that tailors executive pay to produce 
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incentive effects that are to the benefit of shareholders.  In fact, results showed that 
executive pay was higher when a remuneration committee was present.  This result may 
be interpreted as resembling a cosy collusion where executives and NEDs, who sit on 
each others remuneration committees, bidding-up executive earnings (Main & Johnston, 
1993).  This is supported by Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1996) whose results provide 
little support for an association between remuneration committee composition and CEO 
pay.  More recently, Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) confirmed that the 
compensation committee plays a major role in determining the level of CEO pay.  
However, they concluded that regardless of their degree of independence, the structure of 
a CEO’s compensation package does not differentially advantage the CEO or the 
shareholder. 
 
Despite this equivocal evidence, it has been widely recognised in the UK that boards 
should be diverse and composed largely of NEDs.  Many regulators recommend that the 
minimum number of NEDs to sit on the board should be three (Cadbury, 1992; 
Greenbury, 1995), should constitute at least one-third of the board (Hampel, 1998), or 
should be composed exclusively of NEDs who are independent of management (The 
Combined Code, 2000).   
 
British law, however, does not recognise any distinction between executive directors and 
NEDs; both are equal members of a unitary board, and both share, at least in principle, 
the onerous responsibility for the behaviour of the company and its consequences (E. 
Davis & Kay, 1993).  Mangel and Singh (1993) argue that the percentage of NEDs that 
sit on the board of directors has no significant impact on executive compensation.   
 
Executive directors who sit on the board provide first-hand, in-depth company 
knowledge, and bring a recognizable emotional commitment to, and involvement with, 
the company (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  However, executives frequently find it difficult 
to gain sufficient detachment from the development needs of the business in order to take 
a corporate-wide view (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  In addition, affiliated directors place 
more at risk than their position on the board in challenging management.  However, 
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according to Daily et al. (1996) there is no evidence that directors who might be 
sympathetic to the CEO are any more, or less, likely to enhance the CEOs pay package. 
 
In contrast, NEDs or outside directors are generally assumed to be more able to represent 
shareholders’ interests and judge managerial performance impartially (Weisbach, 1988).  
They are seen as guardians of the corporate good and act as buffers between executive 
directors and the company’s outside shareholders (Pass, 2004); providing a link between 
governance on the one hand and performance on the other (Jones, 2004). 
 
As a result, it is thought that a board’s detachment from operations equips it to analyse 
developing strategic decisions with fresh objectivity and breadth of experience (Blair, 
1995).  Therefore, a higher proportion of NEDs may indicate more vigilant external 
monitoring, diminish the ability of management to exploit insider information, and 
reduce potential agency problems (Wright & Kroll, 2002).  Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
also add that NEDs are thought to be better monitors because they lack any disincentive 
to monitor.  In fact, Zajac and Westphal (1996) and Wright and Kroll (2002) both 
suggest that non-executive board members seek to develop and maintain a favourable 
reputation as active representatives of shareholder welfare, as a means to enhance their 
human capital on the boards they currently sit and increase their attractiveness as 
candidates for board appointments at other firms.   
 
Empirical evidence provided by O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) and later by Daily, 
Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) reported that the amount of CEO compensation is 
related to the make-up of compensation committees.  Furthermore, Conyon and Peck 
(1998) found that pay and performance was more closely aligned when there was a 
higher proportion of NEDs serving on the remuneration committee.  In particular, Daily 
and Dalton (1993) found that a high proportion of NEDs had a positive impact on a firms 
financial performance.  In contrast, Muth and Donaldson (1998) and later by Dulewicz 
and Herbert (2004) in a follow up study concluded that significantly better results were 
achieved by companies whose boards had fewer independent directors.  Consequently, it 
may be inferred that companies with independent boards are not more successful than 
those boards, which are composed of executive directors. 
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Finally, the nominations committee is a common feature in most firms.  Based on 
Charkham’s (2001) research into UK and American firms, over half of the companies in 
his sample had an active nominations committee.  This committee is charged with 
identifying qualified candidates to serve on the board of directors (Brountas, 2004). 
 
Top executives play a major role in appointing the board and use the board as a vehicle 
to legitimise decisions that may not be in the best interest of owners (Tosi & Gomez-
Mejia, 1989).  Consequently, the nominations committee is not impervious to the 
attempts made by the CEO to exert social influence, which relies on norms of reciprocity, 
liking, and social consensus to shape the board’s decision-making and, ultimately, 
composition (Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990). Consequently, a CEO’s control over 
the director selection process represents an important source of executive entrenchment 
and, under these circumstances, the CEO is able to nominate and select board members 
who are sympathetic to their desires (Wade et al., 1990).  In support, O'Reilly et al. 
(1988) and O'Reilly, Wade, and Chandratat (1990) demonstrate that CEOs may be able 
to use social influence to affect their compensation.  Therefore, by deliberately 
identifying or promoting people with similar philosophies on strategy and administration, 
CEOs can subtly enhance board support for their initiatives and decisions or minimise 
the risk of dissention (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
 
Furthermore, Zajac and Westphal (1996) suggest that powerful actors in the CEO-board 
relationship may affect the diffusion of board independence through the selection and 
retention of directors whose prior directorship experiences suggest differential sympathy 
for their interests.  This enables powerful actors in the CEO-board relationship to manage 
board interlocks so as to reinforce or increase their control (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  
As a result, Westphal and Zajac (1997) claim that strategy and executive compensation 
are influenced by social and psychological dynamics that operate within the inner circle 
of corporate leaders.  Consequently, it may be argued that the nominations committee is 
not truly independent because the CEO may control the nominations process, maintain 
social relations with board members, and thus expect board support (Bebchuk, Fried, & 
Walker, 2002).  Through co-opting existing board members and nominating new 
directors that are sympathetic to the CEOs interests, increases the risk of entrenchment 
 29
and the possibility that an opportunistic executive will exploit company resources at the 
expense of shareholder wealth.   
 
For example, a CEO may enhance their influence over the board by appointing NEDs 
that are sympathetic to their needs (Wade et al., 1990; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  
Sources of power over the director selection process create an opportunity for political 
behaviour and, consequently, demographic similarity amongst the board will reflect and 
reinforce the existing power distribution and may produce bias in evaluation decisions 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  In contrast, demographic dissimilarity should minimise bias 
and enhance independence and objectivity in decision control activities (Westphal & 
Zajac, 1997).   
 
Some argue that inside directors are more willing to accommodate CEO preferences and 
that an increase in the number of insiders reflects comparatively weak board control over 
the CEO (Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  As a result, NEDs are better positioned to evaluate 
managerial performance impartially (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  However, Westphal and 
Zajac (1995) warn that NEDs who are demographically similar to the CEO may be more 
akin to insiders. 
 
In addition to the governance mechanisms discussed above, it is just as important to 
consider market-wide governance factors, which can also affect pay and performance.   
Consequently, the following section addresses two particular external governance 
mechanisms and discusses how these factors influence the pay-performance relationship. 
 
2.4.3. Market for corporate control  
The market for corporate control works by threatening managers with takeover to keep 
them from abusing their power or misusing corporate resources (Blair, 1995).  It is 
defined as the transferring of managerial control to new capital providers (e.g. 
shareholders) through acquisitions, divestitures, and other control-transfer mechanisms 
(Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996).  However, some argue that although the 
market for corporate control is a powerful mechanism for disciplining management, it is 
flawed because acquisitions or hostile takeovers produce little or no return to acquiring 
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shareholders (Jensen, 1988; Hart, 1995).  Despite this, firms have substantial defences 
against hostile takeovers which include staggered boards, substantial premiums, and 
golden parachute provisions (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  Essentially, Bedchuk and Fried 
(2003) argue that market for corporate control fails to impose tight constraints on 
executive pay. 
 
2.4.4. Executive labour market 
According to Fama (1980), the external labour market may provide enough implicit 
incentives for executives to exert effort.  Essentially, executives are willing to build a 
reputation as being efficient, and to do so they must exert their best efforts even in the 
absence of formal contracts (Fama, 1980).   Lambert and Larcker (1985) add that the 
level of executive pay is, to a degree, determined by the operation of a labour market for 
executive services.  They also comment that this labour market may provide an important 
means of motivating executives to serve their shareholders, and identify two key aspects 
of the labour market.   
 
First, the labour market sets the executive’s wage, and this provides a lower bound on the 
amount of total compensation that must be paid in order to retain their services.  At the 
same time, the availability of other executives of comparable experience and ability at 
this wage provides some constraint on the level of compensation demanded by 
executives in their current jobs.  Secondly, the labour market has the potential to control 
agency problems.  It is suggested that if executives make decisions that harm 
stockholders the labour market should lower the executive’s wage.  To the extent that 
executives are penalised in this way for poor decisions may indicate that they have less 
incentive to behave in a manner that benefits themselves at the expense of the 
shareholders.    
 
The prior discussion highlights some of the features of CG which impact upon pay and 
performance.  However, it is suggested that a firm’s ability to sustain strong CG may be 
hindered by CEO/Chair duality or extensive tenure on the board of directors.  Each 
variable is often considered a feature of weak CG and is examined in turn next. 
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2.4.5. Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/Chair duality 
CEO/Chair duality refers to a board leadership structure in which the same person holds 
both the CEO and board chair positions in a corporation (Rechner & Dalton, 1991).    In 
addition, Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) conceptualise CEO/Chair duality as a double-
edged sword forcing boards to choose between the contradictory objectives of 
entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. 
 
Critics of the independent structure argue that CEO/Chair duality “signals the absence of 
separation of decision management and control” (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 314).  
Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis (1988) also comment that CEOs holding both positions 
have greater informal stature and heightened formal authority over board members.  As a 
result, many argue that a dual role increases CEO power, restricts the boards 
independence, reduces its ability to fulfil its governance function and, moreover, may 
constitute a clear conflict of interest (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Rechner & Dalton, 
1991).  This means that uniting both roles in one person represents a formalised conflict 
of interest in which a CEO who is responsible for the overall strategic management of a 
firm is also in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of that strategy (Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994; Westphal & Zajac, 1997).  Consequently, regulators also concerned with 
the considerable concentration of power that arises where the roles of CEO and chairman 
are combined, recommend that the roles should be divided (Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 
1998).   
 
CEO/Chair duality can firmly entrench a CEO at the top of an organisation and occurs 
when executives gain so much power that they are able to use firm resources to further 
their own interests (Weisbach, 1988).  This will enable the CEO to dominate board 
meetings and control the nominations process, facilitating the consideration of new 
directors that are sympathetic to their interests (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  It is often 
seen as an indicator of executive power over a board (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), 
and in order for the board to effectively monitor and discipline top management, it is 
important to separate the CEO and board chair positions (Jensen, 1993; Mayer, 2000).  In 
summary, Sora and Natale (2004) claim that merging the roles of the CEO and chairman 
into one individual is a recipe for corruption, the misuse of power, and the 
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disenfranchising of stockholders.  Essentially, there is no balance of power, which allows 
the CEO to create a short-term environment that benefits them and risks any long-term 
investments.  
 
Therefore, non-CEO/Chair duality has various positive consequences.  These include: 
enables a more focused division of corporate functions and increases the balance of 
power (Demb & Neubauer, 1992), enhances a board’s independent monitoring capacity 
and curtails management entrenchment (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 
1994; Lee & O'Neill, 2003), inhibits executives from critiquing feedback about their own 
performance, and ensures that the outsiders’ voice is heard (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003).   
 
However, advocates of CEO/Chair duality argue that combining the role of CEO and 
chairman of the board removes ambiguities and conflicts that could otherwise arise 
where power is shared.  Consequently, Harrison et al. (1988) state that the increase in 
power and responsibility that the combined position affords is accompanied by an 
increase in accountability; and that this increase in accountability may offset any 
additional advantage the CEO gains from also holding the board chair position.  Also, 
establishing clear lines of authority and responsibility within a firm, helps to establish 
unity of command, which is defined as the existence of a single top manager with formal 
authority to whom all other managers report, and clarify decision-making authority 
(Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  Furthermore, Sora and Natale (2004) suggest that a dual 
role facilitates the decision-making process by minimising conflict through the removal 
of checks and balances. 
 
It is suggested that the diffusion of power attenuates strong leadership (Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994).  Therefore, CEO/Chair duality may create an illusion of stability and a 
sense that a dominant leader is determining organisational identity (Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994).  In this way, unification of the roles is predicted to lead to greater 
financial performance.   
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To date, there is a significant but limited body of research on CEO/Chair duality, which 
has yielded mixed results and focused primarily on the main effect of CEO/Chair duality 
on corporate performance (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  Despite this, Rechner and 
Dalton (1991) reported that CEO/Chair duality was negatively associated with firm 
performance.  In addition, Main (1991), Boyd (1994), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
(1999), and Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2001) found that the dual role was positively 
associated with CEO compensation.  In contrast, Donaldson and Davis (1991), Main and 
Johnston (1993), Conyon and Leech (1993), Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994), Main et al. 
(1995), Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996), Conyon (1997a), Muth and Donaldson (1998) 
and Benito and Conyon (1999) demonstrate that dual CEO structures had no significant 
impact on executive pay, outperformed independent chair structures, are associated with 
higher return to shareholders, and did not harm long-term company performance.  It may 
be inferred from this research that CEO/Chair duality has a positive effect on 
performance and that the key issue is not to heighten control of management but to 
empower executives. 
 
2.4.6. Tenure on the board of directors 
Supplementing the work of Llewellen (1968), who claims that CEOs spend a significant 
period of time at the helm of an organisation, Charkham (2001) claims that tenure on the 
board is generally between 6 and 8 years.  Research in this area and its influence on pay 
and performance is mixed.  For example, scholars such as Deckop (1988) and Mangel 
and Singh (1993) argue that years of service to the company are not a significant 
determinant of executive pay.  In contrast, Murphy (1986a), H. D. Platt (1987), 
Henderson and Fredrickson (1996), Lippert and Porter (1997), and Wright, Kroll, and 
Elenkov (2002) found a significant positive relationship between executive pay and 
tenure, which supports the contention that tenure plays a major role in determining an 
executive’s total remuneration.  Buchholtz, Ribbens, and Houle (2003) also suggest that 
this positive relationship may be explained due to long periods of tenure increasing the 
level of firm-specific human capital.  Essentially, the company is paying for greater 
expertise.  
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Conversely, Hill and Phan (1991) claim that the sensitivity of pay to performance 
decreases as executive tenure increases.  This may be explained in terms of entrenchment 
whereby an extended period of tenure allows the executive to control the board and exert 
their social influence in order to weaken the relationship between pay and performance 
(Harrison et al., 1988; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wade et al., 1990; Hill & Phan, 
1991).  In addition, Lippert and Porter (1997) found a negative relationship between 
tenure and bonus pay.  An interpretation of this finding is that as tenure increases, the 
CEO may be more willing to have compensation increases in the form of stock and 
options.   
 
To summarise, the governance mechanisms discussed above make a significant 
contribution to the pay and performance relationship.  In particular, institutional 
investors, which are a powerful pressure group, are becoming less common due to the 
rise in dispersed ownership.  Therefore, the board of directors is the shareholders first 
line of defence against incompetent management (Weisbach, 1988).  In general, it is 
suggested that an effective board that rewards executives fairly, i.e. does not reward poor 
performance, be composed entirely of NEDs.  It is argued that independent NEDs are 
better positioned to judge managerial performance impartially.  Furthermore, it is 
suggested that the CEO should not sit on the nominations committee.  It is anticipated 
that this approach will limit the co-option of existing board members and the selection of 
new directors that are sympathetic to the CEOs interests.  This strategy is expected to 
reduce the risk of entrenchment and opportunism, i.e. exploiting company resources at 
the expense of shareholder wealth.  In addition, preventing the CEO from occupying the 
board chair position and limiting executive tenure is expected to have a similar effect.   
 
However, in addition to these peripheral governance factors, this thesis also considers the 
impact of firm performance (variously measured) on executive pay.  The next section 
provides a theoretical context for this pay-performance relation.       
 
2.5. EXECUTIVE PAY IN THEORY 
The problem of compensating agents and employees is far more intricate than is 
represented in the standard agency model (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991).  Furthermore, 
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Brown et al. (2003) suggest that no single theory can fully explain how compensation 
relates to organisational performance.  In addition, Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan 
(2003) claim that one theoretical perspective is insufficient for capturing the complexity 
of the differing interests of ownership types.  Consequently, two of the most prominent 
theoretical propositions to emerge from the executive pay literature are agency theory 
and the self-serving management/power perspective.   
 
In this study, these two theories offer contrasting views on the pay-performance relation 
and, subsequently, provide competing hypotheses that are discussed further in chapter 3.  
Essentially, agency theory predicts a positive association between bonus pay and firm 
performance whereas power theory expects a negative association.  It is anticipated that 
by using two opposing theories will allow for a more complete explanation of this 
inherently complex pay and performance relation.  Each theory is now discussed in 
detail.     
 
2.5.1. Agency theory 
Agency theory is often regarded as the dominant theoretical framework for examining 
the effects of contingent pay in general (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and has its 
roots embedded in Berle and Means’ (1932) influential statement about self-interested 
managers which highlighted the problems emerging from the growing separation of 
ownership and control in modern corporations (Zajac & Westphal, 1995).  Consequently, 
agency theory would argue that the association between pay and performance may be 
strong, but weakened by the ineffective integration and alignment of interests between 
the company’s shareholder principals and executive agents (For an illustration of the 
agency relationship refer to Figure 3 overleaf).  In contrast, stewardship theory would 
argue that the executive is motivated to be a reliable steward of corporate assets and 
maintains that there is no inherent problem with executive motivation (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991; J. H. Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).  
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Figure 3. An agency relationship (Hitt, Ireland et al., 1996, p. 315). 
 
The basic principal-agent model assumes principals are risk neutral because they can 
own shares in multiple, diverse companies, whereas agents are more risk averse owing to 
their un-diversified human and financial capital (Baron & Kreps, 1999; Elvira, 2001; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  Risk averse CEOs may become rigidly devoted to the 
status quo in an attempt to reduce their risk exposure and, subsequently, the benefit of 
alignment is that CEOs will be more likely to take greater risks (D. Miller, 1991; 
Carpenter, 2000).  Fundamentally, this risk differential fosters goal conflict between the 
principal and agent.   
 
Also referred to as the optimal contracting view, agency theory considers the firm’s 
governance structure as a nexus of contracts which is described by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) as,  
Viewing the firm as a nexus of a set of contracting relationships serves to make 
clear that the firm is not an individual but a legal fiction which serves as a focus 
for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals are 
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brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations (p. 311-
312).   
 
Consequently, agency theory is concerned with problems that can arise in any 
cooperative exchange when one party (the principals) contracts with another (the agents) 
to make decisions on behalf of the principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983).   However, agency 
contracts allocate risks and responsibilities to the parties who are best able to bear and 
perform them, thus differentiating separation from ownership and control (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990).  Therefore, shareholder interests must be safeguarded by controls on 
management, but these controls must not unduly shift residual risk onto management 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  Essentially, without an effective system to control 
decisions, managers are apt to behave in ways that reduce their exposure to risks 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). 
 
Risk posture is an important element of corporate strategy (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  As a 
result, delegation causes a misalignment of incentives due to different preferences for 
risk (Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2003).  For example, shareholders maximise 
returns at reasonable risk, focusing on high dividends and rising stock price whereas 
managers in some cases may prefer growth to profits (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).  In an 
agency context, CG is concerned with ways in which agents can be held to account for 
the attainment of the goals given to firms (Child & Rodrigues, 2003). 
 
Managerial discretion refers to the latitude of options available to executives in making 
strategic choices (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  Therefore, high discretion entails 
greater risk and multiple courses of action.   Consequently, executives in high discretion 
firms can potentially earn more because higher pay levels are needed to compensate for 
bearing greater risk (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
Agency theory would argue that managerial discretion, which focuses on the potential 
decision-making freedom of high discretion agents, will promote non-profit-maximising 
choices (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Essentially, the greater the level of discretion, the 
greater the potential impact of an agent on a firm and, hence, the greater their potential 
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marginal product.  Wright and Kroll (2002) add that when agents have greater 
opportunities to make a wider range of decisions, they are more likely to enhance firm 
performance, presumably benefiting the shareholder.  However, they also caution that 
unless agents are monitored actively, discretion may not be desirable because, via 
discretion, agents may selfishly over-invest in projects that are non-value maximising.  
 
Consequently, multi-tasking allows agents to misallocate effort across activities 
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992).  Therefore, when multiple courses of 
action are possible, uncertainty and complexity increase, and it becomes more difficult to 
predict firm performance with much accuracy (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998).  Complexity, 
therefore, distorts the relationship between executive action and firm performance 
(Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  Consequently, incentive problems may arise 
when executives must allocate effort across multiple activities (Bushman & Smith, 
2001).  As a result, it is the board’s responsibility to design compensation schemes that 
provide executives with efficient incentives to raise shareholder value and prevent 
managerial opportunism (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999b).  On this view, executive 
compensation plans are just one type of internal CG mechanism that attempts to tackle 
the agency cost trade-off between insuring executives against poor outcomes and 
incentive alignment concerns (Ezzamel & Watson, 2002).  Conversely, stakeholder 
theory would argue that the main objective of the firm should be defined more widely 
and include the welfare of suppliers, customers and employees, and not solely governed 
in the interests of its shareholders (Purcell, 1992; Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 1997; 
Short & Keasey, 1997).   
 
Agency costs are associated with monitoring and disciplining agents in order to prevent 
abuse and the misallocation of effort (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Blair, 1995).  They 
are the sum of incentive, monitoring, and enforcement costs and any residual loss 
incurred by the principal (Hitt, Ireland et al., 1996).  It does cost to be informed and, 
consequently, significant free-rider problems arise as individual shareholders are 
reluctant to devote resources to managerial monitoring (Forbes & Watson, 1993; Bruce 
& Buck, 1997).  Some argue that the cost to any small atomistic shareholder to monitor 
 39
the executive exceeds the benefits (Prodhan, 1993; Tevlin, 1996).  Two associated 
factors that hinder monitoring efforts are moral hazard and information asymmetry.  
 
The former refers to those actions that agents take that are unobserved by the principal 
(Laffont & Martimort, 2002), and which may be limited by adopting Holmstrom’s (1979) 
‘informativeness principle’.  The ‘informativeness principle’ incorporates any measure of 
performance that reveals information on the effort level chosen by the agent into the 
incentive contract, but will only be implemented into the portfolio of performance 
measures if it has incremental information content over and above the other available 
measures (Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith, 1996; Prendergast, 1999).   
 
The latter arises from the inability of managers to convey information about the firm and 
from the reluctance of investors to gather information about firm activities (Lee & 
O'Neill, 2003).  Specifically, top managers are able to affect the information flow by 
gathering and redistributing information across key external actors and internal locales 
(Collins & Clark, 2003).  As a result, information asymmetry and opportunism will lead 
to the misallocation of effort whereby executives will seek to maximise their own utility 
at the expense of the shareholders.  According to Lubatkin et al. (2003), executives are 
opportunistic by nature and will act in their own self-interest in the absence of restraints, 
even if their actions diminish shareholder wealth.   
 
In an attempt to redress this issue, regulators recommend that companies should adopt a 
philosophy of full transparency (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995), establishing a formal 
and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for 
fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors (The Combined Code, 2000).  
The company’s annual report should be the main vehicle through which the company 
reports to shareholders on directors’ remuneration (Greenbury, 1995; The Combined 
Code, 2000) and should include complete details of all the elements in the remuneration 
package for each individual director (The Combined Code, 2000).  According to the ABI 
(2002), performance targets should generally be disclosed, subject to commercial 
confidentiality considerations.  When objectives are clear and transparent, the easier it is 
to determine whether an executive has failed to perform.  At the very least, shareholders 
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expect to be informed of the basic parameters of performance targets that are set, in 
particular, over the short-term (ABI, 2002). 
 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (2003) and Walker and Louvari (2003) claim that dispersed 
shareholding ownership and the costs associated with increased disclosure reduces the 
intensity of monitoring executive behaviour.  In contrast, Rothfeder (2004) would argue 
that this relative opaqueness is changing and companies are now entering an era of 
information transparency due to increasingly activist stakeholders, the growing influence 
of global markets, the spread of communications technology, and a new customer ethic 
demanding openness, honesty, and integrity from companies.  According to Bushman 
and Smith (2003), corporate transparency is the widespread availability of relevant, 
reliable information about periodic performance, financial position, investment 
opportunities, governance, value, and risk of PLCs, which enhances efficiency by 
enabling managers and investors to identify value creation opportunities with less error. 
 
Overall, therefore, the agency approach generates optimism concerning the governance 
mechanisms in place within public companies, and their ability to achieve an acceptable 
degree of goal alignment. Executive pay in general, and bonus in particular, may 
contribute to this alignment, leading to a positive relation between bonus pay and firm 
performance. 
 
2.5.2. Self-serving management/power perspective 
Although arguably related to agency theory, the self-serving management hypothesis 
emphasises the fundamental misalignment of interests between the principal and the 
agent.  It argues that executives are self-serving and opportunistic and when given the 
necessary latitude will participate in dysfunctional behaviour.  This behaviour is termed 
managerial opportunism or moral hazard and results in rent extraction, a divergence of 
interests and lack of goal congruence between the company’s owners and executives 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Veliyath, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 2001; J. S. Miller et al., 2002).   
 
In conjunction with the self-serving management perspective, the managerial power 
model is heavily associated with the separation of ownership and control of the modern 
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corporation (Garen, 1994).  This refers to a situation where power and control of the 
corporation has shifted away from the common stockholders and, subsequently, 
ownership is becoming more dispersed and control more concentrated (Berle & Means, 
1991).  As a result, the wealth of innumerable individuals is under the same central 
control (Berle & Means, 1991).  This separation, therefore, has eliminated the checks and 
balances that owners once exercised over management and with this undaunted power, 
management may pursue its own interest, oblivious to the welfare of the owners (Berle & 
Means, 1991; Werner & Tosi, 1995).  Certo, Daily, Cannella, and Dalton (2003) add that 
the entrenchment of CEOs with large equity stakes exacerbates self-serving behaviour.  
Consequently, the apparent entrenchment effect of executive ownership is something that 
remuneration committees need to consider when deciding the extent of share ownership 
they encourage amongst their top executives (Dedman, 2003). 
 
Power in this context refers to the capacity of social actors to exert their will and to 
achieve their goals in a particular relationship (Pfeffer, 1981; Weisbach, 1988). In 
addition, Boeker (1992) argues that powerful CEOs are less likely than less powerful 
CEOs to be dismissed during performance downturns.  As a result, power plays a central 
role in CG (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994), and is dependent on 
the ownership structure of the firm, the composition of the board, and whether or not the 
CEO operates as chairman (Bebchuk et al., 2001).  According to Shen (2003), executive 
power increases over time and, without a vigilant board, a top executive may become 
entrenched in their position increasing their ability to exploit corporate assets and extract 
greater rents (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).   
 
Consequently, based on the research of Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993), Zajac and 
Westphal (1995), Sridharan (1996), and Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2004), it may be 
inferred that executive power and control is an important determinant of executive 
compensation and a better explanation for the lack of positive pay-performance 
sensitivity.  However, Murphy (2002) challenges this view and argues that the 
managerial power model is problematic as a theoretical approach and too simplistic to 
explain executive pay practices.  He highlights some of the inconsistencies associated 
with power theory.  First, the escalation in executive pay in the 1990s coincided with 
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increasingly independent boards and, secondly, CEOs hired from the outside with no ties 
to the existing board enjoy attractive pay packages, which contrast with the view that 
CEOs use their relationships with board members to extract rents. 
 
To summarise, the managerial power model claims that incumbent executives exercise 
‘unfettered’ power and influence over captive directors in order to extract rents through 
their compensation arrangements (Murphy, 2002; Dedman, 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 
2004).  Therefore, power theory, in contrast with the agency view, argues that executive 
entrenchment will lead to a negative association between bonus pay and firm 
performance.  As a result, the survival of the corporation depends on the construction of 
appropriate incentive arrangements, which encourage the agent to act in the best interests 
of the principal, i.e. shareholder wealth maximisation, and limit the effects of managerial 
opportunism (Veliyath, 1999).   
 
Consequently, these two contrasting models with competing predictions provide a 
theoretical context for pay and performance.  Therefore, it seems appropriate to now 
address what existing research, from both the UK and America, has concluded about this 
association.  Consequently, section 2.6 to follow, first, considers the issues surrounding 
executive pay research in general, secondly, provides evidence from the UK and, finally, 
America. 
 
2.6. EXECUTIVE PAY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
The criticism of executive compensation in the financial press is based upon anecdotal 
evidence (Lambert & Larcker, 1985).  It is, however, a topic of intense interest and 
controversy that lends itself to empirical inquiry but which has spawned an abundant but 
disjointed and inconclusive literature (J. Kerr & Bettis, 1987; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1988).  This is supported by Gomez-Mejia (1994) who states that, “it is amazing how 
little we know about executive pay in spite of the volume of empirical work available on 
this topic.  Even more discouraging results are conflicting and disappointing” (p. 199).  
He claims that “multiple factors contribute to this empirical morass” (Gomez-Mejia, 
1994, p. 174), and suggests that this weakness may be due to the various paradigms and 
traditions that influence the interpretation of data, the fact that accounting formulas are 
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not homogenous across firms, the difficulty associated with calculating subjective 
assessments of executive behaviour, the impact of lag effects as a result of deferred 
payments, the use of crude proxies to measure executive behaviour and, finally, variables 
which are expected to influence executive pay tend to be highly correlated which poses a 
collinearity problem that makes it difficult to isolate the unique effect of a single factor.    
 
In addition, Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argue that “…adding more empirical 
studies on the statistical relationship between executive pay and firm performance to the 
vast literature that already exists on this issue leads researchers into a blind alley”         
(p. 143).  However, despite generating a spirited debate among academics and 
practitioners alike for at least 75 years (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), executive 
compensation did not become a public issue until 1991, i.e. it was at this time that 
excessive executive pay practices were openly criticised in the popular press (Murphy, 
1998).  Recently, executive pay was criticised for its gross excesses (see Finch & 
Treanor, 2005; Finch, Treanor, & Moore, 2005; Watkins, 2005) and still remains a 
controversial topic of interest. 
 
2.6.1. UK 
Research into UK executive pay has been criticised for, first, failing to provide a 
comprehensive measure of executive pay (Main et al., 1996), secondly, for 
unsuccessfully documenting a distinct relationship between pay and performance 
(McKnight & Tomkins, 1999) and, finally, due to the lack of available and consistent 
data (Conyon et al., 1995; Conyon, 1997b; Laing & Weir, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 
2001).  One of the main grievances of executive pay is that rewards often fail to reflect 
performance (Charkham, 2001).  This view is supported by much of the applied 
executive compensation literature based on UK evidence, which focuses on the strength 
of the relationship between executive pay and company performance.   
 
Results indicate that executives’ compensation is only weakly related to company 
performance (Conyon & Leech, 1993; McKnight, 1996; Ezzamel & Watson, 1998; Laing 
& Weir, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 2001).  In particular, Gregg, Machin, and Szymanski 
(1993) found evidence of a declining relationship between executives’ pay and 
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shareholder returns.  In addition, although focusing on the private utilities sector, Conyon 
(1995) found that the growth in executive pay generally exceeds the growth in company 
performance.  Furthermore, McKnight and Tomkins (1999) discovered an insignificant 
relationship to exist between executive bonuses and changes in earnings per share (EPS).  
To summarise, these studies confirm that it is difficult to isolate a robust relationship, or 
infer direction of causation, between top executive pay and corporate performance and 
even when a link can be determined the quantitative impact appears to be negligible 
(Conyon, 1995, 1997a).   
 
In contrast, alternative studies have discovered a positive and significant relationship to 
exist between executive pay and firm performance (Main, 1991; Main et al., 1996; Cosh 
& Hughes, 1997; Conyon, 1998).  Specifically, Conyon (1997a) concluded that executive 
compensation was positively related to shareholder return.  In addition, McKnight and 
Tomkins (1999) found a modest association between executive bonus and shareholder 
return.  Furthermore, Benito and Conyon (1999) concluded that a 10% increase in 
shareholder return predicts a £1,852 increase in executive compensation when evaluated 
by average pay.  This mixed set of results, however, suggests that performance may have 
a persistent effect on executive pay (Boschen & Smith, 1995).  But, is this UK based 
research consistent with studies using American data? 
 
2.6.2. America 
Similarly, decades of work have been unable to show an unambiguous direct link 
between CEO pay and firm performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  Rajagopalan (1996) 
suggests that these contradictions may be partly attributed to the problems stemming 
from estimating the value of deferred, stock-based incentive payments.  Consequently, 
comparable studies based on data from America have also found a weak or statistically 
insignificant relationship between directors’ compensation and company performance 
(see Baker et al., 1988; Deckop, 1988; Leonard, 1990; Mangel & Singh, 1993; Akhigbe, 
Mandura, & Tucker, 1995; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Aggarwal & Samwick, 
1999a; Veliyath, 1999; Attaway, 2000; Balkin et al., 2000; Conyon & Murphy, 2000).  In 
particular, Jensen and Murphy (1990) conclude from their analysis of performance pay 
and top-management incentives that the relation between executive wealth and 
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shareholder wealth is small.  They discovered that executive wealth changes by $3.25 for 
every $1000 change in shareholder wealth and that a 10% increase in firm value is 
associated with a 1% rise in salary and bonus pay.  In addition, B. J. Hall and Liebman 
(1998) discovered that a 10% increase in firm performance will increase salary and 
bonus by 2.2% or about $23,400 when evaluated at the median CEO salary and bonus. 
 
There is considerable controversy surrounding the relationship between shareholder 
return and top executive pay (J. Kerr & Bettis, 1987).  First, because there are so many 
forms of financial compensation, and as they are so complex, calculating an executive’s 
financial income is either intractable or misleading (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988).  
Secondly, changes in shareholder wealth can be attributed to a multitude of factors 
(Wallace, 1997).   
 
However, the assumption is that high levels of pay are evidence that executives are doing 
a good job for shareholders and are “worth every nickel they get” (Murphy, 1986b, p. 
125).  On the contrary, ballooning pay packages may be evidence that executives are out 
of control and the systems that are supposed to make them accountable to investors have 
broken down (Blair, 1995).  Consequently, in order to resolve this controversy, Masson 
(1971), Murphy (1985), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin 
(1987), Abowd (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Hubbard and Palia (1995), and 
Tevlin (1996) have examined the correlation between changes in executive pay and 
changes in shareholder wealth and all documented a positive and significant correlation.   
 
As early as 1971, Masson concluded that executives whose financial rewards were more 
closely aligned with the goals of the shareholders and the long-term profitability of the 
firm do indeed outperform other firms in stock return.  In addition, Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985) explained 5.4% of the variance in executive pay as a function of stock 
market performance.  Furthermore, Murphy (1986b), B. J. Hall and Liebman (1998), 
Abowd and Kaplan (1999), and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) state that the links between 
executive wealth and firm performance have remained positive over time and become 
stronger in recent years.  Nevertheless, there remains little consensus regarding the 
relationship between pay and performance (Daily et al., 2003). 
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Although the primary thrust of Ciscel and Carrol’s (1979) analysis of the pay and 
performance relationship were negative, they concluded that executive pay was 
influenced by several aspects of corporate performance.  Pavlik, Scott, and Tiessen 
(1993), Murphy (1998), and Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000), through a 
meta-analysis of previous studies on executive pay, also identify many factors that are 
known to influence executive compensation. Some of these alternative performance 
indicators include profitability, sales, firm size and industry.  Note that industry is not 
considered as a measure of performance but has been included in the discussion because 
previous research has identified the variable as being a significant determinant of 
executive pay.  As a result, the next section highlights and discusses these alternative 
determinants.   
 
2.7. DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE PAY 
This section examines the extent to which profit, sales, firm size, and industry influence 
executive pay.   
 
2.7.1. Profitability versus sales 
Despite being criticised as a performance indicator for inadequately reflecting a firm’s 
underlying value due to it being easily manipulated (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987), 
American based research has suggested that profitability rather than sales had a 
significant influence on executive compensation (Llewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Prasad, 
1974; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).  In contrast, Ciscel (1974) suggested that 
profitability was not a primary determinant of executive reward.  In addition, Conyon 
and Leech’s (1993) study of UK companies concluded that sales was indeed a good 
predictor of executive pay. 
 
2.7.2. Firm size 
Berle and Means (1991) state that top executives in larger companies are paid more than 
their counterparts in smaller firms.  They suggest that size is the most compelling 
explanation for this difference and, subsequently, the bigger the company, the larger the 
rewards.  In addition, as the size of the company increases the tendency to dispersion also 
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increases.  In general, the larger the company, the more likely its ownership will be 
diffused among a multitude of individuals (Berle & Means, 1991). 
 
One of the earliest British attempts to analyse the relationship between executive pay and 
firm performance is conducted by Cosh (1975).  He discovered that company size was a 
major determinant of the remuneration of executives, a conclusion receiving support 
from numerous scholars from both the UK and America (see Ciscel, 1974; Meeks & 
Whittington, 1975; Agarwal, 1981; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Baker et al., 1988; 
Deckop, 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988; Kostiuk, 1990; Hill & Phan, 1991; Gregg 
et al., 1992; Main & Johnston, 1993; Mangel & Singh, 1993; Garen, 1994; Conyon, 
1995; Hubbard & Palia, 1995; McKnight, 1996; Cosh & Hughes, 1997; Conyon, 1998; 
Daily et al., 1998; Benito & Conyon, 1999; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Laing & Weir, 1999; 
Veliyath, 1999; Pass, Robinson, & Ward, 2000; Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001).  In 
particular, Masson (1971) concluded that companies perform better with respect to firm 
growth when there is a close alignment of interest between the executives, the 
shareholders, and the long-term profitability of the firm.  In addition, Santerre and Neun 
(1989) in their study of American firms in the 1930s found that executive compensation 
was positively related to corporate size and for every 10% rise in organisational size 
culminated in a 3% increase in executive pay.  Furthermore, Tosi et al. (2000) discovered 
that company size and performance explained about half of the variance in executive 
compensation.   
 
In contrast, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) found that bonus pay is not associated with 
firm size.  Additionally, Lambert et al. (1991) found that changes in size did not exhibit a 
high correlation with changes in compensation and that factors other than firm size 
explain the majority of variance in executive pay.  Further support is provided by Pavlik 
et al. (1993), Main et al. (1995), and Murphy (1998) who argue that executive pay is 
weakly related to company size.   
 
Compensation based on firm size alone is justified because more hierarchical layers and 
greater complexity increase the challenge of top executive jobs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
1987).  Also, managing a billion-dollar enterprise with hundreds of thousands of 
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employees may require more expertise, more effort, entail a greater responsibility and 
stress and thus deserve more compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  This 
interpretation builds upon the logic of human capital theory.  Under this proposition, pay 
premiums represent the worth of an executive to a firm as a function of unique and 
valuable managerial skills which directly influences pay levels and contracts (Castanias 
& Helfat, 1991; Pavlik et al., 1993; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 
1997).  Adding to this debate and relating to the managerial talent hypothesis, Bebchuk et 
al. (2001) comment that compensation levels are explained by the inelasticity in the 
supply of executive talent who are qualified to run large firms.   
 
2.7.3. Industry 
Adding to the work of Antle and Smith (1986) whose results were consistent with a 
partial filtering of systematic industry risk in evaluating the performance contributions of 
their CEOs, Deckop (1988) found that CEO compensation practices vary significantly 
among various industries.  In addition, J. Kerr and Kren (1992) found boards consider the 
uniqueness of corporate-level strategies as compared with industry peers.  Therefore, 
industry categories are key factors that boards rely on in order to interpret company and 
CEO performance (Porac et al., 1999).  Porac et al. (1999) comment further and suggest 
that company performance is “inherently equivocal in the absence of background 
comparisons with other firms in similar business situations” (p. 115).  More recently, 
Datta, Guthrie, and Wright (2005) in their study examining how industry characteristics 
affect human resource systems, concluded that industry context has a moderating impact 
on the relationship between human resource systems and organisational effectiveness 
and, subsequently, is an important part of the environment within which organisational 
policies and practices are framed and executed. 
 
Existing empirical studies of executive compensation have consistently documented that 
industry is an important factor in determining levels of executive pay (Conyon & 
Murphy, 1998).  Examples of which include Roberts (1956), who in his study of 
American firms, concluded that industry was related to the amount of executive 
compensation, and Rajagopalan and Prescott (1990) who discovered that industry had a 
significant, although not pervasive, effect on the relationship between total cash 
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compensation and its antecedents.  In contrast, Kostiuk (1990) found little convincing 
evidence of industry differences in executive pay. 
 
In summary, the preceding section has highlighted that there are many factors, other than 
shareholder wealth maximisation, that can influence executive pay levels.  But, how do 
firms ensure that executives are motivated to achieve performance targets that are in line 
with shareholder interests?  One such method is to use performance targets, measures and 
incentives, and these are discussed next. 
 
2.8. PERFORMANCE TARGETS, MEASURES AND INCENTIVES 
Willingly or not, a company and its management are held accountable for their actions by 
various groups of stakeholders who impose standards defined by their interests (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992).  Therefore, performance may be expected to become the principal 
determinant of compensation (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992).  Consequently, regulators 
recommend that executive pay and annual bonuses in particular should be linked to 
performance, emphasising that performance targets should: relate to what individuals can 
influence (Greenbury, 1995); are tailored to the requirements of the business; reviewed 
regularly to ensure that they remain appropriate (ABI, 2002); and, ultimately, should be 
relevant, challenging and designed to enhance the business (The Combined Code, 2000; 
ABI, 2002). 
 
Essentially, standards for corporate performance refer to the explicit and implicit 
yardsticks used by stakeholders to evaluate the performance of a company (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992).  However, Baker (1992) suggests that it is always possible to measure 
performance in some way but the question is not whether performance is easy to measure 
but whether the available performance measure accurately reflects the firm’s objective 
and is thus a good measure.  As a result, Barney (2002) asserts that firm performance is 
an outcome of the strategy-making process that is broadly consistent with the interests of 
all of a firm’s stakeholders, not just its equity holders.   
 
Research conducted by Healy (1985) suggests that internal earnings-based bonus 
schemes are a popular means of rewarding executives as they reflect factors that are more 
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under an executives’ control.  However, Healy (1985) acknowledges that executives may 
manipulate earnings figures in order to maximise their multi-period bonus payments and, 
according to Hunt (1986), executives tend to report financial data in the best possible 
light using accounting practices that overstate earnings.  Additionally, Lambert and 
Larcker (1987) argue that accounting numbers provide a less useful measure of the 
agent’s performance when the consequences of the agent’s current-period actions tend to 
occur in the future and are not reflected in current-period accounting numbers.  However, 
research conducted by Holthausen et al. (1995) based on an American sample found no 
evidence that executives manipulate earnings in response to their bonus plans.  
Nevertheless, the manipulation of accounting earnings exists and is referred to as 
“window dressing” (Feltham & Xie, 1994, p. 442) and more recently as “camouflage” 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p. 61) and, according to the latter, under the power model 
executives prefer pay practices that obscure the total amount of compensation and appear 
to be more performance based than they actually are.   
 
Some academics would argue that market-based performance measures provide a more 
holistic evaluation of the firm’s performance and are also less amenable to manipulation 
by executives than accounting measures, since share price is dictated by the atomistic 
decisions of shareholders on the performance of the firm (Healy, 1985).  At the same 
time, Murphy (1986a) argues that external market-wide movements in equity values are 
typically cited as a major source of uncontrollable noise and may, therefore, represent an 
inappropriate proxy for managerial effort.   
 
Consequently, linking managerial rewards to agreed-upon performance outcomes may 
prevent opportunistic managers from attributing poor performance to the vagaries of the 
marketplace and other factors over which they have no control (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990).  Therefore, earnings-based measures help shield executive compensation from 
market-wide movements in equity values (Sloan, 1993).  However, although profit is the 
most widely used measure of performance for a business firm, it does have a short-term 
orientation and executives may sacrifice long-term profitability in order to improve 
short-term profits (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998).  Nevertheless, Bushman and Smith (2003) 
suggest that objective, verifiable accounting information facilitates shareholder 
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monitoring and the effective exercise of shareholder rights.  It also enables directors to 
enhance shareholder value by advising, ratifying, and policing managerial decisions and 
activities.   
 
Ittner et al. (1997) suggest that internal, non-financial performance measures provide one 
mechanism for increasing the level of executive compensation, and report that 98% of 
sample firms use at least one performance measure in their annual bonus plans.  
Furthermore, they report a negative relation between the use of non-financial 
performance measures and the correlation between accounting returns and stock returns.  
However, their research does indicate that non-financial measures, such as internal 
customer satisfaction surveys, are more prone to executive manipulation and are rarely 
subject to public verification.  In a later study, Murphy (1998) reports that 161 of 177 
sample firms explicitly use at least one measure of accounting profits in their annual 
bonus plans.  He also documents large increases in the pay-performance sensitivities of 
cash compensation with respect to contemporaneous changes in shareholder wealth.  In 
contrast, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) document a robust, inverse relation between 
pay-performance sensitivity and the variance of the performance measure. 
 
Extending this research, Murphy (2001) examined the use of internal and external 
performance standards in executive bonus contracts and how the choice of standard 
affects company performance and realised compensation.  He discovered bonuses were 
not based strictly on an absolute performance measure but rather performance was 
measured relative to a performance standard, and found that less than half of the 
companies in his sample used a single performance measure, with most adopting two or 
more measures.  In most cases, the companies in his sample utilised a mixture of internal 
and external performance standards such as budget, prior year or timeless standards.  The 
findings showed no obvious relation between performance standards and firm 
performance.  It did, however, conclude that internally determined standards are subject 
to ratcheting and provide incentives to smooth earnings, while external standards are not 
influenced by managerial actions.  Executives in companies with external performance 
standards also receive, on average, a larger portion of their pay in the form of annual 
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bonuses.  Consequently, it may be inferred that this dependence on short-term annual 
bonuses may be due to the volatility associated with market-based measures. 
 
Individual Performance Evaluation (IPE) is the term for a mixture of performance 
measures which include subjective evaluations of individual performance, explicit non-
financial performance criteria such as customer satisfaction, aspects of managerial input 
such as leadership, and indications of discretion or subjectivity in determining awards 
(Bushman et al., 1996; Bushman & Smith, 2001).  However, Bushman et al. (1996) do 
highlight the difficulties associated with characterising the specific performance criteria 
or the judgements upon which IPE payoffs are based.  It is also argued that short-term 
bonus plans based on current accounting profits are responsible for managerial myopia, 
i.e. encouraging a preoccupation with current operations and short-term results, and 
discouraging strategic initiatives and long-term investments with deferred and highly 
uncertain returns (Bushman et al., 1996). 
 
As a result, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) argue that discretionary awards may be 
a way to offset certain dysfunctional aspects of an objective incentive system.  In 
support, Bushman et al. (1996) suggest that IPE can be used to supplement traditional 
corporate financial measures, focusing on aspects of managerial performance that are not 
fully captured in current accounting and market-price-based measures of performance. 
 
Research examining the value of IPEs conducted by Bushman et al. (1996) revealed that 
one-third of the sample firms used some form of IPE in determining a CEOs’ bonus.  In 
contrast, two-thirds reported no weight given to the CEOs’ individual performance.  
Furthermore, 20% of sample firms base the annual bonus exclusively on financial 
performance measures, giving no indication that any part of the bonus payout was 
determined subjectively or subject to the discretion of the board (Bushman et al., 1996).  
The remainder of the firms were difficult to classify, reporting a complex variety of non-
financial and qualitative performance measures, and sometimes vague references to the 
use of discretion or subjectivity in determining awards (Bushman et al., 1996).  In a 
related analysis, Ittner et al. (1997) document a positive but imperfect relationship 
between IPE and the use of non-financial performance measures. 
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According to London and Oldham (1976), the process of goal setting involves 
establishing a standard of excellence against which performance is evaluated and found 
that performance and goal difficulty were positively related.  Therefore, the better the 
performance the more difficult the goal to be achieved is.  Research conducted by Locke, 
Shaw, Saari, and Latham (1981) and Chidester and Grigsby (1984) reported that setting 
either difficult or specific goals was associated with increased performance.  Specifically, 
the latter found that difficult or specific goals accounted for approximately 4% of the 
variance in performance.  In addition, Feltham and Xie (1994) suggest that increasing the 
number of performance measures may, first, lead to a rise in the set of viable actions, 
which may increase the likelihood that a more preferred action will be implemented and, 
secondly, may reduce the risk imposed on the agent to induce a particular action.  
Essentially, a multi-dimensional performance measure system may represent a more 
accurate definition of the organisation’s goals (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998). 
 
Locke and Latham (1990) argue that, in order to optimise decision-making, an executive 
needs to process more information than in a single goal setting.  However, the skill and 
effort needed to process this information can be beyond the capacity of many executives, 
which may lead to a greater number of sub-optimal decisions and lower performance.  In 
addition, time and effort involved in making these decisions means that less time and 
effort can be devoted to achieving these goals resulting in lower overall goal 
achievement and performance (Kernon & Lord, 1990).  Consequently, Lingle and 
Schiemann (1996) suggest that the clarity of performance measures may contribute to 
executive uncertainty.  It is recommended that few measures, which are both clear and 
simple as well as easy to understand, manage and communicate, be incorporated into 
performance target design (Lingle & Schiemann, 1996; Ho & McKay, 2002; Franco & 
Bourne, 2003).  As a result, it may be suggested that using simple targets can heighten 
CEO focus, facilitate the monitoring of CEO action, and identify achievement.  
Simplicity, therefore, has the potential to limit CEO discretion and reduce the pay-
performance gap.  In conclusion, Emsley (2003) claimed that uncertainty is likely to 
reduce performance because it might lead to an increasing number of inappropriate 
decisions. 
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A study by S. Kerr (1975) highlighted that most agents focus on the activities that are 
being rewarded.  Therefore, focusing on one performance measure can often lead to 
agents ignoring alternative un-rewarded objectives.  In addition, Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991) argue that multi-tasking agents may misallocate effort across tasks.  
Therefore, combining external and internal performance targets may be associated with a 
heightened degree of complexity, which has the potential to hamper monitoring strategies 
and limit the ability to identify achievement.  Complexity may dilute CEO incentives, 
encourage CEO discretion and widen the pay-performance gap.  Furthermore, Yearta, 
Maitlis, and Briner (1995) claim that multiple goals complicate the decision-making 
process which, in turn, can affect executive performance.  They suggest that as 
executives pursue multiple goals, decisions about prioritising goals as well as allocating 
resources and making trade-offs between them are likely to become more complicated.  
According to Davidson (2002), human beings work best when they handle one thing at a 
time.  This is supported by Emsley (2003) who found that as the number of goals 
increases performance deteriorates.  
 
In accordance with performance targets and measures, incentives are a popular approach 
when attempting to motivate executives to achieve performance targets that are in line 
with shareholder interests.  Furthermore, given the difficulty of directly observing an 
executive’s effort and behaviour, monitoring is made possible through pay practices that 
align the interests of executives with those of the owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Therefore, incentive compensation is not intended to be a gift to the CEO (Tosi & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989), nor the ‘gravy’ on top of an executive’s base salary (Mitchell et al., 
1990).  According to Prendergast (1999), agents do respond to incentives and 
subsequently incentives do matter.  Therefore, adding to the work of Antle and Smith 
(1986), Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) suggest incentives can be a powerful mechanism 
by which to align the behaviour of corporate executives with the overall business 
strategy.   
 
Incentive plans are an integral part of management control since it has been widely 
recognised that incentives, as contributors to income and as measures of recognition of 
performance, are significant motivating factors for corporate executives (Sarin & 
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Winkler, 1980).  Essentially, an incentive system should encourage effective planning 
and honest reporting of targets, and should simultaneously motivate managers to work 
harder to achieve a better performance once these targets are specified (Sarin & Winkler, 
1980).  Significantly, many incentive contracts are based on a single performance 
measure, even if the agent’s action is multidimensional (Feltham & Xie, 1994).   
 
Incentives are held out at the beginning of a time period (Rajagopalan, 1996), serve as 
recognition of managerial competence (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), and are an 
important precursor to effective monitoring (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  In addition, 
incentives provide information about where people should direct their effort and are 
rarely used in isolation but linked implicitly or explicitly with goals (Callahan, Brownlee, 
Brtek, & Tosi, 2003).   
 
Incentive alignment is defined as the degree to which the reward structure induces 
executives to make decisions that are in the best interests of stockholders (Tosi & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989).  Consequently, the management of mutuality (Wright, Dunford, & 
Snell, 2001), i.e. the alignment of interests, between shareholders and executives through 
the effective employment of incentive systems can increase worker output.  However, 
this is only at the cost of imposing greater risk on workers and is reflected in higher 
wages (Prendergast, 1999).   
 
In the economic theory of incentives, most models support the view that extrinsic 
rewards can have a significant impact on performance (Vroom, 1964).  As a result, 
money has become one of the most powerful motivators (Schuler & Huber, 1993), with 
some scholars claiming that an executives’ motivation and behaviour is a function of 
their pay package (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  That is, in formal models 
employees prefer more money than less, dislike effort, and the employer motivates 
higher levels of distasteful effort by offering higher levels of income for better outcomes 
(Baron & Kreps, 1999).  In addition, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) suggest that executives 
prefer cash rewards as opposed to options and are intent on enjoying as much slack as 
possible.   
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Consequently, money is a factor that can motivate people at work (Marchington & 
Wilkinson, 2000), and often matters more than most people would like to admit.  
However, it is also true that intrinsic psychological rewards may be just as, if not more, 
significant.  Despite this, the focus of this study is on extrinsic rewards, which examines 
the relationship between monetary compensation and firm performance.  Therefore, 
although the literature review recognises and discusses, to an extent, the value of intrinsic 
rewards, it would be outside of this studies remit to examine this area of reward closely 
and, hence, has been excluded.   
 
The topic of employee motivation plays a central role in the field of management; and 
often a motivated workforce is cited as a hall mark of competitive advantage and a 
critical strategic asset (Steers, Mowday, & Shapiro, 2004).  According to Locke and 
Latham (2004), motivation refers to internal factors that impel action and to external 
factors that act as inducements to action.  Consequently, motivation influences task 
performance by directing attention, increasing persistence, and increasing effort toward 
task accomplishment (Callahan et al., 2003).  For example, Callahan et al. (2003) found 
that performance increased with the simultaneous use of both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivational sources, but that intrinsic motivation exerted the greatest effect on 
performance.  However, Child and Rodrigues (2003) warn that motivation cannot be 
sustained without fair compensation and recognition. 
 
Individuals who reach the apex of organisations are typically driven by higher-order 
needs such as reputation and status (Maslow, 1943).  At the same time, people are 
spending less time working for more money and more security (Herzberg, 1968).  
Masson (1971) suggests that executives have “alternative objective functions” (p. 1281) 
whereby elements other than pure monetary return are of value to them.  In essence, pay 
provides a key representation of an executive’s achievement and worth to an organisation 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988).  However, monetary rewards can be counter-
productive, can cause dissatisfaction at work, and can eliminate the intrinsic desire to 
perform some activity (Baker et al., 1988; Torrington et al., 2002).  Furthermore, it is 
argued that financial incentives lack power and efficiency when the employee has little 
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control over measures on which their compensation is based (Baron & Kreps, 1999).  
Consequently, there must be a close association between the performance and reward.     
 
Further evidence suggests that incentive systems adopted by firms are varied and that its 
structure is vital to a firm’s performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Buck et al., 2003).  
Consequently, in addition to aggregate incentive systems, which link an individual’s 
compensation to the overall performance of the firm and discussed earlier, companies 
may adopt promotion-based incentive schemes based on the tournament model.   In this 
instance, promotions serve to match individuals to the jobs which they are best suited, 
and to provide incentives for lower level employees who value pay and prestige 
associated with a higher rank in the organisation (Baker et al., 1988).  Bloom (1999) 
describes the distribution of pay in a tournament model as hierarchical where pay is 
concentrated in a few levels, jobs or individuals that are near the top of the distribution.  
It is the prospect of higher wages that induces effort (Prendergast, 1999). 
 
Most companies award annual bonuses if and when pre-determined performance targets 
are achieved.   Consequently, two of the most prominent incentive devices, which to 
some degree are subsets of performance-related-pay (PRP), include deferred 
compensation and bonus-based incentive schemes.  The next section, therefore, outlines 
and reviews PRP and examines the value of deferred compensation and bonus-based 
incentive strategies. 
 
2.9. PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY 
PRP systems are powerful motivators of human action (Baker et al., 1988) and create a 
commonality of interest between shareholders and executives (Forbes & Watson, 1993).  
According to Schuler and Huber (1993), PRP is necessary for company survival in a 
volatile business environment and represents a move away from the traditional view of 
rewards as incentives and towards rewards as total pay systems.  Reward management is 
one of the central pillars of HRM (Poole & Jenkins, 1998), concerned with distributing 
rewards fairly between the good and poorer performers whilst also contributing towards 
improved corporate performance (Torrington et al., 2002).   
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In support, Greene and Podsakoff (1978) in their American based study concluded that 
removing performance-contingent pay resulted in a decline in performance.  However, 
PRP encompasses a delicate set of motivational tools that can be powerfully effective in 
one setting and utterly dysfunctional in another (Baron & Kreps, 1999).  On the one hand 
they create greater incentive alignment between owner and executive but, on the other 
hand, they accentuate a natural propensity toward risk aversion on the part of the agent, 
leading to sub-optimal returns to shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 
2003).   
 
Essentially, the objective of PRP is to improve performance by converting the pay bill 
from an indiscriminate machine to a more finely tuned mechanism, sensitive and 
responsive to a company’s and employee’s needs (Brading & Wright, 1990).  However, 
Marchington and Wilkinson (2000) warn that the links between performance and the 
level of pay are not always clear and effective.   
 
Nevertheless, based on Mahoney’s (1992) non-traditional classification of executive 
bonus pay systems, PRP has two distinct varieties.  The first is a merit-based system 
whereby a proportion of future remuneration is linked to a subjective performance 
assessment conducted by a supervisor (Torrington et al., 2002).  It is a one-time 
adjustment to pay that must be earned each evaluation period (Lowery, Beadles, Petty, 
Amsler, & Thompson, 2002).  The second variety is a goal-based system, and in this 
instance, a proportion of future remuneration is linked to an objective performance 
assessment where the employee is tasked with achieving certain performance targets.  It 
is part of an individual’s compensation package that is not guaranteed but must be earned 
only if pre-determined performance targets are met (Sturman & Short, 2000; Torrington 
et al., 2002).   
 
Compensation arrangements in practice are diverse and encompass disparate elements 
including deferred pay such as stock options as well as short-term pay such as bonuses 
(Lewellen et al., 1987).  The following section discusses both elements in turn. 
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2.9.1. Deferred compensation 
A deferred compensation strategy is used as a means of bonding executives to their firm 
(Eaton & Rosen, 1983), and consists of pensions, stock options and other LTIPs.  Stock-
based incentives offer a more efficient trade-off between risk and incentives and, 
subsequently, are more effective at aligning the interests of the manager with that of the 
owner.  Blair (1994) suggests that pressures to tie executive pay to stock market 
performance came out of an extended episode in which the way to improve stock 
performance was often corporate restructuring, for example, to downsize and cut costs.  
However, such incentives are skewed because they can give executives an unlimited 
potential for gain if stock prices rise but may inflict no penalty if stock prices fall (Blair, 
1995).  This view is echoed by Certo et al. (2003) who state that because executives incur 
no cash outlay until they exercise options, they experience less downside risk.  
Essentially, deferred rewards are worth less to the executive than instant cash.   
 
Despite these drawbacks, stock-based compensation initiatives are the largest component 
of long-term compensation and have come to dominate the pay of top executives (Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Blair, 1995; Tosi et al., 1997).  This shift in executive pay from cash to 
equity sees the executive being paid like owners in order to act like owners (Berle & 
Means, 1991; B. J. Hall, 2000; Ezzamel & Watson, 2002).  It is an attempt to align the 
interests of executives with those of shareholders, decrease the degree of risk aversion of 
executives (Vogel & McGinnis, 1999), discourage managerial opportunism, promote 
shareholder-wealth maximisation, and increase firm performance (Sanders, 1999; B. J. 
Hall, 2000; Pass et al., 2000; Sanders, 2001).  This view is supported by Certo et al. 
(2003) who found that investors view stock option compensation positively, and believe 
stock options and equity ownership are distinct, but complementary, incentive 
mechanisms. 
 
B. J. Hall and Liebman (1998) report  that a majority of the variation in executive wealth 
associated with changes in firm value stems from the executives’ holdings of stock 
options.  Furthermore, McKnight and Tomkins (1999) comment that much of the 
research on executive pay has focused on long-term pay such as stock options rather than 
short-term compensation such as the annual bonus.  In addition, Hayes and Schaefer 
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(2000) suggest that salary and bonus payments may be superfluous as incentive 
instruments.  Consequently, McGuire and Matta (2003) question this widespread reliance 
on stock option programs as a means to align executives’ and shareholders’ interests and, 
subsequently, call for a focus on bonus-based incentive programs. 
 
2.9.2. Bonus-based incentives 
One important component of executive remuneration is the annual bonus with most firms 
using short-term or annual bonus plans in their executive compensation programs 
(Conyon et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Ittner et al., 1997).  According to 
Rajagopalan (1996) and later Kaplan and Atkinson (1998), annual bonuses emphasise 
short-term performance and tend to use cash (rather than stock) as the form of incentive.  
In addition, Baron and Kreps (1999) argue that onetime bonus payments are more salient 
to the workforce resulting in a long-term trend toward bonuses and away from rises in 
base pay.  It is also suggested that bonuses are a ubiquitous component of executive 
compensation in virtually every for-profit company and a separate and distinct 
component of pay (Sturman & Short, 2000; Murphy, 2001).  Furthermore, short-term 
bonuses represent the most direct and immediate link between managerial actions and 
consequences as cash incentives generate no further risk or commitment on the part of 
the executive since the value of a cash bonus is not affected by how well the firm does in 
the future (Schuler & Huber, 1993; Rajagopalan, 1996; Murphy, 2001).   
 
Short-term bonuses are notoriously susceptible to manipulation or tampering (Larker, 
1983; Healy, 1985) and, according to Grant (2003), have played a large part in the rise of 
executive pay.  Despite this, the annual bonus as an incentive device has continued to 
grow in popularity, which is supported by a number of UK and American studies.   
 
Studies based on UK firms conducted by IDS (1993) in the first instance reported that in 
1979 only 8% of large companies had an annual bonus scheme for their top executives 
and by 1993 almost all companies had some form of annual bonus scheme for their 
executives.  Secondly, McKnight (1996) found that the mean annual bonus figure for 
1993 and 1994 were £94,709 and £112,058 respectively revealing a growth rate of 
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18.32% (£17,349).   Finally, Conyon and Murphy (1998) found that, on average, bonuses 
equated for 18% of an executive’s total pay.   
 
Alternatively, studies based on American firms conducted by Leonard (1990) in the first 
instance revealed that between 1981 and 1985 the proportion of sampled firms using 
bonus systems increased from 95.6% to 98.3% demonstrating a growth rate of 2.7% over 
a 5-year period.  Finally, S. E. Hall and Koors (2004) highlighted that bonus pay for 
CEOs rose from 16% in 2002 to 21% in 2003. 
   
Bonus pay is an old and effective way to improve firm performance and represents 
rewards for past actions or made to induce future contributions (Prasad, 1974; Lawler, 
1990).  The annual bonus, which is typically tied to short-term measures, is any cash 
payment earned during the previous twelve months that was based exclusively on one 
year’s worth of performance information (Abowd, 1990; McKnight, 1996; Bloom & 
Milkovich, 1998; Abowd & Kaplan, 1999).  It must also be re-earned each pay period 
and as it is a onetime payment does not have a permanent effect on labour costs 
(Milkovich & Newman, 2002).  In support, regulators recommend that executives should 
not be automatically entitled to bonuses nor should it become a guaranteed element of 
remuneration (Greenbury, 1995; ABI, 2002).  Essentially, bonuses should be cut or 
eliminated when individual performance is poor (ABI, 2002).   
 
Studies that specifically examine the annual bonus and its subsequent relationship to 
company performance include Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1989) and Gerhart and 
Milkovich’s (1990) study of American firms and McKnight’s (1996) study of UK 
organisations.  All three studies found that bonus pay was positively and significantly 
associated with firm performance as measured by return on equity in the first example, 
return on assets in the second, and EPS in the final instance.  However, McKnight (1996) 
also discovered that alternative performance indicators such as sales turnover and total 
shareholder return (TSR) were insignificantly related to bonus pay.  In a later study 
conducted by McKnight and Tomkins (1999), which was also based on a UK sample, 
indicated that EPS was insignificantly related to bonus pay. 
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Smyth (1959) discovered that many executives considered the bonus payment as a 
regular and permanent addition to salary and as a right of their position.  Lawler (1990) 
would argue, however, that executives have to earn their bonus.  Despite this, a study 
conducted by ECS Wyatt Data Services (1992) found that most firms provide a bonus to 
the CEO regardless of firm performance variations, so that in many cases, it is difficult to 
distinguish bonuses from base salary.  Consequently, bonuses often constitute salary 
supplements that the CEO comes to expect as part of their annual cash compensation 
(Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  It is further suggested that because bonuses are regularly awarded 
they become more like an entitlement and, hence, more like fixed pay (Gomez-Mejia & 
Wiseman, 1997).  Conversely, Sturman and Short (2000) argue that bonus pay is part of 
an executive’s compensation that is not guaranteed and contingent upon performance 
criteria.   
 
Following the work of Smyth (1959) and Baker et al. (1988), Indjejikian and Nanda 
(2002) suggest that bonuses are an integral component of an organisation’s management 
control systems and that bonuses regardless of ability, position, and promotion prospects 
motivate individuals to be more productive (See Figure 4 overleaf for a typical executive 
annual bonus plan).  Additionally, bonus-based incentives will be more significant at 
higher levels in the organisation since the probability of future promotion is lower except 
through the market to enter organisations (Baker et al., 1988; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 
1997).  Short-term bonus plans, which can vary in terms of the type of payment, i.e. cash 
or equity, and in the timing of payment, are a popular inclusion in the design of executive 
pay packages (Ittner et al., 1997).  They are a means to reward superior performance as 
well as compensating for heightened responsibility and pressure, and recruiting and 
retaining exceptional talent (Vogt, 1995; Joyce, 1999; Sturman & Short, 2000; Osborne, 
2001).  However, Bushman and Smith (2001; 2003) argue that the contribution of cash 
compensation to the overall intensity of top executive incentives has diminished in recent 
years. 
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Figure 4. A typical executive annual bonus plan adapted from Murphy (2001) 
(Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002, p. 797). 
 
2.10. SUMMARY 
Pay and performance is a topic that has generated an abundance of research but produced 
a mixed set of results (Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  The consensus is that executive pay has a 
weak or statistically insignificant association with firm performance (Barkema & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  As a result, academics have called for a more concentrated effort 
to research aspects of pay that have been mainly neglected such as the annual bonus.  
The annual bonus is shown to be a significant and popular component of executive 
reward (Conyon et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Ittner et al., 1997), and one in need 
of further analysis (McGuire & Matta, 2003).  Consequently, this study, as outlined in 
chapter 1, considers the relationship between executive annual bonus pay and firm 
performance in the UK.  The agency model alone cannot fully explain the intricacies 
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associated with the research question identified in chapter 1.  Therefore, in order to 
provide greater clarity the self-serving management/power model is used in tandem with 
the agency model to explain the pay-performance relation. 
 
The next chapter uses this literature and agency theory in conjunction with the self-
serving/power model to develop a set of competing hypotheses.  These will guide the 
subsequent research and address the overall research question specified in section 1.5 
namely: what is the relationship between executive bonus pay, its detailed 
characteristics, and firm performance in the UK?  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter develops a set of testable hypotheses using two contrasting theories: agency 
theory and the self-serving management/power model.  They examine the relationship 
between the value of an executive's short-term annual bonus and a series of independent 
variables including firm performance (i.e. TSR and EPS), firm size (i.e. total number of 
employees), payment type (i.e. cash/shares), performance target type (i.e. hard/soft and 
simple/complex), and specific CG features (i.e. NED ratio on the remuneration 
committee, CEO presence on the nominations committee, CEO/Chair duality, tenure, and 
power).  In addition, the association between firm performance and the form of payment 
and performance target type is examined.  It has nine sections. 
 
Each section presents competing hypotheses: (a) based on agency and (b) power theory. 
Applying (a) and (b) in turn: 
? Section 3.1 explores the relationship between the value of the bonus and firm 
performance;  
? Section 3.2 examines the relationship between the value of the bonus and firm size; 
? Sections 3.3 to 3.4 analyse the value of the bonus and its association with payment 
types and how these forms of payment relate to company performance; 
? Sections 3.5 to 3.6 investigate the value of the bonus and its association with 
hard/soft performance targets and how these targets relate to company performance 
respectively; 
? Sections 3.7 to 3.8 conduct the same analysis but using a simple/complex 
dichotomy; and 
? Section 3.9 explores the value of the bonus and firm-level characteristics, since 
governance as well as firm performance may be expected to influence the level of 
executive pay (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). It has five sub-sections:   
o Section 3.9.1 develops hypotheses in relation to the composition of the 
firm’s remuneration committee and bonus; 
o 3.9.2, similarly addresses the nominations committee;  
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o 3.9.3, looks at the relation between CEO/Chair duality, whereby the roles 
of the CEO and the chairman of the board are combined, and the value of 
the bonus;   
o 3.9.4, examines the relation between executive tenure and the value of the 
bonus; and 
o 3.9.5, considers executive power and entrenchment as an influence on 
bonus value. 
 
3.1. THE VALUE OF THE ANNUAL BONUS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Agency theory identifies agency problems between shareholders and managers based on 
the misalignment of interests between the principal and the agent.  Consequently, it is the 
board’s responsibility to design compensation schemes that provide managers with 
efficient incentives to raise shareholder value (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999b; Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003).  As a result, it is assumed that shareholders will design bonus schemes 
based on performance targets that contribute to shareholder value.  Consequently, from 
an agency perspective, it is hypothesised that:   
H1a. The value of executive bonus will be positively associated with firm 
performance, as measured by TSR and EPS 
 
By implication, a mirror image of this hypothesis will be based on the self-serving 
management/power model, which argues that the conflict of interest between principal 
and agent arises because of opportunistic, self-serving executives (Holmstrom, 1979; 
Veliyath, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 2001; J. S. Miller et al., 2002).  In addition, it suggests 
that because ownership and control has become more dispersed, executives are able to 
fully entrench themselves within the firm and extract greater rents through their 
compensation arrangements (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004), oblivious to the welfare of the 
owners.  Therefore, under the power model, it is hypothesised that: 
H1b. The value of executive bonus will be negatively associated with firm 
performance, as measured by TSR and EPS 
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3.2. THE VALUE OF THE ANNUAL BONUS AND FIRM SIZE 
In this study, as a control variable and primary indicator of firm size, the total number of 
employees is taken as a proxy for firm size.  According to Berle and Means (1991), firm 
size is the most compelling explanation for levels of executive pay.  In addition, 
tournament theory and an association between firm size, task complexity and needed 
executive effort (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) suggests that executive compensation 
is positively correlated with firm size (Santerre & Neun, 1989; Tosi et al., 2000).  
However, from an agency perspective, because an executive’s primary responsibility is 
to raise shareholder value through raising a company’s share price, strategies to increase 
firm size that were considered to be non-value maximising would be avoided as a course 
of action.  Consequently, due to the focus on shareholder welfare, it is hypothesised that: 
H2a. The value of executive bonus will not be positively associated with firm size 
 
Based on power theory, a mirror image of this hypothesis would argue that entrenched 
executives will focus on self-interested goals that are, generally, non-value maximising 
and, therefore, may be more inclined to grow firm size rather than TSR or EPS.  This 
may be due to the positive affirmations associated with running large corporations.  
Therefore, it is hypothesised that:       
H2b. The value of executive bonus will be positively associated with firm size 
 
3.3. THE VALUE OF THE ANNUAL BONUS AND PAYMENT TYPES  
Bonus as shares, and this better alignment of shareholder/executive interests, may also be 
associated with greater executive effort, improved firm performance and higher bonus.  
Thus, agency theory argues that this may lead to a reduction in risk aversion (Vogel & 
McGinnis, 1999), discourage managerial opportunism, promote shareholder-wealth 
maximisation, and increase firm performance (Sanders, 1999; B. J. Hall, 2000; Pass et 
al., 2000; Sanders, 2001).  Therefore, consistent with agency theory, external, verifiable 
performance measures better align the relationship between share-based pay and 
performance.  Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H3a. The value of executive bonus will not be positively related to cash bonuses 
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In contrast, short-term cash bonuses are, in general, awarded on the basis of achieving 
subjective, less transparent and internally generated performance targets such as aspects 
of managerial input like leadership.  As a result, they are notoriously susceptible to 
manipulation or tampering (Larker, 1983; Healy, 1985).  Therefore, a mirror image of 
this hypothesis would suggest that, consistent with power theory, entrenched executives 
will attempt to extract greater rents through short-term cash bonus contracts.  
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H3b. The value of executive bonus will be positively related to cash bonuses 
 
3.4. FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ANNUAL BONUS PAYMENT TYPES  
As the name would suggest, share-based bonuses are closely associated with share price 
performance.  Agency theory argues that the alignment of interests between shareholder 
and executive is improved when using share-based (rather than cash) bonuses (Berle & 
Means, 1991; B. J. Hall, 2000).  Shares that embody the present value of future income 
flows give the executive an incentive to invest in financial and human assets, including 
acquisitions.  Cash-based bonuses, however, are considered to have the opposite effect, 
distorting effort, and encouraging short-term achievement rather than long-term 
improvements in shareholder value (Rajagopalan, 1996).  Therefore, agency theory 
would expect share-based bonuses to be linked directly or indirectly with the long-term 
goals of the firm, and it is hypothesised that: 
H4a. Share-based bonuses will be positively associated with firm performance as 
measured by TSR  
 
However, consistent with power theory, it is argued that entrenched executives prefer 
cash to shares (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).  Essentially, cash incentives generate no further 
risk or commitment on the part of the executive since the value of a cash bonus is not 
affected by how well the firm does in the future (Schuler & Huber, 1993; Rajagopalan, 
1996; Murphy, 2001).  Consequently, due to a short-term focus with no incentive to 
develop long-term strategies that may raise shareholder value, it is hypothesised that: 
H4b. Cash bonuses will be negatively associated with firm performance as measured 
by TSR  
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3.5. THE VALUE OF THE ANNUAL BONUS AND HARD/SOFT PERFORMANCE 
TARGETS  
Performance targets, both hard (i.e. external targets and/or internal targets that are 
published in annual reports) and soft (i.e. unspecified targets), are a common feature in 
the design of an executive’s remuneration package.  Hard targets such as share price and 
published internal targets are difficult to manipulate but are influenced by uncontrollable 
exogenous factors (Healy, 1985; Murphy, 1986a; Rajagopalan, 1996).  Consequently, the 
transparency and tight shareholder monitoring often associated with hard targets may 
lead to smaller bonuses.  Therefore, from an agency view, it is hypothesised that: 
H5a. The value of executive bonus will be negatively associated with hard 
performance targets  
 
In contrast, unspecified or non-financial measures such as customer satisfaction (based 
on internal surveys) are more prone to executive manipulation and are rarely subject to 
public verification (Ittner et al., 1997).  Based on the power model, other things equal, 
entrenched executives prefer less risk, more slack, and greater compensation (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2004).  Therefore, powerful executives may ensure that soft, unspecified targets 
(because they are considered opaque, easy to manipulate, difficult to verify, and may 
distort the pay-performance relationship) are the preferred choice of performance 
measure.  Consequently, larger bonuses may be linked with softer, unspecified bonus 
indicators.  As a result, it is hypothesised that:   
H5b. The value of executive bonus will be positively associated with soft 
performance targets  
 
3.6. FIRM PERFORMANCE AND HARD/SOFT PERFORMANCE TARGETS  
Hard performance targets are, in general, external, visible and more difficult to attain.  
However, they do give executives an incentive to improve external performance 
measures that may increase the demand for company shares and hence TSR or the size of 
the dividends released through EPS.  Therefore, consistent with agency theory, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H6a. Firm performance, as measured by TSR and EPS, will be positively related to 
hard performance targets 
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Conversely, soft targets are generally internal, less visible and easier to attain.  In 
addition, they are easy to manipulate (Healy, 1985; Rajagopalan, 1996) or camouflage 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004), enabling powerful executives to extract greater rents.  
However, this practice may not be associated with stronger overall firm performance.  
Therefore, power theory predicts that entrenched executives will prefer soft, unspecified 
targets and with incentives to improve internal less visible measures of performance may 
neglect actions that increase shareholder value in preference for non-value maximising 
opportunities.  As a result, it is hypothesised that: 
H6b. Firm performance, as measured by TSR and EPS, will be negatively related to 
soft performance targets 
 
3.7. THE VALUE OF THE ANNUAL BONUS AND SIMPLE/COMPLEX 
PERFORMANCE TARGETS  
An extension of the performance target hypothesis includes the dimension of simple 
versus complex performance targets.  Lingle and Schiemann (1996) suggest that the 
clarity of performance measures contributes to executive uncertainty.  As a result, it is 
recommended that few measures, which are clear and simple as well as easy to 
understand, manage and communicate, be incorporated into performance target design 
(Lingle & Schiemann, 1996; Ho & McKay, 2002; Franco & Bourne, 2003).  Therefore, it 
may be suggested that simple targets facilitate executive focus, the monitoring of 
executive action, and the identification of executive achievement.  Simplicity has the 
potential to limit executive discretion and reduce the pay-performance gap through 
improved transparency and tighter shareholder monitoring, which may lead to smaller 
bonuses.  Consequently, based on an agency view, it is hypothesised that: 
H7a. The value of executive bonus will be negatively associated with simple 
performance targets 
 
However, combining external and internal performance targets may be associated with a 
heightened degree of complexity, which has the potential to hamper monitoring strategies 
and limit the ability of shareholders to identify achievement.  Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) argue that multi-tasking agents may misallocate effort across tasks.  Complexity, 
therefore, complicates the decision-making process (Yearta et al., 1995), dilutes 
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executive incentives, creates opportunities for powerful executives, encourages executive 
discretion, and widens the pay-performance gap.  Consistent with power theory, 
entrenched executives want to maximise their multi-period bonus payments and in doing 
so prefer complex targets because they are opaque and open to manipulation, which 
makes identifying achievement with any certainty difficult.  As a result, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H7b. The value of executive bonus will be positively associated with complex 
performance targets 
 
3.8. FIRM PERFORMANCE AND SIMPLE/COMPLEX PERFORMANCE TARGETS  
As in section 3.7, it is argued that simple targets can facilitate executive focus, the 
monitoring of executive action, and identifying achievement.  Therefore, simplicity has 
the potential to limit executive discretion and tighten the pay-performance gap through 
improved transparency and closer shareholder monitoring.  Consequently, based on an 
agency view, it is hypothesised that: 
H8a. Firm performance, as measured by TSR and EPS, will be positively related to 
simple performance targets 
 
In contrast, Yearta et al. (1995) argue that complexity complicates the decision-making 
process.  It may also dilute executive incentives, create opportunities for powerful 
executives, encourage executive discretion, and widen the pay-performance gap.  
Therefore, consistent with the power model, entrenched executives want to maximise 
their bonus payments and, subsequently, prefer complex targets because they are opaque 
and vulnerable to manipulation, which makes identifying achievement with any real 
accuracy difficult.  As a result, it is hypothesised that: 
H8b. Firm performance, as measured by TSR and EPS, will be negatively related to 
complex performance targets 
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3.9. THE VALUE OF THE ANNUAL BONUS AND GOVERNANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
3.9.1. Remuneration committee NEDs 
Research suggests that the composition of the remuneration committee will influence 
executive pay (O'Reilly et al., 1988).  On the one hand, Mangel and Singh (1993) argue 
that the percentage of NEDs that sit on the board of directors has no significant impact on 
executive compensation, whereas Conyon and Peck (1998) found that pay and 
performance was more closely aligned when there was a higher proportion of NEDs 
serving on the remuneration committee.  Despite these conflicting results, an agency 
view predicts that a higher proportion of NEDs on the committee will provide greater 
shareholder representation.  They are thought to be more equipped to analyse strategic 
decisions objectively (Blair, 1995) and are considered better monitors because they lack 
any disincentive to monitor (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  Therefore, a higher proportion of 
NEDs may indicate more effective external monitoring, limit management’s ability to 
exploit insider information, and reduce potential agency problems (Wright & Kroll, 
2002).  Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H9a. A high percentage of NEDs will be negatively related to the value of executive 
bonus 
 
A mirror image of this hypothesis, based on power theory, would argue that entrenched 
executives are in a position to influence the number and identity of NEDs that are 
appointed to the committee.  Essentially, powerful executives prefer ‘insiders’ as 
opposed to ‘outsiders’.  However, unmotivated outsiders may be easier to manipulate 
than knowledgeable insiders.  In any case, executives may be able to pack the 
remuneration committee with sympathetic outsiders (see section 3.9.2 below in relation 
to board nominations).  Therefore, from a power perspective, it is hypothesised that: 
H9b. A low percentage of NEDs will be positively related to the value of executive 
bonus 
 
3.9.2. CEO presence on the nominations committee 
Executive or insider nominations provide first-hand, in-depth company knowledge, and 
bring a recognizable emotional commitment to, and involvement with, the company 
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(Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  This ‘informativeness’ may facilitate the decision-making 
process by removing the ambiguities and conflicts that could otherwise arise when board 
composition is mixed.  From an agency perspective, it is suggested that this efficiency 
will provide an environment that supports and is focused on raising shareholder value 
rather than exploiting corporate assets to extract greater rents.  As a result, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H10a. CEO presence on the nominations committee will be negatively associated with 
the value of executive bonus 
 
Control over employee selection is an efficient means of building or protecting power 
bases (Pfeffer, 1981) and, according to Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), executives play a 
major role in appointing the board and using the board as a vehicle to legitimise 
decisions that may not be in the best interest of owners.  Consequently, executive control 
over the director nomination process represents an important source of managerial 
entrenchment (Wade et al., 1990).  For instance, CEOs who have an active presence on 
the nominations committee can co-opt the board by favouring the appointment of 
sympathetic new directors (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989), whereby NED interests are 
aligned with those of management rather than shareholders.  This rise in the level of CEO 
entrenchment may lead to the weak monitoring and control of executive pay packages.  
Consequently, under the power model, it is hypothesised that: 
H10b. CEO presence on the nominations committee will be positively associated with 
the value of executive bonus 
 
3.9.3. CEO/Chair duality 
CEO/Chair duality may be interpreted by agency theory as being consistent with an 
efficient arrangement involving synergy.  Alternatively, it may be seen as just another 
dimension of the variety of ways in which executives exert their power over the firm at 
the expense of shareholders.  
 
Looking first at the agency view, combining the role of CEO and chairman of the board 
facilitates the decision-making process by removing the ambiguities and conflicts that 
could otherwise arise where power is shared.  In addition, Harrison et al. (1988) state that 
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the increase in power and responsibility that the combined position affords is 
accompanied by an increase in accountability.  It is argued that this accountability may 
limit the misuse of power to extract greater rents regardless of the level of performance 
and may indeed concentrate CEO efforts to improve shareholder value.  As a result, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H11a. The value of executive bonus will be negatively related to CEO/Chair duality  
 
Executive power commonly manifests itself in the form of CEO/Chair duality whereby 
the CEO also operates as chairman of the board (Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  Prior 
research on whether or not CEO/Chair duality influences executive pay is mixed 
(Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  Nevertheless, a dual role may increase CEO power, 
restrict board independence, reduce its ability to fulfil its governance function and, 
moreover, may constitute a clear conflict of interest (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Rechner 
& Dalton, 1991).  Consequently, combined roles may be expected to weaken shareholder 
monitoring, since the CEO is also the shareholders’ chief representative. This may result 
in weaker controls on executive pay, with the value of rewards positively associated with 
duality.  Therefore, based on power theory, which argues that entrenched executives will 
act in their own self-interest (Lubatkin et al., 2003) and use corporate assets to extract 
greater rents (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004), it is hypothesised that: 
H11b. The value of executive bonus will be positively related to CEO duality  
 
3.9.4. Executive tenure 
Long-periods of tenure increase the executive’s level of firm-specific human capital 
(Buchholtz et al., 2003).  It is suggested that long tenure leads to greater expertise and 
experience, which may culminate in the executive being better qualified to enhance 
shareholder value.  In addition, it is suggested that as tenure increases, the executive may 
be more willing to receive compensation in the form of stock and options (as opposed to 
cash bonuses).  Therefore, with increased executive knowledge on how to raise 
shareholder value, increased tenure may reduce the need for bonus as an alignment 
mechanism.  As a result, from an agency view, it is hypothesised that: 
H12a. The value of executive bonus will not be positively associated with years of 
tenure 
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Executive power also manifests itself in terms of executive tenure on the board of 
directors, as entrenched executives control boards.  Research indicates that tenure has a 
significant effect on executive pay (see Murphy, 1986a; H. D. Platt, 1987; Henderson & 
Fredrickson, 1996; Lippert & Porter, 1997; Wright et al., 2002).  From a power 
perspective, this may be explained in terms of entrenchment whereby an extended period 
of tenure allows the executive to control the board and exert their social influence in 
order to weaken the relationship between pay and performance (Harrison et al., 1988; 
Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wade et al., 1990; Hill & Phan, 1991). Consequently, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H12b. The value of executive bonus will be positively associated with years of tenure 
 
3.9.5. Executive power 
Executive power may manifest itself in terms of CEO/Chair duality and increased 
executive tenure.  As indicated in section 3.9.3, a dual role may facilitate the decision-
making process by removing the ambiguities and conflicts that could otherwise arise 
where power is shared.  This increase in power and responsibility that the combined 
position affords is accompanied by an increase in accountability, which may limit the 
misuse of power to extract rents regardless of performance.  In addition, increased tenure 
may bring to the firm (and shareholders) the fruits of executives’ knowledge, experience 
and contacts.  On an agency view, therefore, CEO/Chair duality and tenure would not be 
expected to be positively associated with bonus value.  Consequently, it is hypothesised 
that: 
H13a. Executive power will be negatively associated with the value of executive 
bonus 
 
Over time, power may increase and, without a vigilant board, top executives may become 
entrenched in their positions, increasing their ability to exploit corporate resources and 
extract greater rents (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Shen, 2003).  Essentially, incumbent 
executives exercise unfettered power and influence over captive directors in order to 
extract rents through their compensation arrangements (Murphy, 2002; Dedman, 2003; 
Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).  Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
H13b. Executive power will be positively associated with the value of executive bonus 
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3.10. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the main hypotheses to be tested in this thesis.  In particular, it 
has been hypothesised using two competing theories (agency and the self-serving 
management/power theory) that firm performance will generally be positively and 
negatively associated with the value of executive bonus pay, respectively.  Bonus 
features may be viewed as micro governance characteristics, and, again, pairs of 
competing hypotheses have been generated for each one.  
 
The next chapter discusses the methodology adopted to test these proposed hypotheses.  
It specifies the philosophical position adopted, the data collection methods employed, 
together with the choice of variables, and econometric models.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. RESEARCH AIM 
The aim of this research is to examine the relationship between an executive’s annual 
bonus and firm performance.  This is a unique research endeavour as much of the 
existing literature on executive pay has focused on long-term incentives, almost to the 
exclusion of short-term rewards such as annual bonuses.  In addition, the originality of 
this research centres on the independently constructed database of UK companies1 that 
are listed in the FTSE-350.  In relation to other studies in the field, the database demands 
standard methods and tools for analysis.  This study, however, has these characteristics 
that make it distinctive. 
1) Almost all empirical studies on executive pay conducted in the past have utilised 
American data or focused on American contexts (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
Consequently, data on other countries represents a rich, virtually untapped, source of 
increased understanding of what determines executive pay (Barkema, Geroski, & 
Schwalbach, 1997).  Therefore, due to a shortage of research on executive pay that 
utilises UK evidence, the present study will focus on UK firms and practices.   
2) Much of the past research on executive pay has focused on aggregate pay measures 
(see Veliyath, 1999; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002).  As a result, few, if any, UK studies 
have analysed exclusively the relationship between annual bonus pay, as a single 
feature of executive compensation, and company performance.  Evidence also 
indicates a shortage of UK research that examines the association between 
performance targets, the value of the annual bonus and firm performance.   
3) The analysis of compensation for executives below the very top of the corporate 
hierarchy is valuable because many strategic decisions are made by top managers of 
business units, as opposed to the corporate CEO (Lambert et al., 1991).  To further 
emphasise this point, Ezzamel and Watson (2002) claim that the limitation of 
previous research on executive pay is its predominant focus on the remuneration of 
the CEO, or highest paid director, to the exclusion of other board members.  In 
                                                 
1 UK companies – this refers to companies listed on the FTSE-350.  It is acknowledged that some of these 
companies e.g. Antofagasta plc (Chile), Eurotunnel plc (France), SABMiller plc (South Africa), etc, have 
their main offices located outside of the UK.  However, for the purpose of this study, companies that trade 
on the UK’s stock exchange, i.e. the FTSE, are considered a UK company. 
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response, this study’s scope is much wider and, hence, examines the top tier of 
management in addition to the CEO.  
4) The data is current and based on two consecutive years (2001/02 and 2002/03).  It is 
anticipated that this contemporary data will reflect and accommodate the many 
political and economic changes that have occurred over the past decade.   
5) As a result of poor response rates, or as a deliberate methodological decision, 
previous studies have employed small sample sizes ranging from 50 to 150 firms (see 
McKnight, 1996; Conyon & Sadler, 2001).   The present study, however, has used a 
sample framework that is relatively large, comprising 299 separate companies and 
1,542 individual executives. 
6) The inclusion of qualitative interviews into the research design is a strategy that is 
unique to the field.  The semi-structured interviews are a means to validate the 
objectivity of the annual reports and inform some of the methodological choices, 
which are referred to later in the chapter. 
7) Unlike other studies, this research uses two prominent theories gleaned from the 
executive pay literature, i.e. agency theory and the self-serving management/power 
perspective, in order to explain the relationship between bonus pay and firm 
performance.  According to J. R. Platt (1964), testing opposing hypotheses is 
important for strong inference.  In addition, Stinchcombe (1983) argues that such an 
approach generates a set of observations that allows researchers to “decide between 
two alternative theories, both of which according to present knowledge are quite 
likely” (p. 25).  Furthermore, Zajac and Kratz (1993) and Finkelstein and D'Aveni 
(1994) both support the view that research on CG might benefit when potentially 
contradictory theories on organisations and agency relations are considered 
simultaneously, with the latter adding that their reconciliation can reveal promising 
contingency relationships that may deepen understanding of board-CEO issues. 
 
Hughes (1990) states that every research tool or procedure is embedded in commitments 
to particular visions of the world and to knowing that world, and that no method of 
investigation is self-validating but operates within a given set of assumptions. “Every 
philosophy presupposes a reality” (Lawson, 1997, p. 48), therefore, the explanation of 
behaviour depends on the vantage point from which it is observed, that is, “where you 
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stand can influence what you see” (Fischer, 1998, p. 128).  Consequently, the 
epistemological stance of any research project will influence its design and the methods 
employed for data collection.  Therefore, the particular ontological and epistemological 
assumption adopted by the researcher is outlined next.   
 
4.2. POSITIVISM 
Positivism is “a philosophy of the natural sciences” (Blaikie, 1993, p. 14) and is the 
dominant philosophy of this study.  From an ontological perspective, positivist research 
is conducted in an observable and tangible social reality, which is viewed as a complex 
set of causal relations between events which are depicted as an emerging patchwork of 
relations between variables (Blaikie, 1993; Denscombe, 2002b; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, 
& Lowe, 2002).  In terms of epistemology, the researcher is an objective, value-free 
analyst, independent of and detached from the phenomena under investigation with the 
end product being the derivation of covering laws (Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Denscombe, 
2002b; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
 
Remenyi, Williams, Money, and Swartz (1998), supplementing the work of Denzin 
(1989), Blaikie (1993), and May (1993), describe positivism as a perspective that views 
people as phenomena to be studied externally, explaining behaviour on the basis of 
quantifiable observations, which lend themselves to statistical analysis.  Such an 
approach assumes there are independent causes that lead to observed effects and that 
evidence and prudence are important to ensure findings can be generalised to the wider 
population (Remenyi et al., 1998).  In addition, Remenyi et al. (1998) claim that one of 
the key tenets of positivism is that it employs a reductionist approach to exploring the 
relationships among the variables to be studied.  This simplification of the real world 
environment is necessary in order to control the investigation and understand how the 
variables concerned are behaving.  However, this simplification may lead to 
complicating factors, and possibly some of the most interesting, being omitted from the 
research.  
 
Giddens (1974) points out that the term positivist has become one of opprobrium, with 
Jung (1995) suggesting that, despite science providing enormous quantities of 
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knowledge, the insights are sparse and specialised in nature.  Jung (1995) also comments 
that science is far too general and has failed to adequately manage the subjective variety 
of individual life.   
 
Therefore, aware of the limitations of a pure positivist approach, this study is 
incorporating an interpretive aspect into the research.  By substantiating empirical 
findings with interpretive data, which is concerned with understanding social phenomena 
from the participants frame of reference (Hussey & Hussey, 1997), the reliability and 
validity of the results may be heightened.  In this study, a total of six interviews will be 
conducted due to the reasons outlined in 4.1 point six. 
 
4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
Remenyi et al. (1998) claim that it is difficult to generate theory without data and at the 
same time difficult to collect data without a theoretical framework.  Consequently, based 
on Bulmer’s (1986) assumption that these two aspects of research are interdependent, 
Remenyi et al. (1998) add that a dialectical relationship exists between the two aspects, 
which act to reinforce each other.  Essentially, both are central to any significant research 
activity and both are required to make any real scientific progress.  Therefore, this study 
amalgamates both the empirical and theoretical approaches into the research design.   
 
From an ontological perspective, the empiricist assumes that evidence is collected from a 
natural world which is depicted as tangible, objective, and measurable (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Hussey & Hussey, 1997).  In addition, it is 
epistemologically assumed that to be of any significance knowledge needs to be based on 
evidence from this external reality in order to be able to make a satisfactory claim to have 
added to the body of knowledge (Remenyi et al., 1998; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  In 
contrast, the theoretical approach, which refers to ideas and constructs that are 
contemplative or abstract (McNeill, 1990), is concerned with the acquisition of theory 
conceptualised by Hammersley (2000) as “knowledge of general relationships among 
types of phenomena” (p. 225).  In this instance, theory directs and supports the collection 
of data and econometric analysis.   
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It is also suggested that the theoretical phase of the research is representative of a 
deductive method whereby theorising comes before the research enquiry (Finn, Elliot-
White, & Walton, 2000).  In this context, the deductive strategy ensures that theory, in an 
extensive and mature area of study, develops incrementally.  In addition, under a 
deductive framework, science and knowledge develop through advancing hypotheses, 
making deductions from them and using empirical observations to test these deductions 
until they are accepted or refuted (Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Finn et al., 2000; P. K. 
Smith, 2000).   
 
Consequently, it may be suggested that this study adopts a pure but exploratory research 
approach.  The former leads to theoretical development by re-examining existing theories 
on executive pay, whilst the later, seeks out and explains observed patterns and trends in 
the pay-performance relationship by discovering and measuring causal relations (Hussey 
& Hussey, 1997; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
 
4.4. A MULTI-METHOD APPROACH 
According to Sayer (1992), in order to confirm quantitative empirical data, qualitative 
information is needed on the nature of the objects involved.  As a result, using 
Cresswell’s (1998) three types of research design this study adopts a two-phase design 
whereby the main quantitative phase is supported by a qualitative phase.  In addition, 
Downward, Finch, and Ramsay (2002) suggest that using a variety of research techniques 
enhances the accounts afforded to types of phenomena.   
 
Although conclusions are not drawn from the interviews, this study nevertheless 
combines two methods of data collection.  The quantitative method tests hypotheses and 
identifies patterns in variables whereas the qualitative method validates corporate 
information and informs some of the methodological decisions.  This use of multiple, but 
independent, research methodologies to study the same phenomenon is a strategy 
advocated by Fielding and Fielding (1986) and what Denzin (1989) broadly terms 
methodological triangulation.  Specifically, this study employs a between-method 
triangulation strategy, as opposed to a within-method approach, which combines 
dissimilar methods to measure the same unit as well as act as a vehicle for cross 
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validation between the quantitative and qualitative data (Jick, 1979; Denzin, 1989).  
Therefore, the effectiveness of triangulation rests on the premise that the unique 
deficiencies of each single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing 
strengths of another (Jick, 1979; Denzin, 1989).  Fisher (1998), complementing the work 
of Jick (1979), states that multiple perspectives and measures opens the door to a more 
subtle and complex form of rigour thus allowing for greater accuracy and robustness.   
 
4.5. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH: THE DATABASE 
With its origins in the scientific empirical tradition the quantitative approach relies on 
numerical evidence to draw conclusions, to test hypotheses or theory, and is concerned 
with: measurement, causality, generalisation, and replication (Bryman, 1989).  It is 
infused with positivism and is based on the collection of quantifiable observations, which 
permit the deduction of laws and the establishment of relationships (Bryman, 1989; 
Burns, 2000).   
 
As a result, the quantitative aspect of this investigation is based on a database 
independently self-assembled from primary sources, i.e. the annual reports of firms.   
Prior research indicates that the database is a reliable and popular resource when 
examining executive pay.  This is often due to the low response rates associated with 
getting compensation departments of large publicly held corporations to participate in 
survey research (Eskew & Heneman, 1996).  The newly constructed database is a FTSE-
350 composite using an FMLX directory as at 2 September 2003.  It consists of 
significant details pertaining to executive demographics, and remuneration and corporate 
performance figures, which are taken from company annual reports.    
 
Companies’ annual reports are a common resource tool when examining compensation 
and CG details (see Main & Johnston, 1993), which are freely and cheaply accessible and 
open to public scrutiny.   They are also a worthy and reliable source of data, which 
provides relatively clean disaggregated information on salaries and annual bonuses of 
individual executives which can be easily matched to company performance data 
(McKnight, 1996; Murphy, 1998; McKnight & Tomkins, 1999). 
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However, some argue that using published data, rather than collecting data from personal 
observation, may culminate in measurement error existing in the data (Ciscel & Carroll, 
1979).  Such errors, as highlighted by Lewellen et al. (1987), may occur not only because 
the proxy measures chosen to define company characteristics may, as in any empirical 
study, not perfectly capture those characteristics, but also because – even if perfect – they 
are inevitably subject to short-run fluctuations that are not truly indicative of underlying 
longer-run changes.  Furthermore, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) are doubtful that 
continued number crunching of these databases will provide much additional insight on 
the determinants of executive pay.  Others claim that the extent of compensation 
disclosure in company accounts is woefully inadequate (Conyon et al., 1995).  As a 
result, descriptions of executive bonus plans in the literature are anecdotal, non-
representative, or gleaned from voluntary (and non-random) disclosures in company 
proxy statements (Murphy, 1998).   
 
Further limitations associated with unobtrusive measures such as public or private 
archival documents include recognising that calculating procedures in order to formulate 
accounting figures such as EPS may vary from one company to the next.  Essentially, 
there is no way to ensure consistency among the sample so that the same calculating 
practices are adopted.  Additionally, accounting documents may not be completely 
accurate and may have been written with a specific audience and purpose in mind 
(Burns, 2000).  Therefore, these documents may represent the imprint of the organisation 
that produced it, with bias arising simultaneously from both the author and the 
organisation.  Nowadays, executives have become much more adept at manipulating and 
massaging accounting and compensation figures (Charkham, 2001).  Consequently, in 
order to offset some of these concerns, interviews are used in this study.   
 
It seems appropriate at this stage to provide some justification for adopting particular 
variables, and their subsequent measures, which have a prominent role in the analysis.  
Each significant variable and measure is now discussed.   
1) The annual bonus figure refers only to the short-term aspects of bonus pay such as 
cash and shares.  However, compensation of an executive in their last or first year at 
the firm may reflect a partial year payment (Barron & Waddell, 2003).  These partial 
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year payments, if documented, are included whereas deferred bonuses and 
discretionary elements are excluded.  If details of how the bonus is paid are not 
provided it would be assumed that the bonus is paid in cash.  Also, unlike Barron and 
Waddell (2003) who excluded from their sample those cases with a zero total 
compensation figure, executives in this study with a zero bonus figure remain in the 
sample. 
2) Logarithm (1 + Bonusi,t / Salaryi,t) (Bruce, Skovorova, Fattorusso, & Buck, 2005).  
Using Logarithm (1 + Bonusi,t / Salaryi,t) for executives in company i at year t, is the 
equivalent of having Logarithm (Salaryi,t + Bonusi,t) and Logarithm (Salaryi,t) as an 
offset (an explanatory variable with the coefficient constrained to be equal to 1).  
Therefore, changes in the bonus are technically estimated through relative changes in 
the executives total cash rewards (Salaryi,t + Bonusi,t) holding salary constant, i.e. 
dividing this expression throughout by Salaryi,t  and taking logarithms, reduces it to 
the variable Logarithm (1 + Bonusi,t / Salaryi,t). 
3) TSR is a market measure, which is the calendar year holding period return per share 
of common stock.  The numerator of TSR is dividends per share earned over the 
calendar year plus the capital gain per share between the end of last year and the end 
of the current year (Abowd, 1990).  TSR is a primary benchmark for shareholders 
and investors in assessing firm performance, and a principal performance element 
UK companies exploit for measuring executive effort (see McKnight, 1996; Pass et 
al., 2000; Conyon et al., 2001).  However, some argue that shareholder return is 
subject to a wide variety of influences that could introduce noise into assessments of 
managerial performance (Forbes & Watson, 1993; Pavlik et al., 1993; Conyon, 
1997a; Benito & Conyon, 1999; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004).  In line with this 
opinion, interview responses indicate that, in general, TSR is an imperfect and 
inappropriate performance measure, especially over the short-term, due to the 
influence of wider market factors.  Nevertheless, the participants did acknowledge 
the importance of delivering value to shareholders through TSR.  Despite these 
comments, TSR will remain a primary performance indicator because of its inherent 
value to shareholders. 
4) EPS indicates the profitability of a company and will be used as an alternative 
measure of firm performance.  According to McKnight (1996), company’s frequently 
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adopt EPS to gauge executive effort and, usually considered from the shareholders 
perspective, may be calculated as follows: net profit after taxation and preference 
dividend divided by the number of ordinary shares in issue during the year (Dyson, 
2001).  In relation to the interview responses, some participants claim that EPS is 
imperfect, inappropriate, too myopic, and needs additional measures to provide a 
balance.  However, because it is post-tax and more difficult to manipulate than a 
straight profit measure, the general consensus is that EPS is indeed an appropriate 
measure of firm performance.  Again, despite these comments, like TSR, EPS will 
remain a primary performance indicator not only because it is difficult to manipulate 
but also because it is a fair reflection of a firm’s internal performance. 
5) Roberts (1956) discovered that, despite using net sales as the index of corporate size, 
other measures of corporate size did not alter his conclusions significantly.  This 
suggests that using total number of employees, as a measure of firm size, would not 
be inappropriate.  Evidence also indicates that total number of employees is a 
standard and common measure for firm size (see Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Murphy, 
1985; Hill & Phan, 1991; Krug, 2003; Datta et al., 2005).   
6) Logarithm values are used in the analysis in order to control for extreme values and 
ensure that the results remain unbiased (Porac et al., 1999).   
7) Measures of weak CG, which are indicative of a powerful and entrenched executive 
include:  
a) CEO/Chair duality – a popular measure to evaluate executive power (see Wade et 
al., 1990; Rechner & Dalton, 1991); 
b) CEO presence on the nominations committee – a common indicator to examine 
selection bias (see Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996); 
c) Ratio of NEDs to inside directors – a frequently used measure to assess corporate 
control (see Beatty & Zajac, 1994); and 
d) Tenure on the board of directors – a popular indication of executive entrenchment 
(see Hill & Phan, 1991). 
8) Based on Weisbach’s (1988) three-fold classification of board directors which 
consisted of ‘insiders’, ‘outsiders’ and ‘grey’ directors, this study adopts the 
following classification.  ‘Insiders’ are full-time employees of the corporation and 
NEDs or ‘outsiders’ refer to board members that neither work for nor have extensive 
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dealings with the company.  ‘Grey’ directors are those members that have had an 
extensive business relationship or family tie with the company and/or management 
and in this study are not a distinct category but classified as ‘insiders’. 
9) According to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) research methods and the composition 
of samples in past research have typically ignored potential industry effects.  As a 
result, this study has recorded industry details for all the companies in the sample.  
The industry variable is used as a control variable and implemented as one strategy of 
localising the variance in bonus pay. 
 
Table 1 overleaf summarises all the significant variables that are included in the 
database. 
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Table 1. Summary of all significant variables included in the database. 
 
Variable Specification 
industry 
(dummy) 
Industry type dummy variables (n = 13 including: chemical and pharmaceuticals; oil, gas and 
minerals; finance; media, marketing and telecommunications; other services; food, drink and 
tobacco; construction and building material; engineering, electrical and other manufacturing; retail 
and distribution; e-business, software and computer services; property; transport and leisure; 
utilities).  
finyren1 Company’s financial year-end date for 2001/02. 
finyren2 Company’s financial year-end date for 2002/03. 
noexec Number of executive directors that sit on the board of directors. 
age Current age of executive director. 
nation Nationality of executive director. 
nationality 
(dummy) 
Nationality dummy variables (n = 4 including: UK, American, other, unknown). 
gender Executive director gender. 
status Current employment status of executive director (n = 7 including: resigned, replaced, retired, no 
change, NED, redundant, died). 
logemp1 Logarithm value of total number of employees including directors, full-time and part-time staff for 
2001/02. 
logemp2 Logarithm value of total number of employees including directors, full-time and part-time staff for 
2002/03. 
growloemp Growth in the logarithm value of total number of employees including directors, full-time and part-
time staff from 2001/02 to 2002/03. 
eps1 ‘Basic’ earnings (+ve) or loss (-ve) per share for 2001/02. 
eps2 ‘Basic’ earnings (+ve) or loss (-ve) per share for 2002/03. 
groeps Growth in EPS from 2001/02 to 2002/03 
tsr1 Logarithm value of TSR for 2001/02. 
tsr2 Logarithm value of TSR for 2002/03. 
grotsr Growth in logarithm value of TSR from 2001/02 to 2002/03. 
sal1 Salary details for executive director for 2001/02. 
logsal1 Logarithm value of salary details for executive director for 2001/02. 
sal2 Salary details for executive director for 2002/03. 
logsal2 Logarithm value of salary details for executive director for 2002/03. 
annbon1 Dichotomous variable that determines whether or not the executive director received an annual 
bonus for 2001/02. 
annbon2 Dichotomous variable that determines whether or not the executive director received an annual 
bonus for 2002/03. 
bonfig1 Annual bonus figure for executive director for 2001/02. 
logbo1 Logarithm value of annual bonus figure for 2001/02. 
segbo1 Ranges of bonus payments for 2001/02. 
bonfig2 Annual bonus figure for executive director for 2002/03. 
logbo2 Logarithm value of annual bonus figure for 2002/03. 
segbo2 Ranges of bonus payments for 2002/03. 
percbo1 Calculates the annual bonus as a percentage of salary for 2001/02. 
percbo2 Calculates the annual bonus as a percentage of salary for 2002/03. 
logbosal1 Logarithm (1 + Bonusi,t / Salaryi,t) for 2001/02. 
logbosal2 Logarithm (1 + Bonusi,t / Salaryi,t) for 2002/03. 
cashother1 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the form in which the annual bonus was paid in 2001/02 (n = 4 including: 
instant cash, other, unspecified, n/a). 
cashother2 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the form in which the annual bonus was paid in 2002/03 (n = 4 including: 
instant cash, other, unspecified, n/a). 
pertarg1 Dichotomous variable that determines whether or not the company incorporates performance 
targets into the annual bonus element of an executive directors’ remuneration package for 2001/02. 
tytarg11 Details of the first performance target, if any, in 2001/02. 
tytarg12 Details of the second performance target, if any, in 2001/02. 
tytarg13 Details of the third performance target, if any, in 2001/02. 
tytarg14 Details of the fourth performance target, if any, in 2001/02. 
noperta1 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the number of performance targets used in 2001/02 (n = 4 including: one 
performance target only, more than one performance target, unspecified, n/a). 
hardsoft1 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the use of hard/soft performance targets in 2001/02 (n = 3 including: external 
target and/or published internal target, unspecified, n/a).  
 88
compsimp1 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the use of simple/complex performance targets in 2001/02 (n = 4 including: 
one performance target only, more than one performance target, unspecified, n/a). 
pertarg2 Dichotomous variable that determines whether or not the company incorporates performance 
targets into the annual bonus element of an executive directors’ remuneration package for 2002/03. 
tytarg21 Details of the first performance target, if any, in 2002/03. 
tytarg22 Details of the second performance target, if any, in 2002/03. 
tytarg23 Details of the third performance target, if any, in 2002/03. 
tytarg24 Details of the fourth performance target, if any, in 2002/03. 
noperta2 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the number of performance targets used in 2002/03 (n = 4 including: one 
performance target only, more than one performance target, unspecified, n/a). 
hardsoft2 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the use of hard/soft performance targets in 2002/03 (n = 3 including: external 
target and/or published internal target, unspecified, n/a).  
compsimp2 
(dummy) 
Dummy variables for the use of simple/complex performance targets in 2002/03 (n = 4 including: 
one performance target only, more than one performance target, unspecified, n/a). 
remcomm Dichotomous variable that denotes the presence of a remuneration committee. 
nooutdir Number of NEDs that occupy a position on the remuneration committee. 
noinsdir Number of inside directors that occupy a position on the remuneration committee. 
totinout Total number of members on the remuneration committee (i.e. sum of NEDs plus inside directors). 
nomceo Dichotomous variable that denotes a situation where the CEO has an active presence on the 
nominations committee.   
dualfunc Whether or not the CEO operates under a dual function (i.e. operates as both CEO and chairman of 
the board). 
tenure Calculates how many years the executive director has spent on the board of directors by subtracting 
the start date from the current year. 
power 
 
CG indicators determine the executive directors level of power within the organisation.  A powerful 
executive would have one of the following features: their tenure on the board of directors is greater 
than 10 years, the CEO is also chairman of the board, the executive director has an active presence 
on the nominations committee, there is a permanent ‘insider’ on the remuneration committee, or 
simply there is no active remuneration committee.  
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4.5.1. Sampling frame 
This research adopts a single sampling frame.  In relation to the quantitative 
methodological approach, this study selects a sample from a much larger group i.e. the 
entire population of large companies in the UK, and comprises 350 UK companies that 
are listed on the FTSE-350 index.  This non-probability sampling technique is termed a 
judgement or purposive sample and refers to procedures directed toward obtaining a 
certain type of element (Dane, 1990).   
 
The rationale behind this selection is, first, the sample consists of large companies that 
feature the wide range of governance elements included in the database.  Secondly, such 
a sample consists of a wide range of large corporations that are distributed across the UK 
and who operate in various industries and market sectors.  Note that small firms are not 
included in this study due to difficulties associated with obtaining the relevant 
management, share price and company data.  Finally, the size of the sample is 
substantial, which is likely to increase the probability of the sample being representative 
of the population (Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Remenyi et al., 1998).  It is also noted that 
companies who are listed on the FTSE have an obligation to publish annual reports 
making access to the required data more feasible.  However, data availability continues 
to represent a fundamental constraint on progress (Bushman & Smith, 2001). 
 
In addition, by purposefully sampling the top tier of the population of quoted companies 
and concentrating solely on the top tier of management, to the neglect of lower levels of 
the corporate hierarchy, is to employ an upper-echelons perspective (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Mueller & Barker, 1997; Cannella, 2001).  This orientation is derived from 
the belief that an organisation becomes a reflection of its top executives and if we want to 
understand organisational outcomes, we must understand the experiences, values, 
motives, and biases of the top executives (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Mueller & Barker, 
1997; Cannella, 2001). 
 
The sample consists of 299 publicly traded companies listed on the FTSE-350 index as at 
2 September 2003.  Financial institutions such as pension funds and insurance 
companies, who do little else but invest in shares, are excluded from the sample (see 
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Walker & Louvari, 2003).  Companies of this nature have few employees, massive 
financial assets, and boards made up entirely of NEDs.   
 
Banks and the like, however, remain in the sample.   The data includes demographic and 
remuneration details relating to main board executive directors, including CEOs, as well 
as firm-level information relating to CG and firm performance. All these variables are 
extracted from company annual reports for two consecutive years.  The data for 2001/02 
included annual reports published between 01 June 2001 and 31 May 2002 and 2002/03 
consisted of annual reports published between 01 June 2002 and 31 May 2003.   
 
The firms in the sample cover most sectors of the economy with finance (13.4%, n = 40), 
transport and leisure (11.4%, n = 34), and retail and distribution (10.7%, n = 32) being 
the most highly represented industries. Since unit trusts, etc, were excluded, this sample 
represents the FTSE-350 population minus those firms.   
 
4.5.2. Data analysis  
According to Ostle and Malone (1988), the statistical analysis of data only describes 
what is; it cannot determine what ought to be, except insofar as it may throw light upon 
probable concomitants and consequences of certain situations.  The role of statistical 
research is to function as “gatekeepers” (Cook, Campbell, & Peracchio, 1990, p. 493), a 
tool in designing research, analysing data, and drawing conclusions (Ostle & Malone, 
1988).  As a result, the levels of data acquired by the research consist of a combination of 
both nominal and ratio data.  The nominal level data refers to those responses in which 
numbers are used to classify observations such as does the company implement an 
executive bonus strategy? 0 = Yes, 1 = No (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996).  
The ratio level data refers to those variables that have a natural zero point and consist of 
continuous data such as TSR and EPS which are measured to the nearest small unit, and 
discrete data such as the monetary bonus payment the executive receives and total 
employment figures which are measured to the nearest whole number (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Denscombe, 2002a). 
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Data analysis is sequential and progressive, and there are three stages to the analysis.  
The first phase is descriptive, which highlights and illustrates graphically some of the 
associations between variables.  The second phase is a more sophisticated, cross-
sectional exploration of the interrelationship among the variables and a single period 
multiple regression analysis achieves this.  The final and most advanced phase of the 
analysis involves panel regressions.   
 
The first two phases use the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences and refers to 
descriptive and inferential statistics, i.e. tests of significance.  Descriptive results are a 
graphical representation of associations and, according to Glenberg and Langston (1992), 
such an approach makes it easier to identify relations among data.  Inferential statistics, 
however, find correlations or relationships between variables.  Consequently, through 
combining verbal with the graphical representation of concepts can lead to greater 
comprehension (Glenberg & Langston, 1992). 
 
At this stage it is worth emphasising that correlation does not imply causation (Holland, 
1986).  This is highlighted by Pavlik et al. (1993) who argue that most studies rely on ex 
post correlations and one cannot infer causation from them.  Also, most variables 
expected to influence executive pay tend to be highly correlated and this poses a 
collinearity problem that makes it difficult to isolate the unique effect of any single factor 
(Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  For the purpose of the investigation it is proposed that one of the 
tests to be conducted is a multiple regression analysis which, according to Hinton (1995), 
is an appropriate statistical test when correlating more than two variables.   
 
Multiple regression is an extension of the bivariate regression and is used for prediction 
as well as explanation (Lewis-Beck, 1993).  It offers a fuller explanation of the 
dependent variable since few phenomena are products of a single cause, and ensures that 
the effect of a particular independent variable is made more certain, for the possibility of 
distorting influences from the other independent variables is removed (Lewis-Beck, 
1993).  This reflects the exploratory approach previously cited on page 82 and relates 
specifically to explaining hypotheses outlined in chapter 3.   Fundamentally, multiple 
regressions hold constant the other independent variables through statistical control as 
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opposed to experimental control.  In this instance, the test is used to find the differences 
and significance of relations in a cross section of data spanning two concurrent years 
(2001/02 and 2002/03) between executive bonus pay, which acts as the dependent 
variable and TSR and EPS, which acts as the independent variables.  Due to a wide 
variety of internal and external contingencies surrounding executive bonuses, it is worth 
acknowledging that direction of causation with regard to bonus pay and firm 
performance is, if at all, difficult to determine.  The results, therefore, are discussed in 
terms of associations rather than causations.   
 
The final phase of the analysis uses STATA and examines the data longitudinally.  Data 
on two moments in time enable the bonus and its responsiveness to firm performance to 
be modelled as well as assess immediate reaction effects on year-to-year changes in 
bonus design.  Essentially, the panel regression provides more data points, thereby 
increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity among explanatory 
variables and, hence, improving the efficiency of the econometric estimates (Hsiao, 
2003).  As an additional attempt to preserve degrees of freedom variables that proved to 
be insignificant were omitted from the regression equation (Fey & Denison, 2003). 
 
4.6. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: THE INTERVIEW 
Ackroyd and Hughes (1983) define the fundamentals of the interview as, “encounters 
between a researcher and a respondent in which the latter is asked a series of questions 
relevant to the subject of the research” (p. 66).  Considered the most widely applied 
technique for conducting a systematic social enquiry, the interview is regarded as a 
special form of purposeful conversation that can elicit the candid expression of opinions 
residing in the respondent (Stroh, 2000; Holstein & Gubrium, 2002).  However, the 
purpose of the interview in this study is to validate and cross-verify data extracted from 
company annual reports and inform some of the methodological choices.  Advocates of 
incorporating qualitative interviews into the research design include Bushman et al. 
(1996), Franco and Bourne (2003), Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) and Fey and 
Denison (2003).   
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Aware of the ethical issues associated with face-to-face interviews, the researcher, before 
conducting the interviews fully discloses their role to the participant, informed consent is 
acquired, and all details relating to confidentiality and anonymity is explained to the 
participants.  In terms of anonymity, it is possible, following content analysis, to separate 
the identity of the individual from the information they have supplied, thereby making it 
difficult to associate a name with the data.  It is anticipated that guaranteeing anonymity 
and confidentiality encourages a greater freedom of expression from the participants.  
Also, in order to reduce the potential effect of interviewer bias, the interviews are 
conducted in an environment where the participant is most comfortable and able to 
provide honest answers.   
 
4.6.1. Interview sampling frame 
In terms of the sampling method adopted for the qualitative interviews, although the 
sampling frame is the same, the size of the sample is greatly reduced.  Therefore, the 
interview sample consists of five with pay and benefits managers and one with a globally 
recognised remuneration consultancy.  This reduction in sample size is necessary as 
quality of responses, in contrast to quantity, is sought after.  Consequently, the 
investigation adopts a probability sampling approach, which works on the premise that 
each individual has a known and equal chance of being selected (Dane, 1990).  
Therefore, a simple random sampling technique that involves an unsystematic random 
selection process is employed thus reducing selection bias (Dane, 1990).   
 
Based on the research conducted by Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) who chose the chief 
compensation officer as their primary interviewee, the pay and benefits manager is 
selected for these reasons.  They are, typically, a key member of the compensation 
committee and among the most informed about organisational pay policies, practices, the 
processes used to set executive pay, monitoring activities, and the incentive structure for 
executives.  In addition, as few organisations are willing to tolerate and give their time to 
researchers (Cook et al., 1990; Eskew & Heneman, 1996) and due to the difficulties 
associated with gaining access to senior executives (Currall, Hammer, Baggett, & 
Doniger, 1999), by purposefully selecting pay and benefits managers as opposed to 
executive directors increases the likelihood of achieving the interview target. 
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Finally, the interview with a remuneration consultant provides an additional but 
alternative perspective on executive pay.  It is included for two reasons.  First, it tests 
whether the views and opinions on executive pay of the remuneration consultant are 
shared by the pay and benefits managers.  Secondly, like the pay and benefits managers, 
the remuneration consultant is very well informed about pay policies, practices, 
processes, monitoring strategies, and incentive structures, but the difference being that 
they make ‘real’ recommendations on how to remunerate corporate executives.  They are 
instrumental in designing compensation schemes in terms of ratio of short-term and long-
term pay, the form of payment (e.g. cash, shares, deferred or matching shares), and the 
number and type of performance targets to be used (e.g. internal, external, or both).  It is 
this point of view that is of most interest.  
 
4.7. SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the methodology for testing the set of hypotheses specified in 
chapter 3.  An empirical, positivist approach using quantitative methods (i.e. an 
independently assembled database), supported by qualitative interviews in order to 
validate the objectivity of the annual report and inform some of the methodological 
choices, is the chosen methodology.  The database is considered a reliable and popular 
research tool.  Data collection using company annual reports are common to the 
executive pay field (see Main & Johnston, 1993) and a reliable source of data 
(McKnight, 1996; Murphy, 1998; McKnight & Tomkins, 1999).   Variables and models 
have also been specified and the next chapter presents results for both the executive 
director and CEO samples which include descriptive statistics, and multiple and panel 
regression analysis.  In this discussion and in its Figures and Tables, reference is made to 
each hypothesis above, e.g. H1, H2, etc.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The data analysis is divided into two sections.  Section one examines a broad population 
of all executive directors (n = 1,542) in the sample, whereas section two explores a sub-
population that focuses solely on the CEO (n = 3002).  Evidently, the samples differ in 
terms of case volume.  However, the number of companies included in both samples will 
remain the same.  As a result, firm-level characteristics for both samples are identical and 
are discussed in further detail next. 
 
5.1. FIRM DEMOGRAPHICS 
In relation to firm size, the median value as measured by the total number of employees 
for 2001/02 equals 7,909 and for 2002/03 equals 8,005.  In addition, alternative firm–
level governance characteristics include: CEO/Chair duality, the presence of a 
remuneration committee and subsequent insider/outsider ratios, and whether or not the 
CEO sits on the nominations committee.  The details relating to NEDs and in turn the 
remuneration and nominations committee are based on information taken from the 
2002/03 annual report only, given that few changes are expected after one year.   
 
First, results indicate that 5% of CEOs (n = 15) also operate as chairman of the board, 
whereas the remaining 95% (n = 285) function solely as CEO.  Secondly, all but one 
company confirmed the presence of an active remuneration committee.  The median size 
of a remuneration committee is 4 and, in terms of composition, independent NEDs 
dominate the committee.  Consequently, executive directors constitute a negligible 
fraction (8.4% of boards have insiders) within the committee (See Table 2 overleaf). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 (n = 300) – 300 CEOs were taken from 299 firms. One firm (Pennon Group plc) had two CEOs of equal 
importance and, consequently, both were included in the study. 
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Table 2. Number of inside directors on the remuneration committee. 
 
 
 
 
Thirdly, of the 299 companies in the sample, only 32.3% (n = 97) actively prevent the 
CEO from sitting on the nominations committee.  Therefore, in 67.7% (n = 203) of 
companies the CEO is eligible to sit on the nominations committee. 
 
Finally, as a means of approximating the level of power and control a CEO has in an 
organisation, CG variables are used as indicators of CEO power and examined on an 
individual basis.  The variables under analysis include: CEO/Chair duality, remuneration 
committee presence, number of inside and outside directors on the remuneration 
committee, CEO presence on the nominations committee, and tenure on the board of 
directors (more than 10 years on the board was indicative of strong executive power).  
For example, weak CG/powerful executive will have at least one of the following 
features: the CEO is also chairman of the board, there is no active remuneration 
committee, there is a permanent insider on the remuneration committee, the CEO has an 
active presence on the nominations committee, or tenure on the board of directors is 
greater than 10 years.   By implication, strong CG/less entrenched executive will be 
represented by: non-CEO/Chair duality, an active remuneration committee, remuneration 
committee is made up entirely on NEDs, the CEO does not have an active presence on 
the nominations committee, and tenure on the board is less than 10 years.   
 
Results indicate that 78% (n = 234) of CEOs operate within a weak governance 
framework and, subsequently, occupy a strong executive position in the firm.  The 
remaining 22% (n = 66) function within a strong governance framework and, 
consequently, occupy a weak position in the firm (See Table 3 overleaf). 
 
 
Number of Inside Directors Frequency Percent 
 0 274 91.6 
 1 19 6.4 
 2 5 1.7 
 3 1 0.3 
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Table 3. Distribution of executive power. 
 
Executive Power Frequency Percent 
  Strong Executive Power 234 78 
  Weak Executive Power 66 22 
 
 
The data analysis is sequential and progressive.  This approach is applied to both samples 
and is discussed in detail in section 4.5.2.  However, in brief, there are three stages to this 
analysis.  The first phase is descriptive and illustrates graphically some of the 
associations between variables.  The second phase is a cross-sectional exploration of the 
interrelationship among the variables, which is achieved through single period multiple 
regressions.  The final phase involves panel regressions and examines the data 
longitudinally, which allows the bonus and its responsiveness to firm performance to be 
modelled as well as the assessment of immediate reaction effects on year-to-year changes 
in bonus design (Hsiao, 2003). 
 
Therefore, sections 5.2 and 5.3 present the results from the descriptive analysis for both 
the executive directors and CEOs respectively. 
 
5.2. EXECUTIVE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
5.2.1. Executive demographics 
In the 299 publicly traded companies, details of 1,542 individual executives are recorded.  
Included within this sample are details of 300 CEOs.  In a very small number of cases (n 
= 6) the chairman, executive chairman, or managing director is used as an appropriate 
substitute for an absent CEO.  Averages, using the median as the preferred measure of 
central tendency due to its resistance to extreme values, indicate that: 
? The median number of executives per company is 5;   
? The median age of an executive is 51;   
? Males dominate the sample and constitute 97% (n = 1,495) of the total; 
? Despite being unable to confirm nationality details for 18.4% (n = 283) of the total 
sample, the results do indicate that UK nationals dominate the sample and represent 
72.6% (n = 1,120);   
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? The median number of years an executive will spend on the board of directors is 6;  
? Of the 1,542 individual executives the results indicate that 79.2% (n = 1,222) 
remained in full-time employment with the same company over the two-year period 
under analysis.  Conversely, 20.8% (n = 320) did not and Figure 5 below provides 
some explanation for departure.  
 
Figure 5. Executive employment status at the end of 2002/03. 
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Industry type has been identified as an influencing factor on executive pay (Conyon & 
Murphy, 1998).  As a result, the following section attempts to identify some of the 
differing characteristics between industries by examining variation in annual bonus pay, 
TSR, EPS and number of employees.  
 
5.2.2. Executive industry differences 
5.2.2.1. Executive industry differences based on annual bonus pay 
Figure 6 and 7 overleaf indicate that the variance between the smallest and the largest 
average bonus for 2001/02 and 2002/03 was £288,995 and £241,404 respectively.  This 
resulted in a 16.5% reduction and a total range of variation of £47,591 from year one to 
year two.  In addition, the industries that pay the largest average bonus for both years 
include oil, gas and minerals (2001/02 = £327,634; 2002/03 = £289,158), finance 
(2001/02 = £273,928; 2002/03 = £295,536), and food, drink and tobacco (2001/02 = 
£249,256; 2002/03 = £262,965). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100
 
Figure 6. Executive mean annual bonus for 2001/02 based on industry. 
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Figure 7. Executive mean annual bonus for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.2.2.2. Executive industry differences based on total shareholder return (TSR) 
Figure 8 overleaf illustrates a range differential of 1.5 and, with the exception of the e-
business/software and computer services (-1.2) and media, marketing and 
telecommunications industries (-0.5), on the whole, average TSR values in 2001/02 did 
not fluctuate dramatically but remained relatively stable.  
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Figure 8. Executive mean log-TSR value for 2001/02 based on industry. 
 
In contrast, Figure 9 overleaf reveals a range differential of approximately 0.7 with all 
industries experiencing a negative average TSR value in 2002/03.  In particular, the e-
business/software and computer services (-0.8), and other services (-0.5) industries have 
the lowest average TSR value.  
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Figure 9. Executive mean log-TSR value for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.2.2.3. Executive industry differences based on earnings per share (EPS) 
Figure 10 and 11 overleaf illustrate an average variation of 64 pence in EPS during 
2001/02 and 54 pence during 2002/03.  Furthermore, with the exception of the media, 
marketing and telecommunications (2001/02 = -19; 2002/03 = -16) and e-
business/software and computer services industries (2001/02 = -31; 2002/03 = -8), the 
remaining 11 industries have a positive average EPS value throughout 2001/02 and 
2002/03.  In particular, the construction and building material (2001/02 = 33; 2002/03 = 
38) and food, drink and tobacco industries (2001/02 = 29; 2002/03 = 34) have the largest 
average EPS values for both years. 
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Figure 10. Executive mean EPS value for 2001/02 based on industry. 
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Figure 11. Executive mean EPS value for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.2.2.4. Executive industry differences based on number of employees 
Figure 12 and 13 overleaf indicate that the firms with the largest average number of 
employees for both years include food, drink and tobacco (2001/02 = 60,591; 2002/03 = 
60,183), retail and distribution (2001/02 = 46,769; 2002/03 = 47,570), oil, gas and 
minerals (2001/02 = 42,697; 2002/03 = 41,415), and other services (2001/02 = 37,470; 
2002/03 = 34,767).  In contrast, the property (2001/02 = 1000; 2002/03 = 1000) and e-
business/software and computer services (2001/02 = 5,962; 2002/03 = 5,523) industries 
have the lowest average number of employees for both years. 
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Figure 12. Executive mean number of employees for 2001/02 based on industry. 
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Figure 13. Executive mean number of employees for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.2.3. Executive remuneration details 
This section focuses on base salary and bonus as executive rewards, excluding other 
forms of reward such as options, pensions and perquisites.  Therefore, descriptive 
statistics relating specifically to the executive’s remuneration details highlight the 
following: 
? The median base salary for 2001/02 is £250,000 and for 2002/03 is £256,000.  This 
amounts to a rise of £6,000 over the two-year period and equal to a 2.5% increase; 
? The median bonus figure for 2001/02 is £77,000 and for 2002/03 is £90,000.  This 
amounts to a rise of £13,000 over the two-year period and equal to a 17% increase; 
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? Based on the median values above, the annual bonus as a percentage of salary 
amounted to 30.8% in 2001/02 and 35.2% in 2002/03.  This amounts to a total rise of 
4.4% over the two-year period; 
? In 2001/02, 88.5% (n = 1,365) of executives received an annual bonus.  This figure 
increases to 92% (n = 1,419) in 2002/03.  As a mirror image of this, 10.8% (n = 167) 
of executives did not receive an annual bonus in 2001/02.  This figure decreases to 
8% (n = 123) in 2002/03. 
 
By extension, the sections to follow examine the form of the bonus payment (i.e. cash, 
shares, deferred shares, etc), the types of performance targets used (i.e. external and/or 
internal) and how these targets have changed over the two-year period. 
 
5.2.3.1. Executive annual bonus payment types 
For 2001/02, the most prominent mode of payment associated with the annual bonus is 
cash (57.6%).  In contrast, all other alternative modes of payment, which are generally 
more long-term such as shares, deferred shares, and matching shares, amount to 30.5%.  
Of this group, cash with voluntary deferred share and matching share options (9.1%) and 
cash with compulsory deferred share options (7.8%) are the second and third most 
prominent modes of payment.  Figure 14 overleaf illustrates the distribution of payment 
types between instant cash payments versus alternative modes of payment, i.e. not cash, 
in 2001/02. 
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Figure 14. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2001/02. 
 
For 2002/03, the most prominent mode of payment associated with the annual bonus is 
also cash (57.8%).   In contrast, all other alternative modes of payment totalled 34%.  Of 
this group, cash with voluntary deferred share and matching share options (10.7%), and 
cash with compulsory deferred share options (8.5%) are the second and third most 
prominent modes of payment.  Figure 15 overleaf illustrates the distribution of payment 
types between instant cash payments versus alternative modes of payment, i.e. not cash, 
in 2002/03. 
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Figure 15. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2002/03. 
 
5.2.3.2. Executive annual bonus performance targets 
Annual bonus performance targets are categorised in terms of their external/internal 
orientation.  This classification considers whether external targets are transparent for 
shareholders and, therefore, whether executives recognise the possibility that 
shareholders may monitor their decisions.  In contrast, internal targets may not and are, 
subsequently, vulnerable to executive abuse.  Figures 16 and 17 overleaf illustrate the 
distribution of performance targets considered along a continuum from external to 
internal, and even unspecified.   
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Figure 16. Executive external/internal performance targets for 2001/02. 
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Figure 17. Executive external/internal performance targets for 2002/03. 
 
Results indicate that in 2001/02, 88.6% of executives have their annual bonus linked to 
some form of performance target.  Significantly, a small fraction (0.3%) of the 
companies in the sample use external targets (ETs), which are share-based, as a solitary 
measure of short-term performance.  Furthermore, 26% implement published internal 
targets (PITs) and a further 0.8% uses a mixture of the two.  In addition, 30.8% use a 
combination of ETs and/or PITs in conjunction with unspecified internal targets (UITs), 
whereas 25% use UITs only.   
 
In the following year, this figure increases to 91.8%.  Again, a small fraction (0.2%) of 
companies use ETs as a solitary measure of short-term performance.  Furthermore, 
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26.3% utilise PITs and a further 1.5% use a mixture of the two.  In addition, 41.7% use a 
combination of ETs and/or PITs with UITs, whereas 19.5% use UITs only. 
 
In total, 27% of companies in 2001/02 and 28% of companies in 2002/03 use 
performance targets and contemporaneously disclose them.  Although not a significant 
percentage, approximately one-third of firms actively practice a transparent 
compensation strategy.  As the mirror image of this, 55.8% and 61.2% of firms in 
2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively have some unspecified element in their annual bonus 
schemes. 
 
However, in 2001/02, 6.6% of firms did not disclose the performance conditions that are 
attached to the annual bonus.  This figure decreases to 2.8% in the following year.  
Significantly, in 2001/02, 25% of firms refer to internal performance targets but fail to 
provide specific details.  This figure decreases to 19.5% in 2002/03.  In total, 62.4% of 
companies in 2001/02 and 64% of companies in 2002/03, use performance targets but 
fail to fully disclose specific details, if at all.  Consequently, a significant number of 
firms in the sample, approximately two thirds, actively practice an opaque compensation 
strategy. 
 
Results also indicate that the most frequently occurring performance measures over the 
two-year period consist of three PITs (based on EPS, group profit, and cash flow), and 
two UITs (based on individual and group performance targets).  For 2001/02 and 
2002/03, cumulative frequency scores indicate that individual performance targets are the 
most common performance measure (2001/02 = 517; 2002/03 = 601), followed by group 
profit targets (2001/02 = 476; 2002/03 = 549), then by EPS (2001/02 = 368; 2002/03 = 
388), then by group performance targets (2001/02 = 309; 2002/03 = 311) and, finally, by 
cash flow targets (2001/02 = 123; 2002/03 = 213). 
 
The next section extends the analysis above and examines the shifts in performance 
targets over the two years (i.e. from 2001/02 to 2002/03).   
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5.2.3.3. Executive performance target migration 
In 2001/02, 164 executives were not compensated with an annual bonus.  In the 
following year, 86.6% (n = 142) of this group did receive an annual bonus and the shifts 
are illustrated in the bottom part of Figure 18 overleaf.  In 2002/03, 101 executives had 
their annual bonus removed from their remuneration package and these changes are 
illustrated in the top part of Figure 18 overleaf.  A total of 123 executives did not receive 
an annual bonus in 2002/03, a reduction of 25%.  
 115
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Executive performance target migration to and from ‘no annual bonus’. 
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Further analysis explores these bonus changes from two contrasting perspectives.  The 
first perspective considers the migration of performance targets based on a hard to soft 
continuum (See Figure 19 overleaf).  Again, hard targets are measurable targets open to 
shareholder monitoring whereas soft targets include any unspecified element.  
 
The second perspective examines the migration of performance targets based on a simple 
to complex continuum (See Figure 20 overleaf).  Simple targets include a single 
performance target.  This may better align the relationship between executive action and 
firm performance by preventing the misallocation of effort across multiple activities and, 
therefore, channelling executive effort more effectively.  Of course, by the same token, 
an executive’s focus on a single performance target will mean that others may be 
neglected.   
 
On the other hand, complex targets consist of multiple performance targets and may 
distort the relationship between executive action and firm performance when executives 
must allocate effort across multiple activities (Balkin et al., 2000; Bushman & Smith, 
2001).  At the same time, complex targets make it more difficult for shareholders to 
monitor whether bonuses are actually earned. 
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Figure 19. Executive performance target migration in the context of ‘hard’ to ‘soft’. 
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Figure 20. Executive performance target migration in the context of ‘simple’ to ‘complex’. 
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Figure 19 suggests that companies are utilising more measurable hard performance 
targets in contrast to softer, unspecified targets.  Specifically, 199 executives transferred 
from soft performance targets to a hard performance target strategy, which incorporated 
at least one quantifiable performance indicator.  In contrast, 53 executives moved in the 
opposite direction, i.e. from hard to soft.  However, the largest shift from soft 
performance targets was to those performance targets that maintained some unspecified 
element (n = 144).  
 
Alternatively, Figure 20 suggests that companies are utilising more types of performance 
targets and, hence, adopting a more complex rather than simple approach when designing 
executive bonuses.  Specifically, 194 executives transferred from one to two or three 
types of performance target in contrast to 60 executives that moved in the opposite 
direction.  However, the largest shift from a simple performance target approach was to 
supplement the solitary measure of performance with an additional indicator (n = 179).       
 
Having outlined the remuneration details for the executive director sample and, in 
particular, highlighted the types of bonus payments and performance targets companies 
use, it seems appropriate to now explore the association between the value of the annual 
bonus and firm performance.   
 
5.2.4. Executive annual bonus value and firm performance 
Figure 21 and 22 overleaf illustrate the relationship between the annual bonus for 
2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean log-TSR value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  
In general, results indicate that large bonuses do not guarantee improved firm 
performance. 
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Figure 21. Executive bonus payment ranges for 2001/02 compared with the mean log-
TSR value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 22. Executive bonus payment ranges for 2002/03 compared with the mean log-
TSR value for 2002/03. 
 
Of course, TSR is a controversial short-term performance indicator due to its 
vulnerability to external shocks unrelated to executives’ efforts.  Therefore, EPS is used 
as an alternative measure of performance and represents a measure of profit that is not as 
vulnerable to external factors as TSR, but one that executives can feasibly influence more 
easily.  Consequently, Figure 23 and 24 overleaf illustrate the relationship between the 
annual bonus for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean EPS value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 
respectively.  Results imply a linear relationship, which suggests that firm performance 
increases with bonus value.  Specifically, improvements in a firm’s EPS are expected to 
be associated with larger bonus payments.  To some extent, this may be a result of 
incentive effects, but must also reflect the fact that many bonuses are mechanically 
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linked through the bonus formula, with some variables (e.g. net profit, sales, etc) feeding 
directly into EPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
(H1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Executive bonus payment ranges for 2001/02 compared with the mean EPS 
value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 24. Executive bonus payment ranges for 2002/03 compared with the mean EPS 
value for 2002/03. 
 
The section to follow explores the association between short-term ‘visible’ annual bonus 
payments (i.e. cash) and the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) transformation for 2001/02 
and 2002/03 respectively.   
 
5.2.5. Executive annual bonus value and payment types 
Before presenting the results, the choice of this transformation (i.e. Log (1+ 
Bonus/Salary) should be explained.   
 
Originally, the value of the annual bonus was to be analysed in its log form: Log 
(Bonusi,t).  However, using Log (Bonusi,t) resulted in data that was biased since all 
companies with zero bonuses are excluded from the analysis.   Consequently, this leads 
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to a sample that is misrepresented as 19.1% and 21.5% of executives with bonus 
schemes, in 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively, received no annual bonus.  As a means to 
offset this problem Log (1 + Bonusi,t / Salaryi,t) is employed.  For a full description of this 
log equation refer to chapter 4, page 85.  However, the use of the transformation of this 
bonus variable has implications for the significance of firm size, which will be explained 
later. 
  
Furthermore, the annual bonus is predominately a cash payment.  However, executives 
do receive share-based bonuses.  Therefore, unless holding conditions are explicitly 
attached to shares and stated in the company’s annual report, shares are classified as an 
immediate short-term bonus that may be cashed as soon as they are awarded and its 
value, if disclosed, is included in the total annual bonus amount for that year.   In 
addition, some companies require executives, albeit on a compulsory or voluntary basis, 
to defer and invest a percentage of their cash bonus in the form of company shares.  
Consequently, if the amount to be deferred is disclosed in the annual report then this 
figure is also included in the total annual bonus amount for that year.   
 
As a result, Figure 25 and 26 overleaf examine the relationship between annual bonus 
payment types (i.e. short-term, instant cash payments versus alternative possibilities such 
as long-term pay including shares, deferred shares, and matching shares) for 2001/02 and 
2002/03 and the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  In 
general, results reveal that short-term, instant cash payments are associated with low 
bonus amounts whereas all other forms of payment, which are more long-term such as 
shares and deferred shares, are associated with large bonuses. 
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Figure 25. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2001/02 compared with the mean 
Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
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Figure 26. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2002/03 compared with the mean 
Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
 
But, to what extent do these payment types (i.e. instant cash payments versus alternative 
possibilities e.g. long-term pay) influence firm performance? Consequently, the next 
section examines the relationship between annual bonus payment types for 2001/02 and 
2002/03 and firm performance as measured by TSR for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and EPS 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.   
 
5.2.6. Executive annual bonus payment types and firm performance 
Figure 27 and 28 overleaf illustrate the relationship between annual bonus payment types 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 in relation to firm performance as measured by the mean log-
TSR value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  The analysis has produced contrasting 
results.  Figure 27 indicates that compensating executives with short-term, instant cash 
payments is associated with improved firm performance when compared to alternative, 
long-term modes of payment.  In contrast, Figure 28 suggests that remunerating 
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executives with short-term, instant cash payments is associated with weaker firm 
performance when compared to alternative, long-term forms of payment.   
 
 
 
 
 
(H4)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2001/02 compared with the mean 
log-TSR value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 
28. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2002/03 compared with the mean log-TSR 
value for 2002/03. 
 
Figure 29 and 30 overleaf illustrate the relationship between annual bonus payment types 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean EPS value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  
The results indicate that compensating executives with short-term, instant cash payments 
is associated with improved company performance.  In contrast, alternative, long-term 
modes of payment are associated with weaker company performance. 
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Figure 29. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2001/02 compared with the mean 
EPS value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 30. Executive annual bonus payment type for 2002/03 compared with the mean 
EPS value for 2002/03. 
 
The following analysis explores the association between annual bonus performance 
targets (i.e. hard/soft versus simple/complex) and the value of the annual bonus as 
measured by Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) and what affect these targets may have on firm 
performance.   
 
5.2.7. Executive annual bonus value, performance targets, and firm performance  
Specifically, section 5.2.7.1 examines the relationship between hard/soft performance 
targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 
2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  Section 5.2.7.2 compares hard/soft performance 
targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 against the mean log-TSR values for 2001/02 and 
2002/03 respectively.  Finally, sections 5.2.7.3 and 5.2.7.4 present the same analysis 
using simple/complex performance targets. 
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5.2.7.1. Executive annual bonus value and hard/soft performance targets 
Figure 31 below and 32 overleaf illustrate the relationship between hard/soft 
performance targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 
2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  Hard targets constitute ETs and PITs or both and are 
subject to shareholder monitoring.  In contrast, soft targets consist of anything that 
includes an unspecified element and, subsequently, are not open to shareholder 
monitoring.   
 
 
 
 
 
(H5)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Executive hard/soft performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the mean 
Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
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Figure 32. Executive hard/soft performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the mean 
Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
 
The results, which are consistent over both years, suggest that as performance targets get 
increasingly softer (i.e. implementing vaguer performance targets) the size of the bonus 
increases relative to salary.  In contrast, as the performance targets get harder (i.e. 
making the performance targets more transparent) the size of the bonus decreases relative 
to salary.  This is consistent with tougher, externally verifiable targets leading to lower 
rewards that are harder for executives to earn. 
 
5.2.7.2. Executive hard/soft performance targets and firm performance 
Figure 33 and 34 overleaf compare hard/soft performance targets for 2001/02 and 
2002/03 against the mean log-TSR values for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  For the 
purpose of this analysis, hard targets are measurable targets open to shareholder 
monitoring whereas soft targets include any unspecified element.  
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Figure 33. Executive hard/soft performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the mean 
log-TSR value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 34. Executive hard/soft performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the mean 
log-TSR value for 2002/03. 
 
The results, which are consistent over both years, are indicative of a negative trend 
between TSR and soft performance targets.  Consequently, as the performance targets 
become increasingly softer (i.e. implementing vaguer performance targets) TSR 
decreases.  In contrast, hard targets are positively associated with TSR: as performance 
targets become harder (i.e. making the performance targets more transparent) TSR 
increases.   
 
Alternatively, Figure 35 and 36 overleaf examine the relationship between hard/soft 
performance targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean EPS values for 2001/02 and 
2002/03 respectively. 
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Figure 35. Executive hard/soft performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the mean 
EPS value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 36. Executive hard/soft performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the mean 
EPS value for 2002/03. 
 
The results, which are again consistent over both years, are indicative of a negative 
association between EPS and soft performance targets.  Therefore, as the performance 
targets become increasingly softer (i.e. implementing vaguer performance targets) EPS 
decreases.  In contrast, hard targets are positively associated with EPS: as performance 
targets become harder (i.e. making the performance targets more transparent) EPS 
increases.   
 
To summarise, descriptive results indicate that soft performance targets are negatively 
associated with firm performance whereas hard targets are positively associated with 
better firm performance, as measured by TSR and EPS.  
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5.2.7.3. Executive annual bonus value and simple/complex performance targets 
As an alternative to the hard/soft classification, the complexity of performance targets 
and its association with firm performance is examined using two separate but not 
mutually exclusive variables.  The distinction to be made is that one variable examines 
the type of performance target adopted, for example, ETs, PITs, UITs, whereas the later 
considers the actual performance measure employed, for example, TSR, EPS, sales, 
capital, etc.  As a result, Figure 37 and 38 overleaf compare simple/complex performance 
targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 based on performance target type against the mean Log 
(1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03.  To supplement this, Figures 39 and 40 
overleaf illustrate the relationship between simple/complex performance targets for 
2001/02 and 2002/03 based on the number of performance measures and the mean Log 
(1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03.  In this context, simple targets include a 
single performance target/measure.  Conversely, complex targets consist of multiple 
performance targets/measures. 
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Figure 37. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 based on 
performance target type compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
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Figure 38. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 based on 
performance target type compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
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Figure 39. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 based on number 
of performance measures compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
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Figure 40. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 based on number 
of performance measures compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
 
The results, which are again consistent over both years, are indicative of a positive trend 
between the complexity of performance targets (i.e. increasing the number of 
performance target types and/or number of measures) and the value of the bonus.  
Subsequently, executives that operate under complex performance target schemes can 
expect greater increments in bonus relative to salary.  In contrast, results suggest that as 
performance targets become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of 
performance target types and/or number of measures) the bonus decreases.  Therefore, 
executives that operate under simple performance target schemes can expect to receive 
smaller increments in bonus relative to salary.  Significantly, simple targets do not 
compensate the executive as highly as those executives who are set complex targets, and 
executives may be acting self-interestedly, using complexity to mask softness in targets.   
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5.3.7.4. Executive simple/complex performance targets and firm performance 
As already defined in section 5.3.7.3, the complexity of performance targets and its 
association with firm performance is examined using two separate but not mutually 
exclusive variables.  Consequently, Figure 41 overleaf examines the relationship between 
simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 based on performance target type and 
the mean log-TSR value for 2001/02.  To supplement this, Figure 42 overleaf compares 
simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 based on number of performance 
measures against the mean log-TSR value for 2001/02.  
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Figure 41. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2001/02 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 42. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2001/02 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results suggest that there is a positive association between TSR and complex 
performance targets.  Subsequently, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. 
increasing the number of performance target types and/or measures) TSR increases.  In 
contrast, simple targets are negatively associated with TSR: as performance targets 
become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance target types 
and/or measures) TSR decreases.   
 
In addition, Figure 43 overleaf illustrates the relationship between simple/complex 
performance targets for 2002/03 based on performance target type and the mean log-TSR 
value for 2002/03.  To supplement this, Figure 44 overleaf compares simple/complex 
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performance targets for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures against the 
mean log-TSR value for 2002/03. 
 
 
 
 
 
(H8)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2002/03 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 44. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results suggest that there is a negative association between TSR and complex 
performance targets.  Therefore, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. 
increasing the number of performance target types and/or measures) TSR decreases.  In 
contrast, simple targets are positively associated with TSR: as performance targets 
become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance target types 
and/or measures) TSR increases.   
 
To summarise, first year results suggest that there is a positive association between 
complex performance targets and firm performance and a negative association between 
simple targets and firm performance.  In contrast, second year results indicate that there 
is a negative association between complex performance targets and firm performance and 
a positive association between simple targets and firm performance.   
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As an alternative, Figure 45 below examines the relationship between simple/complex 
performance targets for 2001/02 based on performance target type and the mean EPS 
value for 2001/02.  To supplement this, Figure 46 overleaf compares simple/complex 
performance targets for 2001/02 based on number of performance measures against the 
mean EPS value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 45. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2001/02 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 46. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2001/02 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results are conflicting.  Figure 45 suggests that a positive association exists between 
EPS and complex performance targets.  Subsequently, as performance targets become 
more complex (i.e. increasing the number of performance target types) EPS increases.  In 
contrast, there is a negative association between EPS and simple performance targets.  
Therefore, as performance targets become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number 
of performance target types) EPS decreases.   
 
In contrast, Figure 46 is indicative of a negative trend between EPS and complex 
performance targets.  Subsequently, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. 
increasing the number of performance measures) EPS decreases.  Conversely, there is a 
positive trend between EPS and simple performance targets: as performance targets 
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become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance measures) EPS 
increases.   
 
In addition, Figure 47 below compares simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 
based on performance target type against the mean EPS value for 2002/03.  To 
supplement this, Figure 48 overleaf illustrates the relationship between simple/complex 
performance targets for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures and the 
mean EPS value in 2002/03. 
 
 
 
 
 
(H8)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2002/03 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 48. Executive simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results, as with the previous two figures (45 and 46), are also conflicting.  Figure 47 
is indicative of a positive trend between EPS and complex performance targets.  
Therefore, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. increasing the number of 
performance target types) EPS increases.  Conversely, simple targets are negatively 
associated with EPS: as performance targets become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing 
the number of performance target types) EPS decreases.   
 
In contrast, Figure 48 suggests that a negative association exists between EPS and 
complex performance targets.  Therefore, as performance targets become more complex 
(i.e. increasing the number of performance measures) EPS decreases.  Conversely, 
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simple targets are positively associated with EPS: as performance targets become 
increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance measures) EPS increases.   
To summarise, the complexity variables when examined together provide mixed results.  
However, when the variables are analysed separately the results indicate the following.  
There is a positive association between EPS and complex performance targets, and a 
negative association between EPS and simple performance targets, when based on 
performance target type.  In contrast, when based on performance measures, complex 
performance targets are negatively associated with EPS whereas simple performance 
targets are positively associated with EPS.  These findings are consistent over both years. 
 
5.3. CEO DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
5.3.1. CEO demographics 
In the 299 publicly traded companies, details of 300 CEOs are recorded.  In a very small 
number of cases (n = 6) the chairman, executive chairman or managing director was used 
as an appropriate substitute for an absent CEO.  Averages, using the median as the 
preferred measure of central tendency due to its resistance to extreme values, indicate 
that: 
? The median age of a CEO is 53;   
? Males dominate the sample and constitute 98.3% (n = 295) of the total; 
? Despite being unable to confirm nationality details for 14% (n = 42) of the total 
sample, the results do indicate that UK nationals dominate the sample and represent 
76% (n = 228);   
? The median number of years a CEO will spend on the board of directors is 8;  
? Of the 300 individual CEOs the results indicate that 94.7% (n = 284) remained in 
full-time employment with the same company over the two-year period under 
analysis.  Conversely, 5.4% (n = 16) did not and Figure 49 overleaf provides some 
explanation for departure.  
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Figure 49. CEO employment status at the end of 2002/03. 
 
5.3.2. CEO industry differences 
Industry type, as highlighted in section 5.3.2, influences executive pay (Conyon & 
Murphy, 1998).  As a result, the following section attempts to identify some of the 
differing characteristics between industries, within the CEO population, by examining 
variation in annual bonus pay, TSR, EPS and number of employees. 
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5.3.2.1. CEO annual bonus pay 
Figure 50 below and 51 overleaf indicate that the variance between the smallest and the 
largest average bonus for 2001/02 and 2002/03 was £419,851 and £487,187 respectively.  
This resulted in a 16% increase and a total range of variation of £67,336 from year one to 
year two.  In addition, the industries that pay the largest average bonus for both years 
include finance (2001/02 = £484,200; 2002/03 = £581,035), chemical and 
pharmaceuticals (2001/02 = £448,146; 2002/03 = £383,364), oil, gas and minerals 
(2001/02 = £396,455; 2002/03 = £475,615), and food, drink and tobacco (2001/02 = 
£381,115; 2002/03 = £477,707).  
 
 
 
Figure 50. CEO mean annual bonus for 2001/02 based on industry. 
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Figure 51. CEO mean annual bonus for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.3.2.2. CEO total shareholder return (TSR) 
Figure 52 overleaf illustrates a range differential of 1.4 and, with the exception of the e-
business/software and computer services (-1.1) and media, marketing and 
telecommunications industries (-0.5), on the whole, average TSR values in 2001/02 did 
not fluctuate dramatically but remained relatively stable.  
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Figure 52. CEO mean log-TSR for 2001/02 based on industry. 
 
In contrast, Figure 53 overleaf reveals a range differential of approximately 0.7 and, with 
the exception of the oil, gas and minerals industry, all other industries experienced a 
negative average TSR value in 2002/03.  In particular, the e-business/software and 
computer services (-0.7), other services (-0.5), and engineering, electrical and other 
manufacturing (-0.5) industries have the lowest average TSR value. 
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Figure 53. CEO mean log-TSR for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.3.2.3. CEO earnings per share (EPS) 
Figure 54 and 55 overleaf illustrate an average variation of 50 pence in EPS during 
2001/02 and 54 pence during 2002/03.  Furthermore, with the exception of the media, 
marketing and telecommunications industry (2001/02 = -18; 2002/03 = -17) and e-
business/software and computer services industries (2001/02 = -18; 2002/03 = -0.2), the 
remaining 11 industries have a positive EPS value throughout 2001/02 and 2002/03.  In 
particular, the construction and building material (2001/02 = 32; 2002/03 = 37) and the 
food, drink and tobacco industries (2001/02 = 29; 2002/03 = 34) have the largest average 
EPS values for both years. 
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Figure 54. CEO mean EPS value for 2001/02 based on industry. 
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Figure 55. CEO mean EPS value for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.3.2.4. CEO number of employees 
Figure 56 and 57 overleaf indicate that the firms with the largest average number of 
employees for both years include food, drink and tobacco (2001/02 = 49,748; 2002/03 = 
49,505), oil, gas and minerals (2001/02 = 39,123; 2002/03 = 39,033), retail and 
distribution (2001/02 = 37,670; 2002/03 = 38,516), and other services (2001/02 = 
35,134; 2002/03 = 38,211).  In contrast, the property (2001/02 = 1000; 2002/03 = 1000) 
and e-business/software and computer services (2001/02 = 4,890; 2002/03 = 4,756) 
industries have the lowest average number of employees for both years. 
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Figure 56. CEO mean number of employees for 2001/02 based on industry. 
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Figure 57. CEO mean number of employees for 2002/03 based on industry. 
 
5.3.3. CEO remuneration details  
This section focuses on base salary and bonuses as executive rewards, excluding other 
forms of reward such as options, pensions and perquisites.  Therefore, descriptive 
statistics relating specifically to the CEO remuneration details highlight the following: 
? The median base salary for 2001/02 is £350,000 and for 2002/03 is £393,000.  A rise 
of £43,000 over the two-year period and equal to a 12.25% increase; 
? The median bonus figure for 2001/02 is £125,000 and for 2002/03 is £162,000.  A 
rise of £37,000 over the two-year period and equal to a 29.5% increase; 
? Based on the median values above, the annual bonus as a percentage of salary 
amounted to 35.7% in 2001/02 and 41.2% in 2002/03. This amounts to a total rise of 
5.5% over the two-year period; 
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? In 2001/02, 90% (n = 270) of CEOs received an annual bonus.  This figure increases 
to 98% (n = 294) in 2002/03.  By implication, 9% (n = 27) of CEOs did not receive 
an annual bonus in 2001/02.  This figure decreases to 2% (n = 6) in 2002/03. 
 
5.3.3.1. CEO annual bonus payment types 
For 2001/02, the most prominent mode of payment associated with the annual bonus is 
cash (58%).  In contrast, all other alternative forms of payment, which are generally more 
long-term such as shares, deferred shares, and matching shares, amount to 31.3%.   Of 
this group, cash with voluntary deferred share and matching share option (9%) and cash 
with compulsory deferred share option (8.7%) are the second and third most prominent 
payment types.  Figure 58 overleaf illustrates the distribution of payment types between 
instant cash payments versus alternative forms of payment, i.e. not cash, in 2001/02. 
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Figure 58. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2001/02. 
 
For 2002/03, the most prominent mode of payment associated with the annual bonus is 
also cash (62%).  In contrast, all other alternative modes of payment totalled 35.7%.  Of 
this group, with voluntary deferred share and matching share option (10.7%) and cash 
with compulsory deferred share option (10.3%) are the second and third most prominent 
forms of payment.  Figure 59 overleaf illustrates the distribution of payment types 
between instant cash payments versus alternative forms of payment, i.e. not cash, in 
2002/03. 
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Figure 59. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2002/03. 
 
5.3.3.2. CEO annual bonus performance targets 
As in section 5.2.3.2, annual bonus performance targets are categorised in terms of their 
external/internal orientation.  External and internal classification will remain the same.  
Consequently, Figures 60 and 61 overleaf illustrate the distribution of performance 
targets considered along a continuum from external to internal, and even unspecified.   
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Figure 60. CEO external/Internal performance targets for 2001/02. 
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Figure 61. CEO external/Internal performance targets for 2002/03. 
 
Results indicate that in 2001/02, 90% of CEOs have their annual bonus linked to some 
form of performance target.  Significantly, ETs, which are share-based, are never used as 
a solitary measure of short-term performance.  However, 27.3% implement PITs and a 
further 1% uses a mixture of the two.  In addition, 30% use a combination of ETs and/or 
PITs in conjunction with UITs, whereas 25.7% use UITs only.   
 
In the following year, this figure increases to 97.7%.  Again, ETs are not used as a 
solitary measure of short-term performance.  However, 28.3% utilise PITs and a further 
2.3% use a mixture of the two.  In addition, 43.6% use a combination of ETs and/or PITs 
with UITs, whereas 20.3% use UITs only.  
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In total, 28.3% of companies in 2001/02 and 30.6% of companies in 2002/03 use 
performance targets and contemporaneously disclose them.  Although not a significant 
percentage, approximately one-third of firms actively practice a transparent 
compensation strategy.  As the mirror image of this, 55.7% and 63.9% of firms in 
2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively have some unspecified element in their bonus 
schemes. 
 
However, in 2001/02, 7.3% of firms did not disclose the performance conditions that are 
attached to the bonus.  This figure decreases to 3.3% in the following year.  Significantly, 
in 2001/02, 25.7% of firms refer to internal performance targets but fail to provide 
specific details.  This figure decreases to 20.3% in 2002/03.  In total, 63% of companies 
in 2001/02 and 67.2% of companies in 2002/03, use performance targets but fail to fully 
disclose specific details, if at all.  Consequently, a significant number of firms in the 
sample, approximately two thirds, actively practice an opaque compensation strategy. 
 
Results also indicate that the most frequently occurring performance measures over the 
two-year period consist of three PITs (based on EPS, group profit, and cash flow), and 
two UITs (based on individual and group performance targets).  For 2001/02 and 
2002/03, cumulative frequency scores indicate that individual performance targets are the 
most common performance measure (2001/02 = 106; 2002/03 = 123), followed by group 
profit targets (2001/02 = 90; 2002/03 = 116), then by EPS (2001/02 = 75; 2002/03 = 80), 
then by group performance targets (2001/02 = 62; 2002/03 = 64) and, finally, by cash 
flow targets (2001/02 = 23; 2002/03 = 41). 
 
As in section 5.2.3.3, this next section extends the analysis above and examines the shifts 
in performance targets over the two-years (i.e. from 2001/02 to 2002/03) but for the CEO 
sample only.  
 
5.3.3.3. CEO performance target migration 
In 2001/02, 26 CEOs were not compensated with an annual bonus.  In the following year, 
84.6% (n = 22) of this group did receive an annual bonus and the shifts are illustrated in 
the bottom part of Figure 62, overleaf.  In 2002/03, 2 CEOs had their annual bonus 
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removed from their remuneration package and these changes are illustrated in the top 
part of Figure 62, overleaf.  A total of 6 CEOs did not receive an annual bonus in 
2002/03, a reduction of 77%. 
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Figure 62. CEO performance target migration to and from ‘no annual bonus’. 
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As with Figures 19 and 20, further analysis explores these bonus changes from two 
contrasting perspectives.  The first perspective considers the migration of performance 
targets based on a hard to soft continuum (See Figure 63 overleaf).  The second 
perspective examines the migration of performance targets based on a simple to complex 
continuum (See Figure 64 overleaf).  All details relating to hard/soft and simple/complex 
performance targets will remain the same. 
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Figure 63. CEO performance target migration in the context of ‘hard’ to ‘soft’. 
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Figure 64. CEO performance target migration in the context of ‘simple’ to ‘complex’. 
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Figure 63 suggests that companies are utilising more measurable hard performance 
targets in contrast to softer unspecified targets.  Specifically, 42 CEOs transferred from 
soft performance targets to a hard performance target strategy, which incorporated at 
least one quantifiable performance indicator.  In contrast, 11 CEOs moved in the 
opposite direction, i.e. from hard to soft.  However, the largest shift from soft 
performance targets was to those performance targets that maintained some unspecified 
element (n = 30). 
  
Alternatively, Figure 64 suggests that companies are utilising more types of performance 
targets and, hence, adopting a more complex rather than simple approach when designing 
CEO bonuses.  Specifically, 40 CEOs transferred from one to two or three types of 
performance target in contrast to the 12 CEOs that moved in the opposite direction.  
However, the largest shift from a simple performance target approach was to supplement 
the solitary measure of performance with an additional indicator (n = 36). 
 
As in section 5.2.4, the association between firm performance and the annual bonus is 
now examined.   
 
5.3.4. CEO annual bonus value and firm performance 
Figure 65 and 66 overleaf illustrate the relationship between annual bonus for 2001/02 
and 2002/03 and mean log-TSR value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  In general, 
results indicate that large bonuses do not guarantee improved firm performance. 
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Figure 65. CEO bonus payment ranges for 2001/02 compared with the mean log-TSR 
value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 66. CEO bonus payment ranges for 2002/03 compared with the mean log-TSR 
value for 2002/03. 
 
As discussed earlier in section 5.2.4, TSR is a controversial short-term performance 
indicator and, consequently, EPS is used as an alternative measure of performance.  
Therefore, Figure 67 and 68 overleaf illustrate the relationship between the annual bonus 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean EPS value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  
Results imply a linear relationship, which suggests that firm performance increases with 
bonus value.  Specifically, improvements in a firm’s EPS are expected to be associated 
with larger bonus payments.  However, to reiterate, this may be a result of incentive 
effects, but must also reflect the fact that many bonuses are mechanically linked with 
variables (net profit, sales, etc) that feed directly into the EPS figure.   
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Figure 67. CEO bonus payment ranges for 2001/02 compared with the mean EPS value 
for 2001/02. 
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Figure 68. CEO bonus payment ranges for 2002/03 compared with the mean EPS value 
for 2002/03. 
 
The section to follow, as in 5.2.5, explores the association between short-term ‘visible’ 
annual bonus payments and the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03 
respectively. 
 
5.3.5. CEO annual bonus value and payment types 
Again, the value of the annual bonus was to be analysed in its log form: Log (Bonusi,t).  
However, using Log (Bonusi,t) would result in biased data since all companies with zero 
bonuses would be excluded from the analysis.   This would lead to a sample that is 
misrepresented as 19% and 17.3% of CEOs with bonus schemes, in 2001/02 and 2002/03 
respectively, received no annual bonus.  As a means to offset this problem Log (1 + 
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Bonusi,t / Salaryi,t) is employed.  Furthermore, all details relating to short-term bonuses 
remain the same. 
 
Consequently, Figure 69 below and 70 overleaf examine the different types of bonus 
payments for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 
and 2002/03 respectively.  In general, the results reveal that short-term, instant cash 
payments are associated with low bonus amounts whereas all other forms of payment, 
which are more long-term such as shares and deferred shares are associated with large 
bonuses. 
 
 
 
 
 
(H3)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 69. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2001/02 compared with the mean Log (1 
+ Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
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Figure 70. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2002/03 compared with the mean Log (1 
+ Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
 
As in section 5.2.6, the relationship between short-term ‘visible’ annual bonus payments 
and firm performance is now examined.  As a result, the next section examines the 
relationship between annual bonus payment types (i.e. short-term, instant cash payments 
versus alternative possibilities such as long-term pay including shares, deferred shares, 
and matching shares) for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and firm performance as measured by 
TSR for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and EPS for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.   
 
5.3.6. CEO annual bonus payment types and firm performance 
Figure 71 and 72 overleaf illustrate the relationship between annual bonus payment types 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 in relation to firm performance as measured by the mean log-
TSR value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  The analysis has produced contrasting 
results.  Figure 71 indicates that compensating CEOs with short-term, instant cash 
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payments is associated with improved firm performance when compared to alternative, 
long-term modes of payment.  In contrast, Figure 72 is indicative of the exact opposite 
whereby remunerating CEOs with short-term, instant cash payments is associated with 
weaker firm performance when compared to alternative, long-term forms of payment.   
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Figure 71. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2001/02 compared with the mean log-
TSR value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 72. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2002/03 compared with the mean log-
TSR value for 2002/03. 
 
Figure 73 and 74 overleaf illustrate the relationship between annual bonus payment types 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean EPS value for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  
Despite results in Figure 74 being marginal, it may be suggested that compensating 
CEOs with short-term, instant cash payments are associated with improved firm 
performance.  In contrast, alternative, long-term forms of payment are associated with 
weaker firm performance. 
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Figure 73. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2001/02 compared with the mean EPS 
value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 74. CEO annual bonus payment type for 2002/03 compared with the mean EPS 
value for 2002/03. 
 
5.3.7. CEO annual bonus value, performance targets, and firm performance 
As in section 5.2.7, the following section explores the association between annual bonus 
performance targets and the value of the annual bonus as measured by Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary).  Specifically, section 5.3.7.1 examines the relationship between hard/soft 
performance targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 compared with the mean Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  Section 5.3.7.2 compares hard/soft 
performance targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 against the mean log-TSR values for 
2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  Finally, sections 5.3.7.3 and 5.3.7.4 present the same 
analysis using simple/complex performance targets. 
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5.3.7.1. CEO annual bonus value and hard/soft performance targets 
Figure 75 below and 76 overleaf illustrate the relationship between hard/soft 
performance targets implemented for 2001/02 and 2002/03 against the mean Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  Once more, hard targets constitute 
ETs and PITs or both and are subject to shareholder monitoring.  In contrast, soft targets 
consist of anything that includes an unspecified element and, subsequently, are not open 
to shareholder monitoring.   
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Figure 75. CEO hard/soft performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the mean Log 
(1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
 
 
 
 184
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Figure 76. CEO hard/soft performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the mean Log 
(1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
 
The results, which are consistent over both years, suggest that as the performance targets 
get increasingly softer (i.e. implementing vaguer performance targets) the size of the 
bonus increases relative to salary.  In contrast, as performance targets get harder (i.e. 
making the performance targets more transparent) the size of the bonus decreases relative 
to salary.  This is consistent with tougher, externally verifiable targets leading to lower 
rewards that are harder for executives to earn. It is also consistent with shareholder 
efforts to achieve managerial monitoring through harder conditions and the power of 
executives over bonus when governance is weak. 
 
5.3.7.2. CEO hard/soft performance targets and firm performance 
Figures 77 and 78 overleaf compare hard/soft performance targets for 2001/02 and 
2002/03 against the mean log-TSR values for 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively.  For the 
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purpose of this analysis, hard targets include measurable targets open to shareholder 
monitoring whereas soft targets consist of any unspecified element. 
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Figure 77. CEO hard/soft performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the mean log-
TSR value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 78. CEO hard/soft performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the mean log-
TSR value for 2002/03. 
 
The results, which are consistent over both years, are indicative of a negative association 
between TSR and soft performance targets.  Consequently, as the performance targets 
become increasingly softer (i.e. implementing vaguer performance targets) TSR 
decreases.  In contrast, hard targets are positively associated with TSR: as performance 
targets become harder (i.e. making the performance targets more transparent) TSR 
increases.   
 
Alternatively, Figures 79 and 80 overleaf examine the relationship between hard/soft 
performance targets implemented for 2001/02 and 2002/03 and the mean EPS values for 
2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively. 
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Figure 79. CEO type of performance target for 2001/02 compared with the mean EPS 
value for 2001/02. 
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Figure 80. CEO type of performance target for 2002/03 compared with the mean EPS 
value for 2002/03. 
 
The results are again consistent over both years and are indicative of a negative 
association between EPS and soft performance targets.  Therefore, as the performance 
targets become increasingly softer (i.e. implementing vaguer performance targets) EPS 
decreases.  In contrast, hard targets are positively associated with EPS: as performance 
targets become harder (i.e. making the performance targets more transparent) EPS 
increases.   
 
To summarise, the results suggest soft performance targets are negatively associated with 
improved firm performance whereas hard performance targets are associated with 
improved company performance, as measured by TSR and EPS. 
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5.3.7.2. CEO annual bonus value and simple/complex performance targets  
As outlined in section 5.2.7.2, the complexity of performance targets and firm 
performance is examined using two separate but not mutually exclusive variables.  
Consequently, Figure 81 and 82 overleaf compare simple/complex performance targets 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 based on performance target type against the mean Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03.  To supplement this, Figures 83 and 84 overleaf 
illustrate the relationship between simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 and 
2002/03 based on the number of performance measures and the mean Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02 and 2002/03.  Again, simple targets include a single 
performance target/measure whereas complex targets consist of multiple performance 
targets/measures. 
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Figure 81. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 based on performance 
target type compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
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Figure 82. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 based on performance 
target type compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
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Figure 83. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 based on number of 
performance measures compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2001/02. 
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Figure 84. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 based on number of 
performance measures compared with the mean Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) for 2002/03. 
 
The results, which are again consistent over both years, are indicative of a positive trend 
between the complexity of performance targets (i.e. increasing the number of 
performance target types and/or number of measures) and the size of the bonus.  
Subsequently, CEOs that operate under complex performance target schemes can expect 
greater increments in bonus relative to salary.  In contrast, results suggest that as 
performance targets become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of 
performance target types and/or number of measures) the bonus decreases.  Therefore, 
CEOs that operate under simple performance target schemes can expect to receive 
smaller increments in bonus relative to salary.  Significantly, simple targets do not 
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compensate CEOs as highly as those CEOs who are set complex targets, and CEOs may 
be acting self-interestedly, using complexity to mask softness in targets.   
 
5.3.7.3. CEO simple/complex performance targets and firm performance 
Similar to section 5.2.7.3, the complexity of performance targets and firm performance is 
examined using two separate but not mutually exclusive variables.  Therefore, Figure 85 
overleaf examines the relationship between simple/complex performance targets for 
2001/02 based on performance target type and the mean log-TSR value for 2001/02.  To 
supplement this, Figure 86 overleaf compares simple/complex performance targets for 
2001/02 based on number of performance measures against the mean log-TSR value in 
2001/02.  
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Figure 85. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2001/02 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 86. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2001/02 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results suggest that there is a positive association between TSR and complex 
performance targets.  Subsequently, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. 
increasing the number of performance target types and/or measures) TSR increases.  In 
contrast, simple targets are negatively associated with TSR: as performance targets 
become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance target types 
and/or measures) TSR decreases.   
 
In addition, Figure 87 overleaf illustrates the relationship between simple/complex 
performance targets for 2002/03 based on performance target type and the mean log-TSR 
value for 2002/03.  To supplement this, Figure 88 overleaf compares simple/complex 
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performance targets for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures against the 
mean log-TSR value for 2002/03. 
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Figure 87. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2002/03 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 88. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean log-TSR value for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results suggest that there is a negative association between TSR and complex 
performance targets.  Therefore, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. 
increasing the number of performance target types and/or measures) TSR decreases.  In 
contrast, simple targets are positively associated with TSR: as performance targets 
become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance target types 
and/or measures) TSR increases. 
 
To summarise, first year results suggest that there is a positive association between 
complex performance targets and TSR and a negative association between simple targets 
and TSR.  In contrast, second year results indicate that there is a negative association 
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between complex performance targets and TSR and a positive association between 
simple targets and TSR. 
     
As an alternative, Figure 89 below examines the relationship between simple/complex 
performance targets for 2001/02 based on performance target type and the mean EPS 
value for 2001/02.  To supplement this, Figure 90 overleaf compares simple/complex 
performance targets for 2001/02 based on number of performance measures against the 
mean EPS value for 2001/02.  
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Figure 89. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2001/02 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 90. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2001/02 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2001/02 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results are conflicting.  Figure 89 suggests that a positive association exists between 
EPS and complex performance targets.  Subsequently, as performance targets become 
more complex (i.e. increasing the number of performance target types) EPS increases.  In 
contrast, there is a negative association between EPS and simple performance targets.  
Therefore, as performance targets become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number 
of performance target types) EPS decreases.   
 
In contrast, Figure 90 is indicative of a negative trend between EPS and complex 
performance targets.  Subsequently, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. 
increasing the number of performance measures) EPS decreases.  Conversely, there is a 
positive trend between EPS and simple performance targets: as performance targets 
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become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance measures) EPS 
increases.   
 
In addition, Figure 91 below compares simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 
based on performance target type against the mean EPS value for 2002/03.  To 
supplement this, Figure 92 overleaf illustrates the relationship between simple/complex 
performance targets for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures and the 
mean EPS value for 2002/03. 
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Figure 91. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2002/03 based on performance target type. 
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Figure 92. CEO simple/complex performance targets for 2002/03 compared with the 
mean EPS value for 2002/03 based on number of performance measures. 
 
The results, as with the previous two figures (89 and 90), are also conflicting.  Figure 91 
shows a positive trend between EPS and complex performance targets.  Therefore, as the 
performance targets become more complex (i.e. increasing the number of performance 
target types) EPS increases.  Conversely, simple targets are negatively associated with 
EPS: as performance targets become increasingly simpler (i.e. reducing the number of 
performance target types) EPS decreases.   
 
In contrast, Figure 92 suggests a negative association between EPS and complex 
performance targets.  Therefore, as performance targets become more complex (i.e. 
increasing the number of performance measures) EPS decreases.  Conversely, simple 
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targets are positively associated with EPS: as performance targets become increasingly 
simpler (i.e. reducing the number of performance measures) EPS increases.   
 
To summarise this section, the complexity variables when examined together provide 
mixed results.  However, when the variables are analysed separately the results indicate 
the following.  There is a positive association between EPS and complex performance 
targets, and a negative association between EPS and simple targets, when based on 
performance target type.  In contrast, when based on performance measures, complex 
performance targets are negatively associated with EPS whereas simple targets are 
positively associated with EPS.    These findings are consistent over both years.   
 
So far, however, no significance tests have been applied to these conclusions.  Sections 
5.4 and 5.5, therefore, present the results from the multiple regression analysis for both 
the main board executive directors and CEOs respectively.  
 
5.4. EXECUTIVE SINGLE PERIOD MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The single period multiple regressions examine each year’s cross-section independently, 
to be followed by panel regressions.  The dependent variable, which for both years is the 
Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure awarded for that particular year as well as all independent 
variables for that particular year will remain the same for each individual regression.  
The results for each year will be presented in turn. 
 
Diagnostic statistics have highlighted 20 extreme values, or outliers, which exerted 
undue leverage upon the values of the regression models for both years.  In simple 
regression, an outlier is an observation whose dependent variable value is unusual given 
the value of the independent variable (Lewis-Beck, 1993).  In addition, the combination 
of high leverage with an outlier produces substantial influence on the regression 
coefficients (Lewis-Beck, 1993).  Although outlying and influential data might be 
problematic they should not be ignored or discarded automatically and thoughtlessly 
(Lewis-Beck, 1993).  Consequently, following thorough investigation into the identified 
outliers it is evident that the unusual values belong, in general, to a small sub-sample of 
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executives who operate within the finance sector and who receive extremely large 
bonuses i.e. more than £1m, when compared to the average executive bonus.   
 
Even when controlling for industry and nationality effects, the volatility of the annual 
bonus remains high and, subsequently, these extreme values influence the regression 
model significantly.  This effect might be due to some unaccountable factor or additional 
independent variable that has not been considered in the regression model such as long-
term compensation.  Significantly, the discrepancies are not unusual increases in the 
explanatory variables such as EPS or TSR but increases in the value of the annual bonus.  
Therefore, to delete or respecify these values to accommodate the unusual data would 
distort the results and would not be an accurate representation of executive bonuses.  
Essentially, excessive bonuses are not an uncommon feature of executive pay.  
Consequently, on this basis it is difficult to omit the outliers altogether and, hence, all 20 
will remain in the regression model. 
 
5.4.1. Executive single period multiple regression analysis 2001/02   
Table 4 overleaf presents the results of an iterative process of model construction and 
includes 10 explanatory variables.   
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Table 4. Executive model summary: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2001/02. 
 
     Change Statistics 
 Model R  
R 
Square  
Adjusted 
R  
Square  
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate  
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .245(a) .060 .059 .32997 .060 66.143 1 1039 .000 
2 .338(b) .114 .113 .32042 .055 63.896 1 1038 .000 
3 .366(c) .134 .131 .31702 .019 23.346 1 1037 .000 
4 .387(d) .150 .146 .31429 .016 19.112 1 1036 .000 
5 .403(e) .162 .158 .31205 .013 15.955 1 1035 .000 
6 .410(f) .168 .163 .31113 .006 7.137 1 1034 .008 
7 .415(g) .173 .167 .31045 .004 5.480 1 1033 .019 
8 .421(h) .177 .171 .30969 .005 6.128 1 1032 .013 
9 .425(i) .181 .174 .30923 .003 4.059 1 1031 .044 
10 .429(j) .184 .176 .30878 .003 4.013 1 1030 .045 
a  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy) 
b  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02 
c  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy) 
d  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy), American (dummy) 
e  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy), American (dummy), EPS value 2001/02 (pence) 
f  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy), American (dummy), EPS value 2001/02 (pence), oil, gas & minerals (dummy) 
g  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy), American (dummy), EPS value 2001/02 (pence), oil, gas & minerals (dummy), complex 
performance target 2001/02 based on number of performance measures (dummy) 
h  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy), American (dummy), EPS value 2001/02 (pence), oil, gas & minerals (dummy), complex 
performance target 2001/02 based on number of performance measures (dummy), e-business, software & 
computer services (dummy) 
i  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy), American (dummy), EPS value 2001/02 (pence), oil, gas & minerals (dummy), complex 
performance target 2001/02 based on number of performance measures (dummy), e-business, software & 
computer services (dummy), CEO/Chair duality (dummy) 
j  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, instant cash bonus payment 2001/02 
(dummy), American (dummy), EPS value 2001/02 (pence), oil, gas & minerals (dummy), complex 
performance target 2001/02 based on number of performance measures (dummy), e-business, software & 
computer services (dummy), CEO/Chair duality (dummy), CEO present on nominations committee (dummy) 
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Results indicate that adjusted R2 equals 0.18 for the model, which in turn explains 18% 
of the sample variance in the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure for 2001/02.  Among the 
variables that have a significant association with the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure are 
TSR, EPS, cash bonuses, implementing multiple performance targets based on 
performance measures, CEO/Chair duality, CEO presence on the nominations 
committee, American nationality, and three industry types including finance, oil, gas and 
minerals, and e-business, software and computer services.  Firm size, as measured by 
number of employees, however, is insignificant.  
 
The coefficients presented in Table 5 below are used to approximate the size and 
direction of the association that each independent variable has with the dependent 
variable (i.e. Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2001/02).  Associations with each independent 
variable are discussed in turn.   
 
Table 5. Executive coefficients: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2001/02. 
 
   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model   B 
Std. 
Error Beta t  Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
10 (Constant) .333 .024  14.052 .000   
  Log-TSR value 2001/02 .168 .026 .223 6.370 .000 .649 1.542 
  EPS value 2001/02 
(pence) .001 .000 .135 4.217 .000 .774 1.291 
  Instant cash bonus 
payment 2001/02 
(dummy) 
-.105 .020 -.153 -5.306 .000 .956 1.046 
  Complex performance 
target 2001/02 based on 
number of performance 
measures (dummy) 
.058 .020 .085 2.868 .004 .903 1.108 
  CEO/Chair duality 
(dummy) .096 .044 .063 2.186 .029 .960 1.041 
  CEO present on 
nominations committee 
(dummy) 
-.043 .021 -.057 -2.003 .045 .971 1.030 
  American (dummy) .229 .047 .137 4.845 .000 .988 1.013 
  Finance (dummy) .226 .028 .238 8.063 .000 .912 1.096 
  Oil, gas & minerals 
(dummy) .122 .047 .073 2.572 .010 .983 1.018 
  E-business, software & 
computer services 
(dummy) 
.161 .060 .086 2.676 .008 .761 1.313 
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? TSR is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  Results suggest that a 
10% increase in TSR accounts for a 2% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary. Specifically, a firms’ TSR has an estimated cross-sectional effect 
of 0.168, which predicts that a 10% increase in TSR is associated with exp 
(0.1*0.168) – 1 = 0.0169 increase in executive cash pay due to bonuses, whilst 
controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level in 
2002, which was £335,000, implies an additional £5,662 in bonus pay. 
? EPS is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  Results suggest that a 10 
pence increase in EPS accounts for a 1% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary. In particular, a firms’ EPS has an estimated cross-sectional effect 
of 0.001, which predicts that a 10 pence increase in EPS is associated with exp 
(10*0.001) – 1 = 0.01005 increase in the executive cash pay due to bonuses, whilst 
controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level in 
2002, which was £335,000, implies an additional £3,367 in bonus pay. 
? Instant cash bonus payments are negatively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  
It may be suggested that remunerating executives with cash-based bonuses will 
result in a 10% reduction in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary when 
compared with alternative more long-term bonuses     (exp (-0.105) – 1 = -0.0997).  
Specifically, cash only bonuses are on average associated with a -0.0997 decrease in 
executive bonus pay, which implies a reduction of £33,399 in bonus at the median 
pay level.  
? The use of multiple performance targets based on the number of performance 
measures included in the bonus design is positively correlated with Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary).  It may be suggested that, on average, complex performance 
measures (i.e. multiple) result in a 6% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary when compared with simple (i.e. not more than one) performance 
measures (exp (0.058) – 1 = 0.0597).  Significantly, making performance targets 
more complex does lead to larger bonuses.  Furthermore, complex performance 
targets are on average associated with a 0.0597 rise in executive bonus pay, which 
implies an increase of £20,000 in bonus at the median pay level. 
? CEO/Chair duality is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  It may be 
suggested that, on average, companies who allow the CEO to operate as chairman of 
 208
the board leads to a 10% increase in the size of an executive’s annual bonus relative 
to salary when compared with firms who do not operate under a dual role (exp 
(0.096) – 1 = 0.101).  Significantly, CEO/Chair duality does lead to larger executive 
bonuses.  In particular, the dual role, on average, is associated with a 0.101 rise in 
executive bonus pay, which implies an increase of £33,835 in bonus pay at the 
median pay level.    
? The presence of the CEO on the nominations committee is negatively correlated 
with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary), with their presence on the committee leading to a 4% 
reduction in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary.  Significantly, a CEOs 
presence on the nominations committee, who arguably can hand pick board 
members who are sympathetic to their interests, does not automatically result in 
large bonuses (exp (-0.043) – 1 = -0.0421).  Specifically, a CEO who is in a position 
to influence the nominations process is associated with a -0.0421 reduction in 
executive bonus pay, which implies a decrease of £14,104 in bonus pay at the 
median pay level.  
? Executives with American citizenship are positively correlated with Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary).  As a result, American executives can expect to receive an annual 
bonus relative to salary that is 26% larger than those executives who are not 
American (exp (0.229) – 1 = 0.257).  In particular, American executives receive 
higher bonuses resulting in 0.257 higher cash pay independently of salary and 
performance effects.  This is equivalent to a £86,095 increase at the median cash 
pay level.  Significantly, American executives who traditionally are very well 
remunerated are in receipt of the largest bonuses.     
? The finance, oil, gas and minerals, and e-business, software and computer services 
industries are all positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  In terms of 
each industries effect on the size of the executive’s annual bonus relative to salary in 
comparison to executives in retail and distribution, the results indicate increases by 
25% (exp (0.226) – 1 = 0.254), 13% (exp (0.122) – 1 = 0.130), and 18% (exp 
(0.161) – 1 = 0.175) respectively.  Specifically, executives in either industry are 
expected to receive higher bonuses resulting in 0.254, 0.130, and 0.175 higher cash 
pay independently of salary and performance effects respectively.  This is 
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equivalent to a £85,090, £43,550, and £58,625 increase at the median cash pay level 
respectively. 
  
Results also indicate that, based on the beta values, the top five independent variables 
ranked in order of importance are as follows:  the finance industry (Beta = 0.238) has the 
greatest unique association with bonus variance, followed by TSR (Beta = 0.223), then 
by cash bonus payments (Beta = -0.153), then by American executives (Beta = 0.137), 
and finally by EPS (Beta = 0.135).  As noted, firm size was insignificant and, therefore, 
cannot be ranked.  Furthermore, high tolerance levels (i.e. significantly different from 
zero) suggest that multicollinearity is unlikely. 
 
5.4.2. Executive single period multiple regression analysis 2002/03   
Table 6 overleaf presents the results of an iterative process of model construction and 
includes 11 explanatory variables.   
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Table 6. Executive model Summary: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 
2002/03. 
 
     Change Statistics 
 
Model R  
 R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
 Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .207(a) .043 .042 .33425 .043 52.355 1 1172 .000 
2 .292(b) .085 .083 .32693 .042 54.039 1 1171 .000 
3 .333(c) .111 .108 .32246 .026 33.697 1 1170 .000 
4 .357(d) .128 .125 .31950 .017 22.767 1 1169 .000 
5 .379(e) .144 .140 .31669 .016 21.893 1 1168 .000 
6 .396(f) .157 .152 .31439 .013 18.113 1 1167 .000 
7 .404(g) .163 .158 .31329 .007 9.187 1 1166 .002 
8 .412(h) .170 .164 .31224 .006 8.895 1 1165 .003 
9 .416(i) .173 .167 .31173 .003 4.810 1 1164 .028 
10 .420(j) .177 .170 .31119 .004 5.077 1 1163 .024 
11 .424(k) .179 .172 .31079 .003 3.938 1 1162 .047 
a  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy) 
b  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03 
c  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy) 
d  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy) 
e  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy), EPS 
value 2002/03 (pence) 
f  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy), EPS 
value 2002/03 (pence), American (dummy) 
g  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy), EPS 
value 2002/03 (pence), American (dummy), log-employee 2002/03 
h  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy), EPS 
value 2002/03 (pence), American (dummy), log-employee 2002/03, transport & leisure (dummy) 
i  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy), EPS 
value 2002/03 (pence), American (dummy), log-employee 2002/03, transport & leisure (dummy), oil, gas & 
minerals (dummy) 
j  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy), EPS 
value 2002/03 (pence), American (dummy), log-employee 2002/03, transport & leisure (dummy), oil, gas & 
minerals (dummy), chemical & pharmaceutical (dummy) 
k  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2002/03, instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 
(dummy), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures (dummy), EPS 
value 2002/03 (pence), American (dummy), log-employee 2002/03, transport & leisure (dummy), oil, gas & 
minerals (dummy), chemical & pharmaceutical (dummy), construction & building material (dummy) 
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Results indicate that adjusted R2 equals 0.17 for the model, which in turn explains 17% 
of the sample variance in the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure for 2002/03.  Among the 
variables that have a significant association with the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure is 
TSR, EPS, firm size as measured by number of employees, cash bonuses, implementing 
multiple performance targets based on performance measures, American nationality, and 
five industry types including finance, transport and leisure, oil, gas and minerals, 
chemical and pharmaceutical, and construction and building material.   
 
The coefficients presented in Table 7 below are used to approximate the size and 
direction of the association that each independent variable has with the dependent 
variable (i.e. Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2002/03).  Associations with each independent 
variable are discussed in turn.  
 
Table 7. Executive coefficients: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2002/03. 
 
   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
Model   B 
Std. 
Error Beta t   Sig. Tolerance VIF 
11 (Constant) .173 .052  3.318 .001   
  Log-TSR value 2002/03 .111 .020 .164 5.643 .000 .840 1.191 
  EPS value 2002/03 
(pence) .001 .000 .136 4.663 .000 .833 1.200 
  Log-employee 2002/03 .018 .005 .090 3.304 .001 .948 1.055 
  Instant cash bonus 
payment 2002/03 
(dummy) 
-.119 .019 -.172 6.358 .000 .960 1.042 
  Complex performance 
target 2002/03 based on 
number of performance 
measures (dummy) 
.090 .020 .124 4.521 .000 .932 1.073 
  American (dummy) .182 .045 .109 4.065 .000 .988 1.013 
  Finance (dummy) .195 .027 .204 7.217 .000 .884 1.131 
  Transport & leisure 
(dummy) -.067 .031 -.059 2.138 .033 .922 1.084 
  Oil, gas & minerals 
(dummy) .118 .046 .070 2.566 .010 .940 1.064 
  Chemical & 
pharmaceutical (dummy) .101 .041 .068 2.490 .013 .954 1.048 
  Construction & building 
material (dummy) .062 .031 .056 1.984 .047 .881 1.136 
 
 
 
? TSR is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  Results suggest that a 
10% increase in TSR accounts for a 1% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary. Specifically, a firms’ TSR has an estimated cross-sectional effect of 
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0.111, which predicts that a 10% increase in TSR is associated with                   
exp (0.1*0.111) – 1 = 0.0112 increase in executive cash pay due to bonuses, whilst 
controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level in 
2003, which was £356,000, implies an additional £3,987 in bonus pay. 
? EPS is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  Results suggest that a 10 
pence increase in EPS accounts for a 1% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary.  In particular, a firms’ EPS has an estimated cross-sectional effect 
of 0.001, which predicts that a 10 pence increase in EPS is associated with             
exp (10*0.001) – 1 = 0.01005 increase in the executive cash pay due to bonuses, 
whilst controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay 
level in 2003, which was £356,000, implies an additional £3,578 in bonus pay. 
? Firm size, as measured by number of employees, is positively correlated with Log (1 
+ Bonus/Salary) and when doubled, accounts for a 1% increase in the size of the 
annual bonus relative to salary.  The result is consistent with previous research 
whereby larger firms pay out larger bonuses.  Specifically, a firms’ size has an 
estimated cross-sectional effect of 0.018, which predicts that doubling the number of 
employees is associated with 2^0.018 – 1 = 0.0126 increase in the executive cash pay 
due to bonuses, whilst controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the 
median cash pay level in 2003, which was £356,000, implies an additional £4,486 in 
bonus pay.   
? Instant cash bonus payments are negatively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  
It may be suggested that remunerating executives with cash bonuses will result in an 
11% reduction in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary when compared with 
alternative more long-term bonuses (exp (-0.119) – 1 = -0.112).  In particular, cash 
only bonuses are on average associated with a -0.112 decrease in executive bonus 
pay, which implies a reduction of £39,872 in bonus at the median pay level.  
? The use of multiple performance targets based on the number of performance 
measures included in the bonus design is positively correlated with Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary).  It may be suggested that, on average, complex performance measures 
(i.e. multiple) result in a 9% increase in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary 
when compared with simple (i.e. not more than one) performance measures          
(exp (0.09) – 1 = 0.0942).  Significantly, making performance targets more complex 
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does lead to larger bonuses.  Furthermore, complex performance targets are on 
average associated with a 0.0942 rise in executive bonus pay, which implies an 
increase of £33,535 in bonus at the median pay level. 
? Executives with American citizenship are positively correlated with Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary).  As a result, American executives can expect to receive an annual 
bonus relative to salary that is 20% larger than those executives who are not 
American (exp (0.182) – 1 = 0.200).  Specifically, American executives receive 
higher bonuses resulting in 0.200 higher cash pay independently of salary and 
performance effects.  This is equivalent to a £71,200 increase at the median cash pay 
level.  Significantly, American executives who traditionally are very well 
remunerated are in receipt of the largest bonuses.     
? The finance, oil, gas and minerals, and construction and building industries are all 
positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  In terms of each industries effect 
on the size of the executive’s annual bonus relative to salary in comparison to 
executives in retail and distribution, the results indicate increases by 22% (exp 
(0.195) – 1 = 0.215), 13% (exp (0.118) – 1 = 0.125), and 6% (exp (0.062) – 1 = 
0.0640) respectively.  Furthermore, executives in either industry are expected to 
receive higher bonuses resulting in 0.215, 0.125, and 0.0640 higher cash pay 
independently of salary and performance effects respectively.  This is equivalent to a 
£76,540, £44,500, and £22,784 increase at the median cash pay level respectively. 
? The transport and leisure and chemical and pharmaceutical industries are both 
negatively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  In terms of each industries effect 
on the size of the executive’s annual bonus relative to salary in comparison to 
executives in retail and distribution, the results indicate reductions of 6%              
(exp (-0.067) – 1 = -0.0648) and 10% (exp (-0.101) – 1 = -0.0961) respectively.  
Furthermore, executives in either industry are expected to receive reduced bonuses 
resulting in -0.0648, and -0.0961 lower cash pay independently of salary and 
performance effects respectively.  This is equivalent to a £23,069 and £34,212 
decrease at the median cash pay level respectively. 
 
Results also indicate that, based on the beta values, the top five independent variables 
ranked in order of importance are as follows:  the finance industry (Beta = 0.204) has the 
 214
greatest unique association with bonus variance, followed by cash bonus payments (Beta 
= -0.172), then by TSR (Beta = 0.164), then by EPS (Beta = 0.136), and finally by 
complex (i.e. multiple) performance measures (Beta = 0.124).  Significantly, firm size 
was the seventh most important variable (Beta = 0.085).  Furthermore, high tolerance 
levels (i.e. significantly different from zero) suggest that multicollinearity is unlikely. 
 
Further analysis explores those independent variables, identified in sections 5.4.1 and 
5.4.2, which are significantly associated with the dependent variable (i.e. Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively) over the two-year period.  Table 8 
below illustrates this comparison.   
 
Table 8. Association of independent variables with the dependent variable (i.e. Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) 2001/02 and 2002/03) over the two-year period for the executive sample. 
 
 
 
Table 8 above indicates that seven independent variables are significantly associated with 
the dependent variable during 2001/02 and 2002/03.  In particular, the association 
between EPS, the oil, gas and minerals industry and Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) were 
unchanged from year one to year two.  However, instant cash bonus payments and 
complex performance targets based on number of performance measures had an 
increased association with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) over both years equalling 1% and 3% 
respectively.  In contrast, TSR, executives of American nationality, and the finance 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Annual Bonus 
2001/02 
(Effect: Size & 
Direction) 
 
Annual Bonus 
2002/03 
(Effect: Size & 
Direction) 
 
 
 
Percentage 
Difference 
 
 
 
Effect 
Summary 
(H1) TSR 2% more 1% more -1%  
Reduced 
effect 
(H1) EPS 1% more 1% more Nil No change 
(H3) 
 
Instant cash bonus 
payments 10% less 11% less +1% 
Increased 
effect 
(H7) 
Complex performance 
targets based on number 
of performance measures 
6% more 9% more +3% Increased effect 
 American nationality  26% more 20% more -6% 
Reduced 
effect 
 Finance industry 25% less 22% less -3% Reduced effect 
 Oil, gas and minerals industry 13% less 13% less Nil No change 
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industry had a reduced association with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) over the two-year period 
totalling 1%, 6%, and 3% respectively.  
 
5.5. CEO SINGLE PERIOD MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The single period multiple regressions examine each year’s cross-section independently, 
to be followed by panel regressions.  The dependent variable, which for both years is Log 
(1 + Bonus/ Salary) figure awarded for that particular year as well as all independent 
variables for that particular year will remain the same for each individual regression.  
The results for each year will be presented in turn. 
 
Similar to 5.4, diagnostic statistics have highlighted 8 extreme values, or outliers, which 
exerted undue leverage upon the values of the regression models for both years.  
Following thorough investigation into the identified outliers it is evident that the unusual 
values belong, in general, to a small sub-sample of CEOs who operate within the finance 
sector and who receive extremely large bonuses, i.e. more than £1m, when compared to 
the average CEOs bonus.  Similarly, to delete or respecify these values in order to 
accommodate the unusual data would distort the results and would not be an accurate 
representation of CEO bonuses.  Essentially, excessive bonuses are not an uncommon 
feature of CEO pay, and on this basis it is difficult to omit the outliers altogether and, 
hence, all 8 will remain in the regression model. 
 
5.5.1. CEO single period multiple regression analysis 2001/02   
Table 9 overleaf presents the results of an iterative process of model construction and 
includes 4 explanatory variables.  A possible explanation for fewer explanatory variables 
may be due to the reduction in sample size. 
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Table 9. CEO model summary: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2001/02. 
 
     Change Statistics 
 
Model R  
 R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
 Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .331(a) .109 .106 .36625 .109 30.415 1 248 .000 
2 .401(b) .161 .154 .35628 .051 15.081 1 247 .000 
3 .422(c) .178 .168 .35327 .017 5.224 1 246 .023 
4 .440(d) .194 .180 .35061 .016 4.744 1 245 .030 
a  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy) 
b  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02 
c  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001/02, EPS value 2001/02 (pence) 
d  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), log-TSR value 2001-02, EPS value 2001/02 (pence), American 
(dummy) 
 
 
Results indicate that adjusted R2 equals 0.18 for the model, which in turn explains 18% 
of the sample variance in the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure for 2001/02.  Among the 
variables that are significantly associated with the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure are: 
TSR, EPS, American nationality, and the finance industry.  Firm size as measured by 
number of employees, however, is insignificant. 
 
The coefficients presented in Table 10 below are used to approximate the size and 
direction of the association that each independent variable has with the dependent 
variable (i.e. Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2001/02).  Associations with each independent 
variable are discussed in turn.   
 
Table 10. CEO coefficients: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2001/02. 
 
   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
Model   B 
Std. 
Error Beta t  Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
4 (Constant) .302 .026607   11.359 .000     
  Log-TSR value 2001/02 .129 .053995 .153 2.396 .017 .803 1.245 
  EPS value 2001/02 
(pence) .002 .000705 .160 2.480 .014 .795 1.258 
  American (dummy) .223 .102282 .126 2.178 .030 .990 1.010 
  Finance (dummy) .358 .065665 .314 5.447 .000 .988 1.013 
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? TSR is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  Results suggest that a 
10% increase in TSR accounts for a 1% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary.  Specifically, a firms’ TSR has an estimated cross-sectional effect 
of 0.129, which predicts that a 10% increase in TSR is associated with                   
exp (0.1*0.129) – 1 = 0.0130 increase in CEO cash pay due to bonuses, whilst 
controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level in 
2002, which was £500,000, implies an additional £6,500 in bonus pay. 
? EPS is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  Results suggest that a 10 
pence increase in EPS accounts for a 2% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary.  The result suggests that as EPS increases so too does the size of the 
CEO’s bonus.  In particular, a firm’s EPS has an estimated cross-sectional effect of 
0.002, which predicts that a 10 pence increase in EPS is associated with                 
exp (10*0.002) – 1 = 0.0202 increase in CEO cash pay due to bonuses, whilst 
controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level in 
2003, which was £500,000, implies an additional £10,100 in bonus pay. 
? CEOs of American nationality are positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  
American CEOs can expect to receive an annual bonus relative to salary that is 25% 
larger than those CEOs that are not American (exp (0.223) – 1 = 0.250).  Specifically, 
American CEOs receive higher bonuses resulting in 0.250 higher cash pay 
independently of salary and performance effects.  This is equivalent to a £125,000 
increase at the median cash pay level.  Significantly and in line with main board 
executives, American CEOs who traditionally are similarly very well remunerated 
are also in receipt of the largest bonuses.     
? The finance industry is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  CEOs in 
this industry receive a 43% increase in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary 
when compared to CEOs in retail and distribution (exp (0.358) – 1 = 0.430).  In 
particular, CEOs in the finance industry tend to receive higher bonuses resulting in 
0.430 higher cash pay independently of salary and performance effects.  This is 
equivalent to a £215,000 increase at the median cash pay level.  Therefore, finance 
industry firms are found to rely more heavily on bonuses than the sample average.   
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Results also indicate that, based on the beta values, the independent variables ranked in 
order of importance are as follows: the finance industry (Beta = 0.314) has the greatest 
unique association with bonus variance, followed by EPS (Beta = 0.160), then by TSR 
(Beta = 0.153) and, finally, by American CEOs (Beta = 0.126).  As noted, firm size was 
insignificant and, therefore, cannot be ranked.  Furthermore, high tolerance levels (i.e. 
significantly different from zero) suggest that multicollinearity is unlikely. 
 
5.5.2. CEO single period multiple regression analysis 2002/03   
Table 11 below presents the results of an iterative process of model construction, and 
includes 5 explanatory variables.  Again, a possible explanation for fewer explanatory 
variables may be due to the reduction in sample size. 
 
Table 11. CEO model Summary: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2002/03. 
 
     Change Statistics 
 
Model R  
 R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .283(a) .080 .077 .38278 .080 23.221 1 267 .000 
2 .325(b) .106 .099 .37806 .026 7.708 1 266 .006 
3 .357(c) .128 .118 .37416 .022 6.577 1 265 .011 
4 .386(d) .149 .136 .37025 .021 6.624 1 264 .011 
5 .408(e) .166 .150 .36718 .017 5.433 1 263 .021 
a  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy) 
b  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 (dummy) 
c  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 (dummy), EPS value 
2002/03 (pence) 
d  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 (dummy), EPS value 
2002/03 (pence), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures 
(dummy) 
e  Predictors: (Constant), finance (dummy), instant cash bonus payment 2002/03 (dummy), EPS value 
2002/03 (pence), complex performance target 2002/03 based on number of performance measures 
(dummy), American (dummy) 
 
 
Results indicate that adjusted R2 equals 0.15 for the model, which in turn explains 15% 
of the sample variance in the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure for 2002/03.  Among the 
variables that are significantly associated with the Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) figure are: 
EPS, cash bonuses, implementing multiple performance targets based on performance 
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measures, American nationality, and the finance industry.  Firm size, as measured by 
number of employees, however, is insignificant. 
 
The coefficients presented in Table 12 below are used to approximate the size and 
direction of the association that each independent variable has with the dependent 
variable (i.e. Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2002/03).  Associations with each independent 
variable are discussed in turn. 
 
Table 12. CEO coefficients: dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) 2002/03. 
 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
Model  B 
Std. 
Error Beta t  Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
5 (Constant) .321 .052051   6.167 .000     
  EPS value 2002/03 
(pence) .002 .000589 .162 2.858 .005 .992 1.008 
  Instant cash bonus 
payment 2002/03 
(dummy) 
-.134 .046217 -.164 -2.907 .004 .996 1.004 
  Complex performance 
target 2002/03 based on 
number of performance 
measures (dummy) 
.139 .049740 .161 2.791 .006 .953 1.049 
  American (dummy) .241 .103399 .132 2.331 .021 .987 1.013 
  Finance (dummy) .287 .067052 .246 4.284 .000 .965 1.036 
 
 
? EPS is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  Results suggest that a 10 
pence increase in EPS accounts for a 2% increase in the size of the annual bonus 
relative to salary.  Specifically, a firms’ EPS has an estimated cross-sectional effect 
of 0.002, which predicts that a 10 pence increase in EPS is associated with             
exp (10*0.002) – 1 = 0.0202 increase in CEO cash pay due to bonuses, whilst 
controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level in 
2003, which was £553,000, implies an additional £11,170 in bonus pay. 
? Instant cash bonuses are negatively correlated with the bonus variable, Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary).  It may be suggested that remunerating CEOs with cash bonuses will 
result in a 13% decrease in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary when 
compared with alternative more long-term bonuses (exp (-0.134) – 1 = -0.125).  In 
particular, cash only bonuses are on average associated with a -0.125 decrease in 
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CEO bonus pay, which implies a reduction of £69,125 in bonus at the median pay 
level. 
? The use of multiple performance targets based on the number of performance 
measures included in the bonus design is positively correlated with Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary).  It may be suggested that, on average, complex performance measures 
(i.e. multiple) result in a 15% increase in the size of the annual bonus relative to 
salary when compared with simple (i.e. not more than one) performance measures 
(exp (0.139) – 1 = 0.149).  Significantly, making performance targets more complex 
does lead to larger bonuses.  Furthermore, complex performance targets are on 
average associated with a 0.149 rise in CEO bonus pay, which implies an increase of 
£82,397 in bonus at the median pay level. 
? CEOs of American nationality are positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  
American CEOs can expect to receive an annual bonus relative to salary that is 27% 
larger than those CEOs that are not American (exp (0.241) – 1 = 0.273).  Specifically, 
American CEOs receive higher bonuses resulting in 0.273 higher cash pay 
independently of salary and performance effects.  This is equivalent to a £150,969 
increase at the median cash pay level.  Once again, American CEOs who traditionally 
are similarly very well remunerated are also in receipt of the largest bonuses.     
? The finance industry is positively correlated with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary).  CEOs in 
this industry receive a 33% increase in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary 
when compared to CEOs in retail and distribution (exp (0.287) – 1 = 0.332).  In 
particular, CEOs in the finance industry tend to receive higher bonuses resulting in 
0.332 higher cash pay independently of salary and performance effects.  This is 
equivalent to a £183,596 increase at the median cash pay level.  Therefore, finance 
industry firms are found to rely more heavily on bonuses than the sample average. 
 
Results also indicate that, based on the beta values, the independent variables ranked in 
order of importance are as follows: the finance industry (Beta = 0.246) has the greatest 
unique association with bonus variance, followed by cash bonuses (Beta = -0.164), then 
by EPS (Beta = 0.162), complex performance targets based on number of performance 
measures (Beta = 0.161) and, finally, by American CEOs (Beta = 0.132).  As noted, firm 
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size was insignificant and, therefore, cannot be ranked.  Furthermore, high tolerance 
levels (i.e. significantly different from zero) suggest that multicollinearity is unlikely. 
 
Further analysis explores those independent variables, identified in sections 5.5.1 and 
5.5.2, which are significantly associated with the dependent variable (i.e. Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively) over the two-year period. Table 13 
below illustrates this comparison.  
  
Table 13. Association of independent variables with the dependent variable (i.e. Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) 2001/02 and 2002/03) over the two-year period for the CEO sample. 
 
  
 
 
Independent  
Variables 
 
Annual Bonus 
2001/02 
(Effect: Size & 
Direction) 
 
Annual Bonus 
2002/03 
(Effect: Size & 
Direction) 
 
 
 
Percentage 
Difference 
 
 
 
Effect  
Summary 
(H1) EPS 2% more 2% more Nil No change 
 American nationality 
 25% more 27% more +2% Increased effect 
 Finance industry 43% less 33% less -10% Reduced effect 
 
 
Table 13 above indicates that three independent variables had a significant association 
with the dependent variable during 2001/02 and 2002/03.  In particular, the association 
between the EPS and Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) was unchanged from year one to year two.  
Additionally, the association between CEOs of American nationality and Log (1 + 
Bonus/Salary) increased over both years equalling 2%.  Finally, the finance industry 
experienced a reduced association with Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) over the two-year period 
totalling 10%.   
 
However, are these significance tests consistent over time?  Therefore, sections 5.6 and 
5.7 to follow take a longitudinal approach and present results from the panel regression 
analysis for both the main board executive directors and CEOs respectively.  
 
For both samples the dependent variable Log (1 + Bonus/Salary) is non-normally 
distributed and the statistical analysis is based on generalized least squares (GLS) using 
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Bonus 
Salary 
the fixed-effects (within) regression estimator available in STATA.  The following 
equation is specified and estimated (Bruce et al., 2005): 
 
 
Log   1 +                      = β0 + β1 x i,t + ui + εi,t   
                               i,t  
 
for observations t = 1,2 on firm i = 1,…,1452 (2667 cases overall) for the executive 
director sample and t = 1,2 on firm i = 1,…,285 (542 cases overall) for the CEO sample.  
Vector xi,t consists of values of explanatory factors for firm i in moment t.  It includes: 
1) Firm performance indicators: log-TSR, EPS 
2) Firm size indicator: log-Number of Employees 
3) Bonus design factors: 
a) Dummy = 1 if bonus is paid in cash only (bonus payment type is cash) 
b) Dummy = 1 if bonus incorporates multiple performance target types 
(more than one performance target type is present) 
c) Dummy = 1 if bonus incorporates multiple performance measures (more 
than one performance measure is present) 
d) Dummy = 1 if bonus incorporates a soft performance target (an 
unspecified performance target is present) 
4) Time effect (trend) 
 
Here β1 is the vector of coefficients and u i is the firm specific fixed effect, representing 
the effects of those variables constant over time and peculiar to the ith firm. Therefore, 
explanatory variables xi,t do not include factors that are constant in time (such as CEO 
nationality and industry dummies).  Effects of other omitted variables that vary across 
firms and time are represented by the independently, identically distributed error term εi,t 
which is assumed to be uncorrelated both with xi,1 and  xi,2.    
 
In general, the fixed effect model captures all time constant variables, measured and 
unmeasured, and preserves the substantive story of fixed effects without reducing 
degrees of freedom by explaining changes in the explanatory variables that cause the 
independent variable to vary around a mean within the unit (Petersen, 2004).  The fixed 
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effects procedure reports how much the dependent variable changes, on average, when 
changes are made to the independent variables (Petersen, 2004).  In summary, the within 
estimator controls for all time invariant measured and unmeasured variables, addressing 
within individual changes or differences (Petersen, 2004).  For example, as executives 
change from being paid in cash or not cash, what are the changes in bonus earned?  
 
5.6. EXECUTIVE PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Table 14 below presents longitudinal results from the fixed effects model relating to 
executive bonus pay, bonus design, and firm performance.  The longitudinal results for 
each of the variable categories under analysis will be discussed in turn.  
 
Table 14. Executive’ bonus pay: results of a fixed-effects estimator. 
 
Dependent variable: Log (1 + bonus/salary) 
 Fixed effects estimator of the effects of transitional change 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
 
TSR 
 
0.075536 (**) 
 
0.013303 
 
EPS 
 
0.000761 (**) 
 
0.000277 Fi
rm
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 &
 
si
ze
 
(H
1 
&
 2
) 
 
Firm SIZE 
 
-0.055513 0.034632 
 
CASH 
 
-0.057784 
 
0.032960 
Complex MEASURE -0.022795 0.023235 
Complex TYPE 0.016486 0.018730 B
on
us
 
sc
he
m
e 
de
si
gn
 
(H
3,
 5
, &
 7
) 
SOFT -0.024473 0.014044 
American (dropped) (dropped) 
Finance (dropped) (dropped) 
cons 0.870114 (**) 0.315271 
Ti
m
e 
tre
nd
 &
 
co
ns
ta
nt
 
Trend 
(Year dummy) 0.023636 0.010534 
 Number of obs. 2702  
 Number of cases (Executives) 1487  
 F-stat F(8,1207)=7.76  
 R2 4.9%  
* - 5%, ** - 1% significance level 
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5.6.1. Firm performance and firm size based on the executive sample: longitudinal 
analysis 
Table 14 detects a positive and significant association at the longitudinal level between a 
firms TSR and bonus pay.  The estimated longitudinal effect is 0.0755, which predicts 
that a 10% increase in TSR is associated with exp (0.1*0.0755) – 1 = 0.00758 increase in 
executive cash pay due to bonuses, whilst controlling for salary.  In absolute terms, if 
evaluated at the median cash pay level in 2003, which was £348,000, implies a rise of 
£2,638 in bonus pay.  
 
In addition, Table 14 detects a positive and significant association at the longitudinal 
level between a firms EPS and bonus pay.  The estimated longitudinal effect is 0.000761, 
which predicts that a 10 pence increase in EPS is associated with exp (10*0.000761) – 1 
= 0.00764 increase in executive cash pay due to bonuses, whilst controlling for salary.  In 
absolute terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level in 2003, which was £348,000, 
implies a rise of £2,659 in bonus pay.   
 
Longitudinal effects of changes in firm size are not statistically significant.  This 
contrasts strongly with other empirical work, but is mainly a result of the transformation 
of the bonus variable, expressed as a proportion relative to salary. 
 
5.6.2. Executive annual bonus design: longitudinal analysis 
Longitudinal effects relating to changes in annual bonus design, in terms of shifts in the 
type of bonus payment employed, the number of performance measures and/or targets 
used are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 15 overleaf summarises the cross-sectional and panel regression results and their 
estimated effects.   
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Table 15. Executives' bonus pay: summary of bonus effects of two single-period models and a fixed-effects estimator. 
Dependent variable: Log (1 + bonus/salary) 
 2001/02 cross-sectional model 2002/03 cross-sectional model Fixed effects estimator of the effects of transitional changes 
  
Relative change 
in cash earnings 
due to change 
in bonus pay 
Absolute change 
in bonus pay at 
median pay level 
 
Relative change 
in cash earnings 
due to change 
in bonus pay 
Absolute change 
in bonus pay at 
median pay 
level 
 
Relative change 
in cash earnings 
due to change in 
bonus pay 
Absolute change 
in bonus pay at 
median pay 
level 
 
TSR 0.0169 (**) £5,662 TSR 0.0112 (**) £3,987 TSR 0.00758 (**) £2,638 
 
EPS 0.01005 (**) £3,367 EPS 0.01005 (**) £3,578 EPS 0.00764 (**) £2,659 
F
i
r
m
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
s
i
z
e
 
(
H
1
 
&
 
2
)
 
Firm SIZE (Not detected) (Not detected) Firm SIZE 0.0126 (**) £4,486 Firm SIZE (Not detected) (Not detected) 
CASH -0.0997 (**) £-33,399 CASH -0.112 (**) £-39,872 CASH (Not detected)  
Complex 
MEASURE 0.059 (**) £20,000 
Complex 
MEASURE 0.0942 (**) £33,535 
Complex 
MEASURE 
(Not detected)  
Complex TYPE (Not detected) (Not detected) Complex TYPE (Not detected) (Not detected) Complex TYPE (Not detected)  B o
n
u
s
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
(
H
3
,
 
5
,
 
&
 
7
)
 
SOFT (Not detected) (Not detected) SOFT (Not detected) (Not detected) SOFT (Not detected)  
CEO on 
nominations 
committee 
-0.0421 (*) £-14,104       
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
(
H
1
0
 
&
 
1
1
)
 
 
CEO/Chair duality 0.101 (*) £33,835       
American 0.257 (**) £86,095 American 0.200 (**) £71,200 American (Dropped)  
Finance 0.254 (**) £85,090 Finance 0.215 (**) £76,540 Finance (Dropped)  
Oil, gas & 
minerals 0.130 (**) £43,550 
Oil, gas & 
minerals 0.125 (**) £44,500    
E-business, 
software & 
computer services 
0.175 (**) £58,625 Construction & building materials 0.0640 (*) £22,784    
   Transport & leisure -0.0648 (*) £-23,069    
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
&
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
r
e
n
d
 
   Chemical & pharmaceuticals -0.0961 (*) £-34,212    
* - 5%, ** - 1% significance level 
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To summarise, Table 15 indicates that TSR and EPS have a positive and significant 
effect on bonus pay at both the cross-sectional and longitudinal level.  Significantly, firm 
size effects in relation to bonus pay was detected at the cross-sectional level for 2002/03 
only.   
 
In terms of bonus design factors, all are insignificant at both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal levels with the exception of cash bonuses and multiple performance 
measures in 2002/03.  The former has a negative impact on bonus pay whereas the later 
has a positive effect on bonus pay at the cross-sectional level.   
 
With the exception of CEO/Chair duality and the CEOs presence on the nominations 
committee in 2001/02 only, CG effects on bonus pay are not detected.  The former has a 
positive effect on bonus pay whereas the later has a negative impact on bonus pay at the 
cross-sectional level.  
 
In relation to nationality and industry variables, American CEOs, the finance, and oil, gas 
and minerals industries are positively associated with bonus pay over both years.  In 
addition, e-business, software and computer services and construction and building 
materials industries are positively associated with bonus pay at the cross-sectional level 
in 2001/02 only and 2002/03 only respectively.  Conversely, the transport and leisure and 
chemical and pharmaceuticals industries both have a negative impact on bonus pay at the 
cross-sectional level in 2002/03 only.     
 
5.7. CEO PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Table 16 overleaf presents longitudinal results from the fixed effects model relating to 
CEO bonuses, bonus design, and firm performance.  The longitudinal results for each of 
the variable categories under analysis will be discussed in turn.   
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Table 16. CEOs’ bonus pay: results of a fixed-effects estimator. 
 
Dependent variable: Log (1 + bonus/salary) 
 Fixed effects estimator of the effects of transitional change 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
 
TSR 
 
0.060561 (*) 
 
0.025195 
 
EPS 
 
0.000697 
 
0.000578 Fi
rm
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 &
 
si
ze
 
(H
1 
&
 2
) 
 
Firm SIZE 
 
0.017392 0.066091 
 
CASH 
 
-0.125151 
 
0.066828 
Complex MEASURE 0.016333 0.048190 
Complex TYPE 0.011581 0.039498 B
on
us
 
sc
he
m
e 
de
si
gn
 
(H
3,
 5
, &
 7
) 
SOFT -0.028704 0.043148 
American (dropped)  
Finance (dropped)  
cons 0.283061 0.592258 
Ti
m
e 
tre
nd
 &
 
co
ns
ta
nt
 
Trend 
(Year dummy) 0.027112 0.017158 
 Number of obs. 542  
 Number of cases (CEOs) 285  
 F-stat F(8,249)=1.86  
 R2 5.6%  
* - 5%, ** - 1% significance level 
 
5.7.1. Firm performance and size based on the CEO sample: longitudinal analysis 
Table 16 detects a positive and significant association between the changes in TSR and 
bonus pay.  Estimated longitudinal effect is 0.0606, which predicts a 10% increase in 
TSR is associated with exp (0.1*0.0606) - 1 = 0.00608 increase in CEOs’ cash pay due to 
bonuses whilst controlling for CEO salary.  In absolute terms, if evaluated at the median 
cash pay level in 2003, which is equal to £530,863, implies an additional £3,228 in bonus 
pay.  Longitudinal effects of changes in EPS and firm size are not statistically significant.   
 
5.7.2. CEO annual bonus design: longitudinal analysis 
Longitudinal effects relating to changes in annual bonus design, in terms of shifts in the 
type of bonus payment employed, the number of performance measures and/or targets 
used are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 17 overleaf summarises the cross-sectional and panel regression results and their 
estimated effects.   
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Table 17. CEOs’ bonus pay: summary of bonus effects of two single-period models and a fixed-effects estimator. 
 
Dependent variable: Log (1 + bonus/salary) 
 2001/02 cross-sectional model 2002/03 cross-sectional model Fixed effects estimator of the effects of transitional changes 
  
Relative change 
in cash earnings 
due to change in 
bonus pay 
Absolute 
change in 
bonus pay at 
median pay 
level 
 
Relative change 
in cash earnings 
due to change in 
bonus pay 
Absolute 
change in 
bonus pay at 
median pay 
level 
 
Relative change 
in cash earnings 
due to change in 
bonus pay 
Absolute 
change in 
bonus pay at 
median pay 
level 
 
TSR 0.0130 (*) £6,500 TSR (Not detected) (Not detected) TSR 0.00608 (*) £3,228 
 
EPS 0.0202 (*) £10,100 EPS 0.0202 (**) £11,170 EPS (Not detected) (Not detected) 
F
i
r
m
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
s
i
z
e
 
(
H
1
 
&
 
2
)
 
Firm SIZE (Not detected) (Not detected) Firm SIZE (Not detected) (Not detected) Firm SIZE (Not detected) (Not detected) 
CASH (Not detected) (Not detected) CASH -0.125 (**) £-69,125 CASH (Not detected)  
Complex 
MEASURE (Not detected) (Not detected) 
Complex 
MEASURE 0.149 (**) £82,397 
Complex 
MEASURE (Not detected)  
Complex TYPE (Not detected) (Not detected) Complex TYPE (Not detected) (Not detected) Complex TYPE (Not detected)  B
o
n
u
s
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
(
H
3
,
 
5
,
 
&
 
7
)
 
SOFT (Not detected) (Not detected) SOFT (Not detected) (Not detected) SOFT (Not detected)  
 
American 0.250 (*) £125,000 American 0.273 (*) £150,969 American (Dropped)  
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
 
Finance 
 
0.430 (**) £215,000 Finance 0.332 (**) £183,596 Finance (Dropped)  
* - 5%, ** - 1% significance level 
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To summarise, Table 17 indicates that EPS has a positive effect on bonus pay at the 
cross-sectional level but is insignificant at the longitudinal level.  In contrast, TSR has a 
positive effect on bonus pay at the cross-sectional level for 2001/02 only and also has a 
positive influence longitudinally.  Significantly, firm size effects in relation to bonus pay 
were not detected at the cross-sectional and longitudinal levels.   
 
In terms of bonus design factors, all are insignificant at both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal levels with the exception of cash bonuses and multiple performance 
measures in 2002/03.  The former has a negative impact on bonus pay whereas the later 
has a positive effect on bonus pay at the cross-sectional level.   
 
Significantly, CG effects on bonus pay are not detected.  However, in relation to 
nationality and industry variables, American CEOs and the finance industry are 
positively associated with bonus pay over both years.  
 
Chapter 6 to follow will discuss the results using the two theoretical models outlined 
previously (agency theory and the self/serving management perspective) and in the 
context of previous research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
With existing research on executive compensation preoccupied with long-term pay, this 
study is one of a few which has focused on the relationship between short-term executive 
bonuses and firm performance.  Specifically, this chapter will address the main research 
aim, highlighted in chapter 1, which set out to explore the relationship between executive 
bonus pay, its characteristics, and firm performance in the UK.  In order to present a 
detailed and focused discussion, each hypothesis developed in chapter 3 will be 
examined in turn.  Furthermore, the implications of the results will be identified in 
relation to existing theory and models reviewed in chapter 2, previous empirical results, 
and in terms of current business practice and policy.  Results for the two samples used in 
this study (i.e. executive director and CEO samples) are generally comparable.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this discussion, the CEO will be taken as representative of 
the board as a whole. 
 
6.1. BONUS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
CEO pay details are outlined in section 5.3.3.  Approximately 90% of all CEOs in this 
sample are in receipt of an annual bonus.  This compares with Leonard (1990) who found 
that between 1981 and 1985 the proportion of sampled American firms using bonus 
systems increased from 95.6% to 98.3% and IDS (1993), which concluded that by 1993 
almost all companies in the UK had some form of annual bonus scheme for their 
executives.  These high proportions indicate that the annual bonus has been a consistently 
popular executive pay element in the UK and America.   
 
In addition, the median bonus figure rose by 29.5% (£37,000) over the two-year period.  
This rise in bonus figure corresponds to the 18.32% (£17,349) found by McKnight 
(1996) and more recently by S. E. Hall and Koors (2004) who report that  bonus pay for 
CEOs rose from 16% of salary in 2002 to 21% in 2003. Therefore, bonus pay remains a 
persistent and significant element of executive reward. 
 
Generally, the descriptive analysis (Figures 65 to 68) and regressions (single period and 
panel) provide consistent support for H1a, the positive association with firm 
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performance, and the agency theory that underpins this relation.   Both measures of firm 
performance (TSR and EPS) are shown to be positively and significantly related with 
bonus pay.   In contrast, McKnight (1996) found that bonus pay was insignificantly 
linked with TSR but positively and significantly associated with EPS.  He concluded that 
a firm realising a 10% growth in EPS would increase annual bonuses correspondingly by 
1.4%, i.e. an ‘elasticity’ of 1.4% (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  Significantly, a later study 
by McKnight and Tomkins (1999) concluded that EPS was not related to bonus pay.  
However, in this study, with bigger samples and two cross-sections, executive director 
results show a weaker elasticity over the two-year period of 0.51%.  Besides elasticity as 
a relative measure of the responsiveness of executive reward to firm performance, an 
absolute measure was also adopted, i.e. pay ‘sensitivity’, or the absolute increase in CEO 
pay associated with a £1,000 increase in shareholder value. 
 
Therefore, in order to compare directly the responsiveness of bonus pay and shareholder 
return with the results of other studies, which are cited in Table 18 overleaf, the TSR 
coefficients reported in Table 16 were converted into sensitivities and elasticities (see 
footnotes to Table 18).  
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Table 18.  Estimates of Median Executive Pay-Performance (i.e. TSR) Sensitivities and 
Elasticities Compared. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the magnitudes of shareholder value (with the median firm’s market capitalisation 
of £1.446 billion in 2002/03) and CEO pay, it has been observed that sensitivities are 
expected to be low.  In this study, a £1,000 increase in shareholder value is associated 
with a median 2.2 pence increase in CEO pay, which yields a relatively low pay-
performance sensitivity of 0.022. This corresponds to the 0.0135 sensitivity calculated by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) for salary and bonus (see Table 18), a dimensionally similar 
result.  
 
As mentioned, these quite low sensitivities (as a result of the shareholder value and CEO 
bonus magnitudes) suggest that relative rather than absolute measures of responsiveness 
                                                 
3 Performance-Pay Sensitivity – this shows the absolute increment to pay associated with a 1,000 unit (e.g. 
$) increase in shareholder value, so a sensitivity of 0.0135, for salary and bonus, denotes that an additional 
$1,000 of shareholder value is associated with a 1.35 cents of additional executive pay (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990). It is calculated by regressing changes in executive pay on changes in shareholder value.   
 
4 Performance-Pay Elasticity – this shows the % responsiveness of pay to a % change in performance. For 
example, an elasticity of 0.10 denotes that a CEO associated with a 20% rate of return would be paid 1% 
more than a CEO associated with 10% (B. J. Hall & Liebman, 1998, p. 654). It is calculated by regressing 
the change in the log of executive pay on change in the log of shareholder value. 
 
Researcher(s) 
(Date) 
 
Country 
(Years studied) 
 
Performance-Pay 
Sensitivity3 
 
Performance- 
Pay Elasticity4 
 
 Absolute 
Effect 
 
Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) 
(Salary and 
bonus only) 
USA 
(1974-1986) 
 
0.0135 
 
 
 
 
 
Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) 
USA 
(1974-1986) 
 
3.25 
 
 
 
 
B. J. Hall and 
Liebman 
(1998) (Salary 
and Bonus 
only) 
 
America 
(1980-1994) 
 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
 
B. J. Hall and 
Liebman 
(1998) 
America 
(1980-1994) 
6.00 3.9  
Benito and 
Conyon (1999) 
(Salary and 
Bonus only) 
 
UK 
(1990-1996) 
 
 
 
0.26 
 
£1,852 
Current Study 
(2005) (Bonus 
only) 
UK  
(2001/02, 2002/03) 
0.022 0.22 £3,228 
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may be more informative.  Consequently, pay-performance elasticities were calculated 
and represent the percentage change in CEO pay associated with a percentage change in 
shareholder value.  Over the two years, a 10% change in TSR was associated with a 2.2% 
increase in bonus, i.e. an elasticity of 0.22.  This result, as presented in Table 18, is 
identical with the 0.22 calculated for cash pay by B. J. Hall and Liebman (1998) and 
similar to Benito and Conyon’s (1999) estimate of approximately 0.26. Again, the broad 
correspondence of results across different studies, time, and countries is re-assuring.   
 
In addition to examining the pay-performance elasticities, Table 18 also presents results 
in relation to the impact of TSR on bonus pay, as measured by its absolute effect.  In 
absolute terms, results from the fixed effects panel model reveal that a 10% increase in 
TSR is associated with a £2,638 rise in CEO bonus whilst controlling for salary.  
Similarly, from their fixed effects model, Benito and Conyon (1999) concluded that a 
10% increase in shareholder return was associated with a £3,228 increase in executive 
compensation.   
 
Consistent with other research discussed above and presented in Table 18, the results of 
this study suggest that the performance effect on bonus pay, although positive, remains 
relatively weak.  Also, in line with Jensen and Murphy (1990), the relationship between 
CEO and shareholder wealth continues to be small.  Nevertheless, this close 
correspondence of pay-performance sensitivities, elasticities, and absolute effects in 
relation to the other studies offers strong support for H1a and the agency perspective.   
 
To restate this hypothesis, agency theory is concerned with the problems that can arise in 
any cooperative exchange when one party (the principals) contracts with another (the 
agents) to make decisions on their behalf (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  By their very nature, 
agency contracts separate ownership from control and create a risk differential that the 
board must manage so that agents are incentivised to raise shareholder value.  Therefore, 
agency theory would argue that the relation between pay and performance may be 
positive and strong due to the benefits gained from aligning the interests of the executive 
agents with those of the principal shareholders.  Consequently, from an agency 
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perspective, it is predicted that bonus pay will be positively associated with firm 
performance, as measured by TSR and EPS. 
 
The evidence supports this hypothesis, and both TSR and EPS are positively and 
significantly related with bonus pay, albeit weakly.  Therefore, in contrast to Aguilera 
and Jackson (2003) who predict that managers may prefer growth to profits, the results of 
this study would argue that CEOs are to an extent profit-orientated.  Consequently, it 
would appear that, in general, boards have been able to use bonuses to relieve the agency 
problems highlighted by Ezzamel and Watson (2002).  As a result, firm performance 
improvements observed in this study may be consistent with a greater alignment of 
interests between the principal and agent, and the use of incentives that contribute to both 
shareholder value as well as CEO utility.  Furthermore, it may be inferred that the CEOs 
in this study are behaving more like stewards of corporate assets than as immediately 
self-interested CEOs.  
 
Therefore, this result does not support H1b, which argues that bonus pay and 
performance will be negatively associated, or the power model that underpins it.  
Efficient contracting appears to have reduced the risk differential highlighted by 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) between the principal and agent.  It is suggested that, 
first, this reduction may have been achieved through effective and accurate 
accountability of CEO action.  Secondly, this process may have limited opportunistic 
behaviour and the misallocation of effort. 
 
Furthermore, the results do not support the contention that executives are inherently self-
serving or opportunistic (Lubatkin et al., 2003).  Often, the manipulation of financial 
results to mask underachievement in order to sustain a reward is indicative of an 
entrenched CEO exercising unfettered power.  However, the results demonstrate a 
positive association between firm performance, measured through external (TSR) and 
internal (EPS) indicators, and bonus pay.  Consequently, it may be inferred that, despite 
ownership becoming more dispersed and control more concentrated, and in contrast to 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003), CEOs are not abusing their power or authority to exploit 
corporate resources and extract greater rents even when firm performance may be weak.   
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In summary, the sensitivity of CEO bonus pay to changes in TSR and EPS is positive, 
and supports an agency view.  To this extent the power perspective, which argues that 
CEOs pay themselves guaranteed income masquerading as a performance bonus is not 
supported.  Consequently, these results contradict widespread suspicions in the popular 
press that pay is unrelated to performance.  This may be considered to be re-assuring for 
shareholders and other stakeholders with an interest in shareholder return and the 
prosperity of the firm.  However, in addition to these external and internal measures of 
firm performance, firm size, often regarded as the main determinant of executive pay 
(Berle & Means, 1991), may be associated with the value of the bonus, indicating 
another source of executive utility.  This relationship between bonus pay and firm size is 
discussed next. 
 
6.2. BONUS AND FIRM SIZE 
It is generally accepted by most academics (see section 2.7.2) that firm size is 
significantly and positively related with total cash pay (i.e. salary plus bonus) in general, 
since salary and bonus rise proportionally with firm size.  In this respect, this study is no 
different.  However, this study uses a composite bonus figure (i.e. Log 1 + 
(Bonus/Salary) and, hereafter, referred to as ‘bonus pay’) and in relation to firm size was 
statistically insignificant in general.  As a result, although firm size may vary, the 
proportion of bonus pay relative to salary does not change.  This suggests that both large 
and small firms pay out proportionally similar bonuses. 
 
There is, however, one exception.  Single period regression results for the executive 
directors in 2002/03 only suggest that firm size, as measured by number of employees, is 
weakly but positively related with bonus pay.  Therefore, when doubled, firm size 
accounts for a 1% increase in the size of the annual bonus relative to salary.  In absolute 
terms, if evaluated at the median cash pay level, implies an additional £4,486 in bonus 
pay.  This result, albeit marginal, is consistent with previous research whereby larger 
firms pay out larger bonuses.   
 
Although most, if not all, previous studies analysing the association between firm size 
and bonus pay use an absolute total pay figure or bonus value, this study, as indicated, 
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uses a composite bonus pay figure.  Therefore, due to this difference, comparisons made 
with earlier research may be invalid.  Nevertheless, it may be argued that this study lends 
support to studies conducted by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), Lambert et al. (1991), 
Pavlik et al. (1993), Main et al. (1995) and Murphy (1998) who all found that executive 
pay is weakly linked to firm size.  As a result, the regressions (single period and panel) 
provide limited support for H2a, the weak association with firm size, and the agency 
theory underlying it.   
 
From an agency perspective, a CEO’s primary responsibility is to raise shareholder value 
through raising a company’s share price.  Therefore, strategies to increase firm size that 
were considered to be non-value maximising would be avoided as a course of action.  
Consequently, due to this focus on shareholder welfare, it is predicted that bonus pay will 
not be positively associated with total employment.  The evidence generally supports this 
hypothesis and, from an agency view, it may be suggested that the CEO will avoid any 
dysfunctional behaviour, e.g. increasing firm size, if it fails to raise shareholder value.  
Consequently, this disinterest in growth strategies in favour of activities that benefit the 
shareholder (i.e. increasing a firm’s TSR or EPS) again does not support Aguilera and 
Jackson’s (2003) prediction that managers may prefer growth to profits.  As a result, it 
may be inferred that principal and agent interests are in fact closely aligned.   
 
By implication, this result does not support H2b, which argues that bonus pay is 
positively related with firm size, or the power theory that lies behind it.  In contrast to 
Berle and Means (1991) and Werner and Tosi (1995), who argue that with control more 
centralised management may pursue their own interests oblivious to the welfare of the 
owners, the CEOs in this study appear to be less self-interested and motivated more by 
goals that are value maximising.  Consequently, this result, to an extent, confirms that a 
CEOs primary concern is shareholder welfare and that the positive association between 
annual bonuses and TSR strengthens this conclusion.    
 
Unusually, this result contrasts with many of the earlier studies, identified in section 
2.7.2.  In particular, it does not support Berle and Means’ (1991) claim that firm size is 
the most compelling explanation for levels of executive pay or the conclusions reached 
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by Santerre and Neun (1989) and Tosi et al. (2000) where executive pay is positively 
associated with firm size.  In particular, the former calculated the elasticity of executive 
compensation with respect to firm size and indicates that a 10% increase in size causes a 
3% increase in salary.  However, many of these studies address total pay (including 
option valuations) or cash pay (salary plus bonus) and no previous study has focused 
exclusively on the annual bonus.  Therefore, it may be suggested that bonus is one 
element of CEO pay, which is not rigidly linked to firm size, offering more potential for 
influence from performance.  This view is supported by Lambert et al. (1991) who 
concluded that factors other than firm size explain the majority of variance in executive 
compensation.  However, in this study the transformation of the bonus variable 
employed, from an absolute bonus measure to a proportion of salary, must eliminate 
much of the influence of size on bonus pay.  Consequently, this may provide one 
explanation for this insignificant association.   
 
Therefore, in contrast to much of the existing research, firm size in this study is not 
significantly associated with bonus pay.  Besides bonus/performance and bonus/size 
associations, however, it seems necessary to analyse how detailed bonus characteristics 
(e.g. payment types such as cash or shares) are associated with bonus pay and firm 
performance.  This analysis is considered next. 
 
6.3. FORM OF BONUS PAYMENT, BONUS VALUE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
For both years, cash accounted for approximately 60% of the total bonus amount.  This 
suggests that cash, as a bonus payment, remains significant in a climate where the 
emphasis is on more long-term pay strategies (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Blair, 1995; Tosi 
et al., 1997).  In general, however, results show that cash bonuses are not positively 
associated with the value of the bonus awarded.  The descriptive analysis (Figure 69 and 
70) and regressions (single period and panel) provide consistent support for H3a, the 
weak association between cash and bonus value, and the agency theory that underpins it.   
 
According to Berle and Means (1991) and B. J. Hall (2000), share-based (rather than 
cash) bonuses, which are closely linked with share price performance, better align the 
interests of the shareholder with the CEO.  Equity-based pay, therefore, sees the CEO 
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being paid like owners in order to act like owners (Berle & Means, 1991; B. J. Hall, 
2000; Ezzamel & Watson, 2002).  It is suggested that this alignment may have positive 
consequences, which include reducing risk aversion and managerial opportunism, 
promoting shareholder-wealth maximisation, and increasing firm performance (Sanders, 
1999; Vogel & McGinnis, 1999; B. J. Hall, 2000; Pass et al., 2000; Sanders, 2001).  
Therefore, consistent with agency theory, external, verifiable performance measures 
better align the relationship between share-based pay and firm performance.  
Consequently, cash bonuses may be a less popular compensation device due to their 
general opaqueness and, therefore, it is predicted that cash payments will not be 
positively related to the value of the short-term bonus. 
 
Evidence supports this hypothesis and, despite making up approximately two-thirds of 
the annual bonus, cash payments are related to the smallest bonuses.  In contrast, results 
suggest that the largest bonuses are linked with more deferred schemes.  Furthermore, 
based on the single period regression in 2002/03, cash bonuses are associated with 13% 
lower bonus pay for CEOs.  In absolute terms, this implies a reduction of £69,125 in 
bonus at the median pay level.  Consequently, this result suggests that, rather than 
ratcheting the value of the bonus, cash-based pay has the opposite effect.  CEO restraint 
and caution in relation to such a transparent reward as cash bonus may explain this result.      
 
In opposition to Larker (1983) and Healy (1985), it is suggested that cash bonuses may 
not be easily manipulated and, therefore, less likely to be tampered with.  Consequently, 
despite short-term cash bonuses being, generally, awarded on the basis of achieving 
subjective, less visible, and internally generated performance targets, due to the 
magnitude of the cash payment in this study being marginal, it may be inferred that 
CEOs are not trying to extract greater rents through short-term bonus contracts but 
arguably have to earn their bonus (Lawler, 1990).  This result, therefore, does not support 
H3b, which argues that cash payments will lead to larger bonuses, or the underlying 
power model.   
 
In general, share-based bonuses are linked with large bonus values whereas cash bonuses 
are related to small bonus values.  But, to what extent are these forms of payment 
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associated with firm performance?  Consequently, based on the ‘bonding’ qualities of 
deferred pay (Eaton & Rosen, 1983), will share-based bonuses be associated with strong 
firm performance as measured by TSR?  Alternatively, due to the emphasis on the short-
term (Rajagopalan, 1996; Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998) and because cash incentives 
generate no further risk on the part of the CEO since the value of a cash bonus is not 
affected by how well the firm does in the future (Schuler & Huber, 1993; Rajagopalan, 
1996; Murphy, 2001), will cash bonuses be associated with weak firm performance as 
measured by TSR?  Each hypothesis is examined in turn.   
 
H4a predicts that share-based bonuses will be positively associated with TSR.  However, 
descriptive results (Figure 71 and 72) are contrasting.  Year 1 (2001/02) findings show 
that share-based bonuses are related to weak TSR whereas year 2 (2002/03) results reveal 
share-based bonuses to be associated with strong TSR.  Therefore, this mixed set of 
results provide partial support for H4a, the positive association between share-based pay 
and the level of firm performance, and the underpinning agency theory.   
 
With the exception of stock option re-pricing, executives, in general, benefit from share-
based pay only when the company’s performance on the stock market is strong.  
Therefore, in line with agency theory, this study, to an extent, confirms that share-based 
bonuses are linked, directly or indirectly, with the long-term goals of the firm.  
Consequently, this study offers some support for Berle and Means (1991) and B. J. Hall 
(2000) who argue that share-based (rather than cash) bonuses better align the interests of 
the shareholder with the executive.  In addition, it tentatively supports the opinion of 
other academics (see Sanders, 1999; Vogel & McGinnis, 1999; B. J. Hall, 2000; Pass et 
al., 2000; Sanders, 2001) who claim that compensating executives through equity 
arrangements (as opposed to cash-based schemes) will reduce risk aversion and 
managerial opportunism, promote shareholder-wealth maximisation, and increase firm 
performance.  Finally, although the results are mixed, it may nevertheless be inferred that 
share-based bonuses have the potential to align pay with firm performance. 
 
At the same time, this mixed set of results provides partial support for H4b and the power 
theory that underlies it.  To restate this hypothesis, cash bonuses are expected to be 
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negatively associated with TSR.  However, year 1 (2001/02) findings show that cash 
bonuses are associated with stronger TSR whereas year 2 (2002/03) results reveal cash 
bonuses to be associated with weaker TSR.  Consequently, this study, albeit weakly, 
corroborates with Rajagopalan (1996) who claims that cash bonuses encourage short-
term achievement rather than long-term improvements in shareholder value.  Essentially, 
short-term bonuses are measured by internal indicators, which are less transparent than 
external share-based targets.  As a result, opaqueness may contribute to the weak 
association with TSR.  Therefore, it may be suggested that, in agreement with Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) and the power view in general, cash bonuses are a preferred method of 
payment for entrenched executives who try to avoid more stringent performance-related 
pay strategies.  Despite the inconsistent results, it may be inferred that cash bonuses, in 
this power context, promote executive myopia and are often awarded irrespective of a 
firm’s stock market performance.   
 
In general the results are disproportionate.  However, this study does suggest, albeit 
weakly, that share-based pay has the potential to align pay with performance and that 
cash bonuses are a vulnerable form of payment that may be exploited by opportunistic 
executives.  Consequently, having established how different payment forms relate to 
bonus value and company performance, it is necessary to examine the association 
between different performance targets (hard/soft and simple/complex), the bonus value, 
and firm performance.  As a result, each set of performance targets and their proposed 
relationships is now discussed. 
 
6.4. HARD/SOFT TARGETS, BONUS VALUE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Examining hard/soft performance targets first, results indicate that in 2002/03 of the 300 
CEOs in this study 67% (n = 202) are assessed by at least one unspecified performance 
target (i.e. those targets that are not fully disclosed, if at all, in the company’s annual 
report), with 24% (n = 71) of CEOs evaluated by unspecified targets only.  In contrast, 
Ittner et al. (1997) from their 317 firms found that 36% (n = 114) employed non-financial 
measures such as internal customer satisfaction surveys, with 2% (n = 5) measuring CEO 
performance based exclusively on non-financial metrics.  
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Consequently, the results of this study suggest that, over time, performance targets have 
become increasingly softer, in the sense of being unobservable by shareholders.  This 
may be due to powerful CEOs who are in a position to manipulate the type of 
performance targets used or, alternatively, an indication that a CEO’s duties are too 
complex to be assessed exclusively by external measures and, consequently, unspecified 
or non-financial measures attempt to bridge this gap.   However, performance target 
migration results (see Figure 63) indicate that companies, in general, are utilising more 
measurable hard targets (i.e. external and/or internal targets that are published in annual 
reports) rather than softer, unspecified targets.  Despite this, a significant proportion of 
firms still include an unspecified element into their performance target design.  But, what 
is the association between these hard/soft targets and the value of the annual bonus? 
 
Hard, published targets will be negatively related with bonus pay as outlined in H5a.  
Descriptive results (Figure 75 and 76) show that hard targets are negatively associated 
with bonus pay for both years, and responsible for the lowest payouts.  This result 
provides support for H5a, the ability of hard targets to limit bonus value, and the agency 
theory that lies behind it.  Therefore, on an agency view, it may be suggested that hard 
targets, which are both difficult to manipulate and influenced by uncontrollable noise, 
may limit excessive bonuses (Healy, 1985; Murphy, 1986a; Rajagopalan, 1996).  
Consequently, it may be inferred that this increased transparency and tighter shareholder 
monitoring has reduced the pay-performance gap.   
 
In contrast, H5b argues that soft performance targets (i.e. unspecified or non-financial 
measures such as internal customer satisfaction surveys) will be positively related with 
bonus pay.  Regressions (single period and panel) found no significant association 
between soft targets and the bonus variable.  Similarly, Holthausen et al. (1995) found no 
evidence that executives manipulate earnings in response to their bonus plans.  However, 
descriptive results (see Figure 75 and 76 also) show that soft targets are positively 
associated with bonus pay for both years, and responsible for the highest payouts.   
 
This finding provides some support for H5b, the imperfections associated with soft 
targets that expose them to CEO abuse, and the underlying power model.   Therefore, it 
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may be suggested that soft targets, albeit reflecting factors that are more under a CEOs’ 
control (Healy, 1985), are more vulnerable to manipulation.  In addition, entrenched 
CEOs may be more likely to select remuneration practices that obscure the total amount 
of compensation and appear to be more performance based than they actually are.  
Consequently, in line with Murphy (2001) who reported that internally determined 
standards are subject to ratcheting and provide incentives to smooth earnings, it may be 
inferred that CEOs may promote soft, unspecified performance targets which are, 
generally, opaque, open to camouflage, and non-verifiable, as a means to distort the pay-
performance relationship and, ultimately, extract greater rents.     
 
Evidence indicates that hard targets are associated with small bonuses whereas soft 
targets are linked with large bonuses.  But, what is the association between hard/soft 
targets and firm performance?  Consequently, based on the transparency of external 
targets, which make them difficult to manipulate, will hard targets be associated with 
strong firm performance as measured by TSR and EPS?  Alternatively, due to the 
opaqueness of internal, unspecified targets, which make them vulnerable to 
manipulation, will soft targets be associated with weak firm performance as measured by 
TSR and EPS?  Each hypothesis is now examined.   
 
H6a predicts that hard targets will be positively related to TSR and EPS.  Descriptive 
results (Figures 77 to 80) show that hard targets for both years are associated with 
improvements in both TSR and EPS.  Therefore, H6a, the ability of hard targets to 
effectively align pay with performance, and the agency theory that underpins it, is 
supported in this context.  Consequently, it may be inferred that because hard targets are, 
in general, external, visible and more difficult to attain, they give CEOs an incentive to 
improve external performance indicators that may increase the demand for the 
company’s shares and hence TSR, and the size of the dividends released through EPS.  
However, Murphy (2001) would argue that external standards are not influenced by 
managerial actions per se but that share prices and price-related performance are 
frequently subject to the vagaries of the market. 
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However, descriptive results (see Figures 77 to 80 also) show that soft targets are 
negatively associated with TSR and EPS over both years.  In addition, Ittner et al. (1997) 
report a negative relation between the use of non-financial performance measures and the 
correlation between accounting returns and stock returns.  Consequently, these results 
confirm that soft targets, which are generally internal, less visible and easier to attain, are 
not associated with stronger overall firm performance.  Therefore, in accordance with 
Healy (1985), Rajagopalan (1996), and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) soft targets, which are 
easy to manipulate or camouflage, enable powerful CEOs to extract greater rents even 
when performance is weak.  Consistent with the power view, it may be inferred that 
entrenched CEOs will, first, prefer soft, unspecified targets and, secondly, with 
incentives to improve internal less visible measures of performance are more likely to 
neglect actions that increase shareholder value.  This outcome, therefore, lends support 
for H6b, which argues that soft targets will be negatively related to firm performance, 
and the power model that underlies it.   
 
In line with empirical expectations in general, hard targets are associated with small 
bonuses and strong firm performance whereas soft targets are associated with large 
bonuses and weak firm performance.  But, how does this relationship hold up when the 
simple/complex dimension of bonus targets is considered?  This question is addressed 
next. 
 
6.5. SIMPLE/COMPLEX TARGETS, BONUS VALUE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
An extension of the performance target hypothesis includes the dimension of simple 
versus complex performance targets.  In contrast to Murphy (2001), who reported that 
the majority of companies in his sample utilised a mixture of internal and external 
performance standards, and Bushman et al. (1996) who found that one-third of their 
sample used some form of IPE (a mixture of performance measures which include 
subjective evaluations of individual performance, explicit non-financial performance 
criteria, and aspects of managerial input) in determining the level of CEO bonus, results 
of this study are indicative of a 50:50 split.  Half the population of CEOs are evaluated 
using two or more different performance targets whereas the remaining half is assessed 
using one type of performance target only.   
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Therefore, it may be inferred that, over time, performance targets attached to the bonus 
have become increasingly more complex.  This is supported by the performance target 
migration analysis (Figure 64), which shows that companies in general are using more 
types of performance targets and, hence, adopting a more complex (i.e. multiple targets) 
rather than simple (i.e. not more than one target) approach when designing CEO bonuses.  
This approach may be due to powerful CEOs being in a position to manipulate and 
increase the number of performance targets used as a means of camouflaging weak 
performance or, alternatively, an indication that a CEO’s duties are too complex to be 
assessed exclusively by a single measure and, consequently, using supplementary 
measures attempt to bridge this gap.  But, what is the association between 
simple/complex targets and the value of the annual bonus? 
  
Simple performance targets are related to smaller bonuses as predicted by H7a, and 
descriptive results (Figures 81 to 84) show that simple targets are indeed negatively 
associated with bonus pay for both years as well as being responsible for the lowest 
payouts.  Therefore, this result provides some support for H7a, the ability of simple 
targets to limit bonus value, and the underpinning agency theory.   
 
In accordance with the recommendations outlined by Lingle and Schiemann (1996), Ho 
and McKay (2002), and Franco and Bourne (2003), this study suggests that measures that 
are clear and simple as well as easy to manage and communicate may facilitate CEO 
focus, the monitoring of CEO action by shareholders, and the identification of 
achievement.  Consequently, it may be inferred that through improvements in the clarity 
of goals set and tighter shareholder monitoring, simplicity has the potential to limit CEO 
discretion and reduce the pay-performance gap. 
 
In contrast, H7b predicts that complex performance targets are related to larger bonuses.  
Results from the panel regressions were insignificant, however, descriptive analysis (see 
Figures 81 to 84 also) and single period regressions for 2002/03 show a positive and 
significant association between complex targets and the value of the bonus.  Specifically, 
the results from the 2002/03 single period regressions indicate that complex performance 
measures are associated with a 15% increase in bonus pay relative to salary.  In absolute 
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terms, this implies an increase of £82,397 in bonus pay at the median pay level.  This 
outcome, therefore, provides limited support for the imperfections associated with 
complex targets that expose them to camouflage strategies outlined in H7b, and the 
power model that lies behind it.   
 
Significantly, this result suggests that making performance targets more complex is 
associated with larger bonuses.  A possible explanation for this positive association is 
that complexity has the potential to hamper monitoring strategies and limit the ability of 
shareholders to identify CEOs’ achievements.  It may also allow multi-tasking agents to 
misallocate effort across tasks (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), thereby complicating the 
decision-making process (Yearta et al., 1995), diluting CEO incentives, creating 
opportunities for powerful CEOs, and widening the pay-performance gap.  Consequently, 
it may be inferred that entrenched CEOs may try to maximise their bonus payments by 
promoting complex targets, which are opaque, open to manipulation, and which make it 
difficult for shareholders to isolate CEOs’ achievements. 
 
Overall, simple targets are linked with small bonuses whereas complex targets are related 
to large bonuses.  But, what is the association between simple/complex targets and firm 
performance?  Consequently, based on the clarity of simple targets, which make them 
easier to monitor, will simple targets be associated with strong firm performance as 
measured by TSR and EPS?  Alternatively, due to the opaqueness of complex targets, 
which make them susceptible to camouflage and difficult to monitor, will complex 
targets be associated with weak firm performance as measured by TSR and EPS?  Each 
hypothesis is now discussed in turn.   
 
As predicted by H8a, simple targets will be positively related to firm performance as 
measured by TSR and EPS.  However, descriptive results (Figures 85 to 92) show 
contrasting results.  Therefore, due to this mixed set of findings, H8a, the ability of 
simple targets to better align pay with performance, or the underlying agency theory, is 
not supported.  Consequently, this result does not support Locke et al. (1981) and 
Chidester and Grigsby (1984) who both reported that setting either difficult or specific 
goals was associated with increased performance.  Therefore, this study is unable 
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confirm, with any degree of certainty, that simple targets facilitate CEO focus, 
shareholder monitoring, and identifying achievement.  As a result, it may be inferred that 
simplicity, through improved transparency and closer shareholder monitoring, may not 
consistently limit executive discretion and by extension may not tighten the pay-
performance gap.   
 
To restate H8b, complex targets will be negatively related to firm performance.  By 
implication, therefore, these mixed results (see Figures 85 to 92 also) do not support this 
hypothesis or the power model underpinning it.  Consequently, this result is unable to 
corroborate Yearta et al’s (1995) findings which suggest that complexity may complicate 
the decision-making process and influence performance.  Furthermore, results do not 
verify Emsley’s (2003) assertion that as the number of goals increase performance 
deteriorates.  As a result, complex targets may not consistently dilute CEO incentives, 
create opportunities for powerful CEOs, encourage CEO discretion, and widen the pay-
performance gap.  In contrast to the power model, it may be inferred that entrenched 
CEOs may not automatically prefer complex targets because they are opaque and easier 
to manipulate.   
 
Consequently, simple targets are, in general, associated with small bonuses whereas 
complex targets are linked with large bonuses.  Due to inconclusive results, however, the 
relationship between simple/complex targets and firm performance is difficult to 
determine.  Therefore, having now discussed the association between the different 
payment forms and performance targets with pay and performance, this next section 
addresses additional CG factors that previous research identifies as contributing to the 
pay-performance relationship. 
 
6.6. BONUS AND GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Sections 6.6.1 to 6.6.5 discuss the five main governance variables (including the ratio of 
NEDs on the remuneration committee, CEO presence on the nominations committee, 
CEO/Chair duality, tenure, and power), which have been identified in the existing 
literature (see section 2.4) as making a significant contribution to pay and performance. 
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6.6.1. Remuneration committee NEDs  
Results reveal that NEDs dominate the composition of remuneration committees with 
8.4% of firms having insiders.  This suggests that most, if not all, firms in this sample are 
adhering to the recommendations set out in the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), and 
Hampel (1998) reports respectively, and potentially reaping the benefits from adopting a 
non-executive board.  However, results from the single period and panel regressions are 
insignificant, and do not support H9a, which predicts that a high percentage of NEDs will 
reduce the value of the bonus, or the agency theory that lies behind it.   
 
Consequently, in accordance with research conducted by Mangel and Singh (1993), this 
study suggests that the percentage of NEDs that sit on the remuneration committee has 
no significant association with executive bonus pay.  Furthermore, in contrast to Conyon 
and Peck (1998), a higher proportion of NEDs serving on the committee may not better 
align pay with performance.  Therefore, it may be suggested that NEDs are not as 
independent as much of the earlier research suggests but potentially more akin to 
insiders. 
 
Similarly, H9b, which argues that a lower proportion of NEDs will increase the value of 
the bonus, or the underlying power model, is not supported.  As a result, a higher 
proportion of NEDs may not be more representative of shareholder interests, more 
objective, or better monitors.  At the same time, the board may not be composed of 
sympathetic NEDs.  Consequently, in contrast to O'Reilly et al. (1988) and Daily et al. 
(1998), it may be inferred that the composition of the remuneration committee may not 
be a major determinant of CEO bonus pay.   
 
6.6.2. CEO presence on the nominations committee 
Results indicate that 32.3% (n = 97) of firms actively prevent the CEO from sitting on 
the nominations committee whereas in 67.7% (n = 203) of firms the CEO is eligible to sit 
on the committee.  This result suggests that CEOs, in a majority of firms in the sample, 
are in a strong position to co-opt board members.  In general, results from the single 
period and panel regressions are insignificant.  However, single period regression results 
for the executive directors in 2001/02, found that the presence of the CEO on the 
 248
nominations committee is negatively correlated with bonus pay.  Therefore, CEO 
presence on the committee is associated with a 4% reduction in the size of the annual 
bonus relative to salary and, in absolute terms, implies a drop in bonus at the median pay 
level of £14,104.  Significantly, this result suggests that a CEO’s presence on the 
committee, who arguably can hand pick board members that are sympathetic to their own 
interests, does not automatically result in large bonuses.   
 
Consequently, it may be inferred that executive or insider nominations who provide first-
hand, in-depth company knowledge, and bring a recognizable emotional commitment to, 
and involvement with, the company (Demb & Neubauer, 1992), facilitate the decision-
making process by removing the ambiguities and conflicts that could otherwise arise 
when board composition is mixed.  As a result, this creates an environment that supports 
and is focused on raising shareholder value rather than CEO interests and the exploitation 
of corporate resources to extract greater rents.  Therefore, this conclusion offers limited 
support for H10a, which predicts a negative association between CEO presence on the 
nominations committee and bonus value, and the underpinning agency theory.   
 
However, in contrast to Pfeffer (1981) and Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), manipulating 
nominations may not be an effective means of building or protecting power bases or 
legitimising decisions that may not be in the best interest of owners.  Consequently, it 
may be inferred that CEOs, who have an active presence on the nominations committee, 
are very much aware of their duties to shareholders.  Therefore, it is unlikely that CEOs 
may be co-opting the board by favouring the appointment of sympathetic new directors 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989) as one strategy in order to enhance board support for 
their initiatives and decisions, minimise the risk of dissention (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), 
and extract rents which are not in line with performance.  As a result H10b, which argues 
that CEO presence on the nominations committee will be positively associated with 
bonus pay, or the power model that underpins it, is not supported.  However, these results 
do indicate that CEO pay may be influenced by the social and psychological dynamics 
that operate within the inner circle of corporate leaders (Westphal & Zajac, 1997). 
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6.6.3. CEO/Chair duality 
Results indicate that only 5% of CEOs (n = 15) also operate as chairman of the board, 
whereas the remaining 95% (n = 285) function solely as CEO.  This suggests that most, 
if not all, firms are adhering to the recommendations set out in the Cadbury (1992), 
Greenbury (1995), and Hampel (1998) reports respectively, and aware of the pitfalls of 
adopting a dual role.   
 
As mentioned in section 3.9.3, CEO/Chair duality may be interpreted by agency theory 
as being consistent with an efficient arrangement involving synergy.  Alternatively, it 
may be seen as just another dimension of the variety of ways in which CEOs exert their 
power over the firm at the expense of shareholders.  
 
Looking first at the agency view, which underlies H11a and predicts that CEO/Chair 
duality will be negatively associated with bonus pay, results from the single period and 
panel regressions are, in general, insignificant.  However, single period regression results 
for the executive directors in 2001/02, show that CEO/Chair duality is positively 
associated with bonus.  It may be suggested that, on average, companies who allow the 
CEO to operate as chairman of the board is associated with a 10% increase in the size of 
the bonus relative to salary, which in absolute terms is associated with a rise in bonus pay 
at the median pay level equalling £33,835.  Significantly, CEO/Chair duality is related to 
larger bonuses.   
 
In line with Weisbach (1988), this study confirms that CEO/Chair duality may be 
responsible for assisting in the entrenchment of CEOs, which enables them to exploit 
firm resources in order to further their own interests.  This dual role may also allow 
entrenched CEOs to control the nominations process, which facilitates the consideration 
of new directors that are sympathetic to their interests (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  
Often seen as an indicator of CEO power over a board (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), 
this study agrees with the views outlined by Sora and Natale (2004) who argue that 
merging the roles of the CEO and chairman into one individual is a recipe for corruption 
and the misuse of power to extract greater rents.  
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Therefore, in contrast to the agency view, the results of this study do not support the view 
that CEO/Chair duality facilitates the decision-making process by removing the 
ambiguities and conflicts that could otherwise arise where power is shared.  Furthermore, 
in conflict with Harrison et al. (1988) who suggest that the increase in power and 
responsibility that the combined position affords is accompanied by an increase in 
accountability, it is inferred that this increase in accountability may not limit the misuse 
of power to extract greater bonuses regardless of the level of performance.   
 
However, this result does offer limited support for H11b, which argues that CEO/Chair 
duality will be positively associated with bonus pay, and the power model that lies 
behind it.  This finding is supplemented by additional studies (see Main, 1991; Boyd, 
1994; Core et al., 1999; Bebchuk et al., 2001) who found that CEO/Chair duality was 
positively related with executive pay.  Therefore, in accordance with Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) and Rechner and Dalton (1991), a dual role may increase CEO power, 
restrict board independence, reduce its ability to fulfil its governance function, and may 
constitute a conflict of interest.  Consequently, the combined role may weaken 
shareholder monitoring and, by extension, may lead to behaviour that is self-interested 
and the abuse of corporate assets in order to deliver bonuses that are misaligned with 
performance.   
 
6.6.4. Tenure 
In line with Charkham’s (2001) findings, the median number of years a CEO will remain 
on the board is 8.  In general, the relation between bonus pay and tenure is insignificant.  
This result is supported by Deckop (1988) and Mangel and Singh (1993) who both 
reported that tenure was not a significant determinant of executive pay.  In addition, 
Lippert and Porter (1997) found a negative relationship between tenure and bonus pay.  
Consequently, regressions (single period and panel) provide support for H12a, which 
predicts that bonus pay will not be positively associated with tenure, and the 
underpinning agency theory.  According to Buchholtz et al. (2003), long-periods of 
tenure may enhance a CEO’s level of firm-specific human capital, which may manifest 
itself in greater expertise and experience and a CEO who is better qualified to enhance 
shareholder value.  Furthermore, it may be suggested that as tenure increases, the CEO 
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may be more willing to receive compensation in the form of stock and options.  
Therefore, it may be inferred that length of tenure may have a greater association with 
long-term aspects of CEO pay as opposed to short-term bonuses. 
 
By implication, this result does not support H12b or the power model that underlies it.  
This hypothesis argues that bonus will be positively associated with tenure and contrasts 
with the findings of Murphy (1986a), H. D. Platt (1987) Henderson and Fredrickson 
(1996), Lippert and Porter (1997), and Wright et al. (2002) who all found a significant 
positive relationship between executive pay and tenure.  Nevertheless, it may be inferred 
that, in contrast to power theory, extended periods of tenure may not automatically allow 
the CEO to control the board or provide opportunities to exert their social influence in 
order to weaken the pay-performance relationship.  
 
6.6.5. Executive power 
Results indicate that 78% (n = 234) of CEOs operate within a weak governance 
framework (as defined in section 5.1, page 97) and, subsequently, occupy a strong 
executive position in the firm.  The remaining 22% (n = 66) function within a strong 
governance framework and, consequently, occupy a weak position in the firm.  This 
suggests that a vast majority of companies practice weak governance and, in general, 
CEOs have a powerful position in firms.  However, regressions (single period and panel) 
are insignificant and lend support for H13a, which predicts that power will be negatively 
associated with bonus, and the underlying agency theory.  
 
Consequently, this result suggests that entrenchment (e.g. dual roles and extensive 
tenure) and the cooptation of new directors may better align the pay-performance 
relationship.  For example, a CEO who is more knowledgeable and experienced with 
extensive contacts may improve firm performance to the benefit of company 
shareholders.  Therefore, it may be inferred that, on an agency view, power may have a 
greater association with long-term pay strategies rather than short-term annual bonuses.   
 
In contrast to Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Shen (2003), power may not increase over 
time nor will a CEO become entrenched without the intervention of a vigilant board.  
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Therefore, in contrast to popular belief (see Murphy, 2002; Dedman, 2003; Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2004), it may be inferred that increased power will not enhance a CEOs ability to 
exercise unfettered power through the exploitation of corporate assets, the manipulation 
of captive directors, and the extraction of greater rents.  Consequently, H13b in this 
context, which argues that power will be positively associated with bonus, or the power 
model that underpins it, is not supported.   
 
In summary, these peripheral governance mechanisms indicate that, apart from CEO 
presence on the nominations committee and CEO/Chair duality in 2001/02 only, CG 
factors, in general, have a negligible impact on bonus pay.  Therefore, in contrast to 
much of the research and opinion from both academics and practitioners alike, which 
consistently highlight the importance of strong CG as a means of controlling pay and 
performance, CG in this study is of less significance.  Therefore, it may be inferred that 
many of the negative views, which surround the CEO in relation to the power model are 
exaggerated.  It would appear that governance frameworks do not detract from the fact 
that CEOs may have an inherent drive to be respected and successful stewards of their 
firm’s assets.   
 
However, it may also be argued that this lack of association is indicative of governance 
mechanisms working effectively.  Unfortunately, the evidence does not support this 
claim.   It could, therefore, be concluded that shareholders wishing to impose tougher, 
more open performance conditions are wasting their time, since they mainly leave pay-
performance sensitivities unaffected. 
 
Significantly, two control variables (the finance industry and American CEOs) in the 
single period regressions were found to be positively and significantly associated with 
bonus pay.  This result did not extend to the panel regressions.  Essentially, firms in the 
finance sector clearly show a tendency towards higher cash pay, after allowing for 
performance.  Similarly, firms with American CEOs seem to offer a cash pay premium. 
 
This concludes the discussion of the project’s results. The next chapter proposes 
conclusions in relation to the main findings and also highlights any limitations in the 
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study.  It will also offer some recommendations to practitioners and academics on 
practice and policy and future research.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS 
This chapter will summarise the main findings discussed in chapter 6 and propose 
conclusions and recommendations for practice and policy.  At the same time, it will 
highlight the limitations of the study and make recommendations for future research.  To 
aid the reader, Table 19 overleaf presents each hypothesis in chapter 3 and the results 
from the tests performed in chapters 5 and 6.   
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Table 19. Summary of results (descriptive, single and/or panel regressions) in relation to hypotheses.
Hypotheses Support Positive effect of independent variable on bonus 
Negative effect of independent variable on 
bonus 
H1a: bonus positively associated with firm performance 
Yes 
 
EPS (elasticity) = 0.51% 
TSR (elasticity & sensitivity) = 0.22 & 0.022 
10% increase in TSR associated with 
£2,638 rise in bonus 
 
H1b: bonus negatively associated with firm performance Not detected   
H2a: bonus not positively associated with firm size Yes (weak)  Firm size not associated with bonus 
H2b: bonus positively associated with firm size Not detected   
H3a: bonus not positively associated with cash form of 
payment Yes  
Cash bonuses associated with 13% or 
£69,125 reduction in bonus 
H3b: bonus positively associated with cash form of payment Not detected   
H4a: share-based bonuses positively associated with firm 
performance Yes (weak) 
Share-based bonuses associated with 
strong firm performance  
H4b: cash bonuses negatively associated with firm 
performance Yes (weak)  
Cash bonuses associated with weak firm 
performance 
H5a: bonus negatively associated with hard targets Yes  Hard targets associated with reduced bonus 
H5b: bonus positively associated with soft targets Yes Soft targets associated with large bonus  
H6a: firm performance positively associated with hard targets  Yes Hard targets associated with strong firm performance  
H6b: firm performance negatively associated with soft targets Yes  Soft targets associated with weak firm performance 
H7a: bonus negatively associated with simple targets Yes  Simple targets associated with reduced bonus 
H7b: bonus positively associated with complex targets Yes Complex targets associated with 15% or £82,397 rise in bonus  
H8a: firm performance positively associated with simple 
targets Not detected   
H8b: firm performance negatively associated with complex 
targets Not detected   
H9a: more NEDs negatively associated with bonus Not detected   
H9b: fewer NEDs positively associated with bonus Not detected   
H10a: CEO on nominations committee negatively associated 
with bonus Yes (weak)  
CEO on nominations committee associated 
with 4% or £14,104 reduction in bonus 
H10b: CEO on nominations committee positively associated 
with bonus Not detected   
H11a: bonus negatively associated with CEO/Chair duality Not detected   
H11b: bonus positively associated with CEO/Chair duality Yes (weak) CEO/Chair duality associated with 10% or £33,835 rise in bonus  
H12a: bonus not positively associated with tenure Yes  Bonus not associated with length of tenure 
H12b: bonus positively associated with tenure Not detected   
H13a: power negatively associated with bonus Yes  Bonus not associated level of executive power 
H13b: power positively associated with bonus Not detected   
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7.1. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Guidelines on bonus pay outlined in government-backed reports such as Greenbury 
(1995) or the advice communicated by large institutional investors like the ABI (2002) 
stress that executives should not be automatically entitled to bonuses nor should it 
become a guaranteed element of remuneration.   
 
In this context, this study has found that a positive bonus pay/TSR and EPS performance 
relation holds.  Therefore, shareholders and other stakeholders may be satisfied that 
bonuses have not been an automatic entitlement but have indeed been earned through 
firm performance.  Consequently, an advocate of the agency perspective on the role of 
executive bonus would draw positive inferences from the significant relationship overall 
between CEO bonus pay and a firm’s financial performance.   
 
Therefore, in accordance with B. J. Hall and Liebman (1998), this result contradicts the 
claim that CEO contracts are widely inefficient due to the lack of association between 
pay and performance.  As B. J. Hall and Liebman (1998) state, it would appear that in 
general the fortunes of the CEO are inherently linked to the fortunes of the companies 
that they manage.  Consequently, the evidence suggests that bonus pay tends not to be a 
guaranteed element of compensation but is contingent upon performance, a view echoed 
by Sturman and Short (2000).   
 
However, according to Conyon (1995; 1997a), many of the studies on executive pay and 
performance show that it is difficult to isolate a robust relationship, or infer direction of 
causation, and even when a link can be determined the quantitative impact appears to be 
negligible.  Significantly, this study is no different and, despite a positive pay-
performance relationship, the association remains relatively weak.  Therefore, this study 
supports the caveat expressed in a recent article published by IDS, which stressed that 
performance-related pay schemes do not always deliver expected results (Taylor, 2005).  
Consequently, this weak association may provide some entrenched CEOs with 
opportunities to exploit the pay-performance relationship.  As a result, in order to prevent 
this potential abuse, it is recommended that current and future pay schemes, especially 
short-term bonuses, are continually monitored and revised in the light of this possibility.  
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In this context, it seems important to monitor the detailed characteristics of bonus 
schemes, governance mechanisms and their association with bonus pay and firm 
performance. 
 
For example, in line with agency theory, cash payments are not positively related to the 
actual value of the annual bonus.  Therefore, it may be argued that, in contrast to the 
power model, short-term bonuses are not a regular and permanent addition to salary that 
is unearned or any more vulnerable to manipulation by self-serving, entrenched 
executives than other forms of remuneration.  Consequently, in contrast to Grant (2003), 
this study suggests that (cash) bonuses are not entirely responsible for the persistent rise 
in CEO pay.  As a result, it is recommended that cash bonuses, as one form of short-term 
reward, are not devalued and left idle based on the misconception that they are easily 
manipulated and exploited, but continue to be used as an effective remuneration strategy 
to incentivise CEOs and help to align pay with performance.   
 
However, some caution is needed.  The results linking cash bonuses with firm 
performance, although mixed, show partial support for a negative association.  Therefore, 
it may be argued that cash bonuses encourage short-term achievement rather than long-
term improvements in shareholder value (Rajagopalan, 1996) and, consistent with power 
theory, may be adopted by entrenched executives as one way to avoid objective 
performance-related targets.  Consequently, it is recommended that cash bonuses are not 
used as the only method of remuneration but supplemented by long-term share-based 
strategies. 
 
In contrast, share-based payments are positively associated with the actual value of the 
annual bonus.  This result is supported by agency theory and suggests that compensating 
through deferred methods may be one way to align the interests of the CEO with those of 
the shareholder.  In effect, CEOs are being paid like owners in order to act like owners 
(Berle & Means, 1991; B. J. Hall, 2000; Ezzamel & Watson, 2002).   
 
However, the results linking long-term payments with firm performance found in this 
study were similarly mixed.  This may be explained in terms of methodology whereby a 
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two-year data sample is too short a time frame to accurately measure any long-term 
effect or because the data does not document a long-term payment figure e.g. stock 
option or LTIP value.  Also, a volatile stock market may contribute to this discrepancy.  
In line with earlier studies (see Berle & Means, 1991; B. J. Hall, 2000), partial support is 
given to the positive association between long-term pay and stock market performance.  
Therefore, as agency theory would predict, it may be argued that share-based bonuses 
(rather than cash bonuses) may be more effective at aligning pay with performance. 
 
In summary, this evident ambiguity may create opportunities for powerful CEOs to 
extract rents that are not in keeping with the actual performance of the firm.  
Consequently, it is recommended that cash bonuses and share-based bonuses are 
continually monitored by vigilant shareholders and, when possible, are not used as 
solitary incentives but as complementary reward schemes.  It is suggested that the 
deficiencies of each payment will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of 
another.   
 
Many argue that firm size is the most compelling explanation of executive pay (Berle & 
Means, 1991).  However, by using a composite bonus pay figure, this study has found 
that although firm size may change, the proportion of bonus pay relative to salary does 
not vary.  This suggests that both large and small firms pay out proportionally similar 
bonuses. 
 
Regulators, institutional investors and shareholders have for some time been 
championing for greater transparency of remuneration details of corporate elites in order 
to ensure that CEO reward is fair and in line with firm performance.  It may be suggested 
that this pressure on companies to improve their disclosure of compensation details may 
have contributed to the positive association between bonus pay and firm performance 
found in this study.   
 
In particular, transparency in bonus schemes (in relation to hard and simple targets) is 
positively associated with firm performance, on an agency view.  This all suggests that 
CEO bonuses offer a strong and consistent basis for the alignment of principals’ and 
 259
agents’ interests. While bonus hardness and simplicity is associated positively with 
performance, results suggest that detailed bonus scheme characteristics are generally 
insensitive to this relationship.  Bonus schemes in the UK continue to become softer and 
more complex with the former referring to internal or unspecified targets, whereas the 
later refers to the use of multiple targets.  These targets may create opportunities for 
executives to act self-interestedly, mask weak performance, abuse corporate assets and, 
ultimately, extract rents that are not aligned with performance.  Consequently, although a 
multi-dimensional performance measurement system may represent a more accurate 
definition of the organisation’s goals (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998), this study would 
recommend that hard targets which are less amenable to tampering and simple targets 
that are easier to communicate, follow and monitor, should be adopted more frequently 
by large firms.  Essentially, it may be suggested that these targets will encourage the 
CEO to behave more consonantly with shareholder interests. 
 
Of course IPEs, where boards have some discretion over the amount of bonus paid 
against unspecified targets, may succeed in theory, especially where the nature of the 
business makes it advisable to keep CEO targets confidential.  Nevertheless, the 
implication of this thesis is that, on balance, transparency in the form of hardness and 
simplicity (i.e. external or published targets that are easy to communicate, understand 
and monitor) generate the best results. 
 
In general, CG as a moderator of executive pay was insignificant in this study.  It could, 
therefore, be concluded that regulators, institutional investors and shareholders expecting 
firms to follow the tenets associated with strong CG (e.g. independent boards, non-
CEO/Chair duality, limited involvement of the CEO in the nominations process, and 
reduced tenure) may be wasting their time, since they mainly leave pay-performance 
sensitivities unaffected.  However, it is suggested that through the application of strong 
CG it may be possible to at least indirectly influence the form in which the bonus is 
received (i.e. cash or shares) and the type of targets used (i.e. hard/soft and/or 
simple/complex) as one way of controlling CEO behaviour.   
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This finding also contrasts with some of the recommendations discussed by Conyon et al. 
(1995) who call for the expulsion of all executives on the remuneration committee and an 
open selection process for NEDs, which would mean prohibiting the CEO from sitting on 
the nominations committee.  However, it is possible that weak governance may foster the 
rise of powerful CEOs who may exploit their position and due to the relative impotence 
of the shareholder and stakeholder this study suggests that continued vigilance and 
control is still needed.   
 
Finally, this study challenges part of Murphy’s (2002) claim that the managerial power 
model is problematic as a theoretical approach and too simplistic to explain executive 
pay practices.  In terms of theory, the power model has not been problematic and, in fact, 
has proved to be particularly useful in some cases.  For example, explaining the 
relationship between soft targets and firm performance (H6b) and complex targets and 
the bonus value (H7b).  However, although the hypotheses based on the power 
perspective were not supported in general, the model nevertheless facilitates a fuller 
discussion of the pay-performance relationship than would otherwise be the case if 
agency theory were used exclusively.  Therefore, it may be argued that agency theory 
needs to be developed and extended so that the findings in H6b and H7b may be 
explained.   
 
Alternatively, it may be suggested that this lack of support is potentially due to the 
simplicity of the power approach to explain the intricacies associated with pay practices 
and subsequent performance of the firm that Murphy (2002) alludes to.  For example, 
independent boards do not automatically reduce executive pay levels, and newly 
appointed CEOs enjoy just as attractive, if not better, remuneration packages than 
incumbent executives that are expected to use their influence over the board to extract 
rents.  However, in general, this study argues that both theories are needed in order to 
fully explain the pay-performance relation. 
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7.2. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is acknowledged that this study has a number of potential limitations.  The limitations, 
proposed amendments and recommendations for future research will be discussed under 
the following headings: research design and variable changes.    
 
7.2.1. Research design 
It is evident that this study’s main focus is on short-term remuneration (i.e. bonus pay).  
However, it is widely accepted that long-term, more deferred payments such as equity 
holdings, stock options, etc, have come to dominate executive pay (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990; Blair, 1995; Tosi et al., 1997), and may be an important influence on firm 
performance not considered here.  Therefore, it is recommended that future research on 
short-term incentives include long-term pay strategies (even as a control variable) in 
order to complement the analysis and provide a more holistic explanation of the pay-
performance relation.  This view is echoed by McKnight (1996).  At the same time, the 
valuation of long-term rewards such as executive stock options and LTIPs is a tortuous 
and controversial process, with one year of data demanding one researcher-year of effort 
(Buck et al., 2003). In any case, long-term incentives may have little effect on year-on-
year variations.  
 
This study collected data over a two-year period, which in relation to investigating pay 
and performance over the short-term may be deemed appropriate.  However, it is 
recommended that future research extend the years of data collected to a 5 to 10 year 
panel.  A difficulty associated with this proposed extension is the accessibility to the 
required information.  Under the Companies Act of 1985 companies were required to 
disclose salary details for the highest paid director and total emoluments for all other 
directors.  Additional details with regard to payment methods, performance targets, etc, 
were left to the companies’ discretion.  However, since 1985 through various government 
initiatives like the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports, disclosure 
requirements for publicly listed firms has steadily improved.  Despite this development, 
it is highly likely that much of this compensation data will be incomplete and these gaps 
may weaken the effectiveness of this research proposal.  Nevertheless, a longitudinal 
study on the association between short-term pay and performance and examining its 
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durability over the long-term is an interesting research scope and, at the same time, may 
increase the study’s level of robustness. 
 
Consistent with much of the research on executive pay, access to main board executive 
directors is difficult if not impossible.  Nevertheless, a valuable contribution to executive 
remuneration would be to examine how executives perceive themselves to be motivated 
through annual bonuses.  This may be achieved through interviews or 
psychological/motivational surveys.  Again, access will be the single most important 
factor that will hamper this research endeavour. 
 
Although this study does, to some extent, compare UK findings with American data, 
another valuable area for comparison is with Europe e.g. Germany or across regions.  
The institutional, cultural and regulatory norms surrounding executive remuneration are 
very different across the economic triad: Europe, America, and Austral-Asia.  Limited 
evidence in this study showed American CEOs and American companies tended to have 
significantly higher bonus payments, which suggests country variations exist.  This view 
is supported by Teather (2005) who found that British pay scales are dwarfed by the cash 
and perks lavished on executives in corporate America.  Therefore, direct international 
comparisons may create opportunities for countries to learn from the successes and/or 
failures of alternative remuneration practices and policies.  Equally, it may create a better 
understanding of the role the institution and company play in constructing remuneration 
packages, the cultural differences, and international effects.  
 
This study consists of a relatively large and broad sample of executive directors in 
addition to the CEO, who is often the focus of most studies on executive pay (Ezzamel & 
Watson, 2002).  However, shareholder dissent was recently even stronger on the issue of 
non-executive pay at the AGM of Royal London (Thornhill, 2005).  Therefore, it is 
recommended that future samples exploring executive pay-performance relations be 
extended to include all NEDs that sit on the board of directors.  It is suggested that this 
extension will explore what has become an interesting and topical debate in the sense 
that: are the custodians of shareholder welfare remunerated appropriately in order to 
maximise shareholder value?  At the same time, it is believed that this approach may 
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enhance our understanding of remuneration packages in general and, in particular, 
indicate not only how these remuneration strategies may differ, compare, and integrate 
with the executive population, but how well aligned they may be with firm performance.  
It might also be valuable to look qualitatively at how these NEDs operate.   However, 
access will restrict this proposal. 
 
The sample framework used in this study is the FTSE-350.  This sample is representative 
of medium to large UK firms.  It is recommended that in order to gain a more complete 
picture of remuneration practices and policies and how well aligned they may be with 
firm performance, across the UK, it is necessary to collect data on small firms.  It is 
believed that the inclusion of small firms into any future research will improve the 
generalisations that can be made from the study.  For example, Bacon et al. (1996) argue 
that studying human resource practices in small businesses is no less important than 
those in large organisations.  Essentially, the small business sector, which has been 
traditionally marginalized, has become increasingly important economically and 
politically and an area that is open to new research.  However, it is acknowledged that 
ascertaining the relevant information from small firms is difficult due to the problems 
associated with obtaining the relevant management, share price, and company data.  
 
Finally, in this study, CG as a moderator of executive pay was insignificant.  
Nevertheless, CG remains an important determinant in shaping executive pay and 
continues to be a valuable mechanism that can potentially limit executive entrenchment 
and opportunism.  Therefore, it is suggested that future research look more closely at the 
interaction effects between the individual governance mechanisms. 
 
7.2.2. Variable changes 
Although TSR is a primary benchmark for shareholders and investors in assessing firm 
performance (see McKnight, 1996; Pass et al., 2000; Conyon et al., 2001), it is 
acknowledged that as a short-term measure of performance TSR is weak.  This was, 
however, compensated for by including EPS in the analysis.  Nevertheless, TSR is more 
commonly found in long-term assessments of economic performance and, therefore, it is 
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recommended that future studies, analysing short-term performance, use indicators that 
are more agreeable over the short-term such as alternative group profit targets.    
 
In order to prevent zero values from being excluded from the analysis, a logarithm 
equation was used, which estimates changes in the bonus through relative changes in the 
executives total cash rewards holding salary constant (see page 84 for further details).  
Unfortunately, it transpired that this transformation of the bonus variable expressed as a 
proportion relative to salary had an important effect on the size variable i.e. total number 
of employees.  However, it is important that zero bonus values are not excluded from 
further studies as they potentially represent (non) payments for poor performance.  
Therefore, it is recommended that an alternative size variable be used, which may be less 
sensitive to this transformation e.g. sales turnover or total assets. 
 
As in the case of Conyon and Peck (1998), this study focused on a particular set of 
variables to include the presence (or absence) of board monitoring and vigilance.  
Therefore, this analysis excluded other indicators that may be important drivers of 
executive compensation e.g. equity ownership of executives.  It is recommended that a 
measure for the level of ownership be included in future research. 
 
Finally, the whole approach of this thesis could be described as being over-concerned 
with the perspective of shareholders and executives, to the exclusion of other important 
stakeholders.  In this study, level of employment is used as a proxy for firm size and was 
used as a control variable.  However, this variable may be used as a radically alternative 
measure of firm performance that could be considered as being important for employee 
stakeholders.  The results differed very little from the financial performance measures 
such as TSR and EPS.  It would appear, at least in the narrow ambit of this study of 
executive bonus, that executive reward packages that favour shareholders also favour 
employees, probably lenders and arguably suppliers and customers too.  All these 
stakeholders may benefit from executive bonus packages that are more transparent and 
that result in a more significant positive relation between bonus pay and firm financial 
performance. 
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In summary, this study has found that executive annual bonus pay is closely, albeit 
weakly, aligned with firm performance and, therefore, is an aspect of reward that is very 
much earned.  It also suggests that combining cash bonuses with share-based bonuses 
and adopting hard and simple targets, which are generally more transparent in nature tend 
to generate the best results.  Above all, this study acknowledges that executive excess 
cannot be entirely controlled through the design of remuneration packages and, hence, 
stresses the importance of continued vigilance by active shareholders.        
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APPENDIX 
INTERVIEWS AND TRANSCRIPTS 
As mentioned in the main report, six interviews with five pay and benefits mangers from 
the FTSE-350 sample and a remuneration consultancy was conducted during the months 
of June and July 2004.  The inclusion of these qualitative, semi-structured interviews into 
the research design was to validate the objectivity of the annual reports and inform some 
of the methodological choices. 
 
In relation to the former, the interviews confirmed specific details, which had been 
extracted from the company’s annual report on issues relating to CG (e.g. the CEO is not 
chairman of the board? There is an active remuneration committee made up solely of 
four NEDs? The CEO is a member of the nominations committee?), payment form (e.g. 
the annual bonus is paid in cash for 2001/02 and in 2002/03 the annual bonus is paid in 
cash, deferred shares and matching shares?), and performance target type (e.g. for 
2001/02 and 2002/03 the performance targets used include EPS, operating cash flow, 
operating profit, and individual performance?).  In general, the results from the 
interviews confirmed what was already documented in the company’s annual report and, 
therefore, no changes were made.  Based on this finding, the annual reports were 
considered to be a reliable source of data. 
 
With respect to the later, the interviews helped to clarify the value of some of the 
independent variables e.g. TSR, EPS and number of employees.  The opinions relating to 
TSR and EPS are outlined in the main report (see chapter 4, points 3 and 4, pages 84 to 
85).  However, in relation to number of employees this, originally, was considered to be 
a suitable measure of firm performance.  Prior to interviewing, there were some serious 
reservations about its value as an indicator of firm performance.  The results from the 
interviews were expected to assist the decision-making process.  In general, number of 
employees was considered inappropriate and misleading due to the many factors that can 
influence head count.  Following the interview process, number of employees was 
omitted as a measure of firm performance and used as an indicator of firm size only.   
 
The transcripts of these interviews are available upon request. 
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